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INTRODUCTION
The contemporary debate about race in the United States is perplexing. Each side seems genuinely to feel distressed at the demands
being made by the other. Racial minorities point to Dred Scott's' insistence on racial castes, Plessy's2 endorsement of official segregation,
and Brown's3 reluctance to remedy unlawful discrimination as evidence that the white majority is inevitably inclined to advance its own
interests at minority expense. Minority group members, therefore,
tend to argue that the only way to arrest this majoritarian inclination
is through the use of race-conscious remedial programs that will ensure an equitable distribution of resources. Most members of the
white majority concede past transgressions but warn of the need for
fairness in fashioning remedies, asserting that members of the present
majority rarely commit acts of overt discrimination, and that members
of the present minority are rarely among the actual victims of past
discrimination. Members of the white majority, therefore, tend to argue that the only way to end racial discrimination is through a prospective commitment to race neutrality, stressing the irony inherent
in using additional acts of racial discrimination to remedy the racial
discrimination of the past. Accordingly, the nation's debate about the
significance of race, which began with slavery and persisted through
the era of official segregation, has now converged on the contentious
issue of affirmative action. Most recently, the Supreme Court has
sided against racial minorities.
The Supreme Court's 1995 decision in Adarand Constructors,Inc.
v. Penal held that federal affirmative action programs are now subject
to strict scrutiny, just as state and local programs have been since
1989. This decision did not come as a surprise, because the political
realignment of the Court that occurred during the Reagan and Bush
Administrations made judicial invalidation of at least some affirmative
action programs seem inevitable. What did come as a surprise, however, is the vision of contemporary American culture on which the
Court chose to rest its ruling. Counterintuitive as it might initially
seem, the Court elected to treat racial inequality in the United States
1. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
2. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
3. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown 1) (invalidating separate-butequal public schools), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (Brown II) (ordering dismantling of segregated
school systems "with all deliberate speed").
4. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
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as a problem that has become atomistic rather than pervasive in nature. Consequently, the Court went on to regard continued race-conscious efforts to counteract inequality as themselves constituting acts
of pervasive racial discrimination. In so doing, the Court inverted the
concepts of affirmative action and discrimination so that the concept
of affirmative action acquired the negative cultural attributes typically
attributed to discrimination and discrimination acquired the positive
attributes formerly associated with affirmative action. This vision of
contemporary culture is highly artificial, and it undermines the soundness of the Adarand decision. Nevertheless, the Court remained committed to that artificial vision not only in Adarand, but in the other
race cases that it decided during the 1994-95 Term as well.
Ironically, Adarand itself provides compelling evidence of the
Supreme Court's error in asserting that the nation has now evolved to
a post-discriminatory stage of development in which prospective race
neutrality is appropriate. This is because the Adarand decision constitutes an act of official discrimination, embodying the very type of cultural inequality that the Court insists is no longer a cognizable
problem. As a pragmatic matter, Adarand entails a diversion by the
Supreme Court of societal resources from racial minorities to the
white majority, and this diversion is based solely on the grounds of
race. As a rhetorical matter, Adarand finds racial minorities to be
unworthy of legal protection from the same forms of cultural discrimination that the Court holds cannot be inflicted on whites, thereby reviving the precise stigma of inferiority that Brown held to be the core
ingredient of an equal protection violation.
Part I of this article describes the affirmative action debate: Part
I(A) outlines the arguments typically made by proponents and opponents of affirmative action; Part I(B) organizes the Supreme Court's
affirmative action cases by type and outcome, and identifies the voting
blocs that have developed on the Court; Part I(C) discusses the legal
issues that the Court has deemed significant in its affirmative action
decisions, and the effect that the Adarand decision is likely to have on
those issues.
Part II analyzes the rhetorical significance of Adarand and the
other racial discrimination cases that the Court decided during the
same Term: Part II(A) describes the Adarand case; Part II(B) discusses the Supreme Court's rejection of the Adarand presumption
that racial minorities remain socially and economically disadvantaged,
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arguing that this rejection constitutes a Supreme Court proclamation
that the United States has now become a post-discriminatory society.
Part III analyzes the doctrinal play that permitted such a startling
proclamation: Part III(A) argues that the Adarand Court has inverted
the concepts of affirmative action and discrimination in order to misappropriate societal resources from racial minorities, thereby engaging in the very type of racial discrimination that the Adarand
proclamation declares no longer to exist. Part III(B) then discusses
the irony inherent in the Court's expansion of judicial power over the
political process in an area where doctrinal incoherence makes the
governing legal principle inescapably political, and suggests that the
Court should defer to whatever resolution of the affirmative action
debate the political process is able to achieve. The article concludes
with an unsettling suspicion about the Supreme Court's likely motivation in Adarand.
The grip of the Supreme Court on the evolution of our social
norms is so strong that it is difficult to imagine the operation of contemporary culture without Supreme Court oversight of our normative
development. As a result, I am frequently thought to be advocating
Supreme Court protection of minority interests that is more vigilant,
and politically more liberal, than the protection proffered by the present Court.5 That is not my position, however. My position is that the
issue of how societal resources should be allocated between the majority and racial minorities is an issue that is quintessentially political.6
It is an issue whose resolution properly belongs to a process in which
the Supreme Court has no role to play, because-as Adarand demonstrates-Supreme Court involvement in that process provides an artificial boost to the interests of the white majority.7

5. See, e.g., Book Note: Race for Justice, 106 HARV. L. REv. 2015, 2018-19 (1993) (reviewA. SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE COURT: THE SUPREME COURT AND MINORITIES IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA (1993) and stating that Spann despairs the Supreme Court's
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reluctance to redistribute societal resources to racial minorities while failing adequately to explain where the Court derives power to reallocate societal resources). But see SPAN , RACE
AGAINST THE COURT: THE SUPREME COURT AND MINORITIES IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA, at

1-6, 85-86, 170-71(1993) (asserting that to the extent possible, the Supreme Court should have
no role to play in the political protection of racial minority interests).
6. See SPAN, supra note 5, at 1-6, 85-86, 170-71.

7. Lest one conclude that I am asserting a mere ipse dixit, this argument is developed at
length in SPANN, supra note 5. The present discussion of Adarandand the Supreme Court's other

1994-95 Term race cases is offered as a continuation of that extended argument.
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I.

AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

Affirmative action-the race-conscious allocation of resources
motivated by an intent to benefit racial minorities-is the hot topic in
contemporary racial politics.8 Black leaders have insisted on a continued national commitment to affirmative action;9 the University of California has terminated its three decades of affirmative action in hiring
and admissions; t0 the State of California has begun the process of considering a ballot initiative to ban it;" bills have been introduced in
Congress to make it illegal;' 2 Republican presidential hopefuls have

chosen to run
against it; 13 the Clinton Administration has chosen to
4
"review" it,

and then rhetorically to "reaffirm" it; 5 steadfast liberal

8. The present discussion is limited to programs involving racial affirmative action. These
programs are used primarily in the contexts of education, employment, and legislative apportionment. Other types of affirmative action programs exist for characteristics such as gender,
religion, sexual preference, and physical impairment. Still other affirmative action programs exist
for athletes, residents of particular states, children of alumni, and the like.
9. See, e.g., Howard Fineman, Race and Rage: Affirmative Action: Republicans Hope it
Will Drive a Wedge Between Liberal Democrats and White Swing Voters, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 3,
1995, at 25 (reporting that Jesse Jackson has protested threatened retreat from national commitment to affirmative action); John F. Harris, For Clinton, a Challenge of Balance, WASH. POST,
June 14, 1995, at Al, A6 (reporting that Jesse Jackson threatens rebellion if Clinton withdraws
support of affirmative action).
10. See B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., California Board Ends Preferences in College System,
N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 1995, at Al, A14; William Booth, U. of Calif Ends Racial Preferences:
Pioneerin Diversity Adopts Stance Urged by Gov. Pete Wilson, WASH. POST, July 21, 1995, at Al,
A13.
11. The proposed California Civil Rights Initiative would bar affirmative action preferences
that entailed any consideration of race, gender, ethnicity, or national origin in state hiring, contracting or education. See Fineman, supra note 9, at 24; Linda Greenhouse, By 5-4, Justices Cast
Doubts on U.S. ProgramsThat Give Preferences Based Upon Race: Debate Is Fueled: Rigorous
Criteria Set for Court's Approval of Such Programs, N.Y. TIMES, July 2,1995, at D25; Harris,
supra note 9, at Al; Nicholas Lemann, Taking Affirmative Action Apart, N.Y. TiMES MArAZINE, June 11, 1995, at 39; Abigail Thernstrom, A Class Backwards Ideal Why Affirmative Action
for the Needy Won't Work, WASH. POST, June 11, 1995, at Cl.

12. See Kevin Merida, Senate Rejects Gramm Bid to Bar Affirmative Action Set-Asides,
WASH. POST, July 21, 1995, at A13 (describing legislative efforts by Phil Gramm and Bob Dole to
reduce affirmative action); Lemann, supra note 11, at 62 (discussing repeal of FCC minority
distress sale tax certificate program); Thernstrom, supra note 11, at Cl (describing bill introduced by Rep. Charles T. Canady to end preferences in federal programs).
13. Republican presidential candidates for 1996, including Pat Buchanan, Phil Gramm,
Bob Dole, and former candidate Pete Wilson have made opposition to affirmative action essential components of their campaign strategies. See Fineman, supra note 9, at 24-25; Greenhouse,
supranote 11, at D25; Harris, supra note 9. at A6; Lemann, supra note 11 at 39, 54; Thernstrom,
supra note 11, at C1. In 1991, the governor of California, Pete Wilson, vetoed legislation that
encouraged the University of California to strive for ethnic diversity in admissions; and in 1995,
as part of his presidential campaign, Wilson issued an executive order abolishing some of California's existing affirmative action programs. See Lemann, supra note 11, at 39.
14. President Clinton responded to anti-affirmative action sentiment by Republicans and
right wing Democrats by ordering an "urgent, intensive" review of the federal government's
affirmative action programs. See Fineman, supra note 9, at 25; Lemann, supra note 11, at 39;
Thernstrom, supra note 11, at Cl.
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Democrats have loyally defended it;t6 and the American public has
become profoundly ambivalent about it.17 As with the defining racerelations issues for earlier generations-issues including miscegena2
tion, 18 integrated education, 19 official segregation, 20 and slavery the Supreme Court has endeavored to determine the social acceptability of affirmative action. In seeking to make this determination, the
Court has consulted the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution,22 as well as federal antidiscrimination statues such as Title VII.23

The arguments favoring and opposing affirmative action are easy
enough to state in ways that make them sound appealing. Because
neither the Constitution nor federal statutes speak unambiguously to
the issue, however, the Court has had great difficulty in its efforts to
produce a stable resolution of the affirmative action controversy. Nevertheless, several subsidiary issues have emerged, some of which the
Court purported to resolve in Adarand.

15. See John F. Harris. Clinton Avows Supportfor Affirmative Action, WASH. POST, July 20,
1995, at Al; Todd S. Purdum, PresidentShows Fervent Support For Goals of Affirmative Action,
N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1995, at Al.
16. See, e.g., Michael Kinsley, The Spoils of Victimhood: The Case Against the Case Against
Affirmative Action. NEW YORKER, Mar. 27. 1995. at 62 (favoring continued racial affirmative
action).
17. See DeNeen L. Brown, Gray in the Debate on Color: Many See Both Sides of Affirmative Action, WASH. POST, June 5, 1995, at Al, A12 (surveying attitudes on affirmative action);
Greenhouse, supra note 11, at D25 (affirmative action subject of vigorous debate in Congress
and states); Harris, supra note 9, at A7 (describing popular ambivalence about affirmative action); Louis Harris, Affirmative Action and the Voter, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 1995, at A13 (asserting
that Republicans are exploiting confusion among voters "between affirmative action," which
voters favor, and "preferences," which voters do not favor); Lemann, supra note 11, at 39-43, 5254.
18. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (invalidating state statute prohibiting racial
intermarriage).
19. See Brown , 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (invalidating separate-but-equal public schools);
Brown I1, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (ordering dismantling of segregated school systems "with all
deliberate speed").
20. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding racially segregated public facilities under separate-but-equal doctrine).
21. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (holding that blacks are not
citizens within meaning of Constitution and invalidating congressional restrictions on slavery
contained in Missouri Compromise).
22. The Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution provides that, "No State shall... deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend XIV,
§ 1.
23. The federal statute that speaks most directly to the issue of affirmative action is Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits, inter alia, discrimination in employment on
the basis of race. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. IV
1992).
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A.

Arguments

The arguments favoring and opposing affirmative action are both
rooted in the belief that racial discrimination is morally wrong, constitutionally impermissible under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and prohibited by federal antidiscrimination statutes such as
Title VII. Although each side in the affirmative action debate claims
that its position is traceable to the a priori proposition that race is
virtually always an impermissible legislative classification, the two
sides diverge when confronted with the problem of how to deal with
the issue of past discrimination. The way that one ultimately feels
about the competing arguments is likely to be determined by one's
metaphysical conception of equality, and by the instrumental consequences of favoring one argument over the other.2 4
1. Proponents
Proponents of affirmative action begin with the proposition that
racial discrimination is wrong because race is rarely, if ever, a legitimate basis on which to rest governmental classifications.' Unfortunately, however, racial discrimination has been persistently present
since the founding of the nation. 26 Much of this discrimination has
been officially mandated, by those laws regulating slavery27 and re24. 1 do not intend to suggest that compensation for past discrimination is the only, or even
the best, potential justification for affirmative action. Some have argued that the best justification for affirmative action is the need to avoid a permanent underclass that is identified by race,
regardless of the reason for the initial emergence of that underclass. Cf Kathleen M. Sullivan,
Comment. Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's Affirmative Action Cases, 100 HARV L. REV. 78,
91-98 (1986) (asserting that affirmative action is better justified as prospective effort at corrective justice than as a retrospective effort at retributive justice directed against those who are
guilty of past discrimination). Nevertheless, the remedy-for-past-discrimination justification is
the justification on which the Supreme Court, and most members of the public, appear to have
focused.
25. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273 (1986) (opinion of Powell,
J.) ("This Court has 'consistently repudiated "[d]istinctions between citizens solely because of
their ancestry" as being "odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality, "' " (quoting Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (quoting Hirabayashi v.
United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)))); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
355 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (asserting that
race is a relevant classification).
26. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097,2134-36 (1995) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting) (discussing the lingering effects of past discrimination); cf. id. at 2117 (majority
opinion of O'Connor, J.).
27. See, e.g., Bakke, 438 U.S. at 291 (opinion of Powell, J.) (discussing slavery origins of the
Fourteenth Amendment); id. at 326 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting
in part); id. at 387-90 (opinion of Marshall, J.). See generally A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, IN THE
MATTrER OF COLOR: RACE AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS (1978) (discussing laws regu-

lating slavery).
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quiring official segregation in the use of public facilities. 28 Although
the Supreme Court has been charged with the obligation of defending
the rights of racial minorities,2 9 it has not always done so.
The Court upheld and protected the institution of slavery in Dred
Scott v. Sandford.30 And when that case was "overruled" by the Civil
War and the subsequent Reconstruction amendments to the Constitution, the Court adopted narrow constructions of those amendments in
The Slaughter-House Cases,3 1and of Reconstruction statutes in subsequent cases; 32 and when the Court reviewed the first major piece of
Reconstruction legislation in The Civil Rights Cases, the Court held
the legislation invalid.33 The invalidation of the Civil Rights Act of
1866 permitted Jim Crow laws to perpetuate the economic and social
disadvantages of former black slaves. The Jim Crow laws matured
into a regime of official segregation that the Supreme Court upheld in
Plessy v. Ferguson,3 4 which endorsed the constitutionality of separatebut-equal public facilities? 5 During World War II, the Court again
acquiesced in the country's xenophobic aggression by validating the
internment of Japanese-American citizens in Korematsu v. United
28. See, e.g., Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2134-35 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing Plessy's
endorsement of official segregation); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 390-94 (opinion of Marshall, J.).
29. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (positing a
Supreme Court duty to protect "discrete and insular" minorities); see generally JoHNi HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DIsTRusT: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REvIEw 155-60 (1980) (discussing representation-reinforcement theory of judicial review as a means of protecting racial minorities).
30. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
31. The Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). In The Slaughter-House
Cases, the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments were narrowly construed due to federalism
concerns. See generally GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 483-85 (4th ed.
1992) (discussing The Slaughter-House Cases).
32. Subsequent Supreme Court decisions adopted limiting interpretations of Reconstruction statutes and amendments that were more racially motivated. See, e.g., United States v.
Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1882) (holding that Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 did not permit prosecution
of white lynch mob because Fourteenth Amendment did not reach private conduct); United
States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875) (criminal conspiracy provisions of Enforcement Act of
1870 did not permit prosecution for lynching blacks who were not engaged in act of petitioning
federal government as required by Fourteenth Amendment); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214
(1875) (criminal prosecution under Enforcement Act of 1870 against election officials for refusing to permit blacks to vote could not be maintained because Act was not expressly limited to
racially motivated election interference as required under Fifteenth Amendment). See generally
STONE ET AL, supra note 31, at 483-85 (discussing limiting effect of Supreme Court Reconstruction decisions on Reconstruction statutes and amendments).
33. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (invalidating provision of the Civil Rights Act
of 1866 on federalism grounds). See generally STONE ET AL., supranote 31, at 485-88 (discussing
The Civil Rights Cases).
34. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
35. In fact, contrary to popular understanding, Plessy did not actually impose a requirement
that separate facilities be equal. See infra note 284 (separate schools did not have to be equal).
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States.36

Although the Court nominally rejected Plessy in Brown v.
Board of Education37 by invalidating the practice of de jure segregated education, the Court delayed implementation of any meaningful
remedy for Brown3 8 and ultimately interpreted Brown to permit the
continued education of minority children in de facto segregated
schools that were measurably inferior to the schools in which white
39
children were educated.
This historical treatment of racial minorities as inferior has had a
pervasive effect on society, causing race to remain either a conscious
40
or an unconscious factor in virtually all societal decision making.
The racial attitudes that continue to emanate from the nation's long
history of discrimination have placed racial minorities in a disadvantaged position in the competition for societal resources. As a result,
minorities continue to be systematically underrepresented-relative
to the percentage of the population that they comprise-in the allocation of educational, employment, and political opportunities. 41 This
underepresentation, in turn, has caused racial minorities to have lower
standards of living, poorer health, higher vulnerability to crime, and
42
shorter life expectancies than members of the white majority.
Proponents of affirmative action contend that the only way to
compensate for the historical disadvantage of racial minorities is
through the prospective race-conscious allocation of educational, employment, and political resources to minorities through affirmative action programs. Mere prospective racial neutrality does not provided
adequate compensation for past inequities but simply freezes the ex36. Koremastu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
37. Brown 1, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (invalidating separate-but-equal public schools).
38. Brown 11, 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (ordering dismantling of segregated school systems "with
all deliberate speed").
39. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (refusing to order interdistrict school desegregation involving majority-black urban and majority-white suburban schools necessary to
meaningfully remedy desegregation of inner-city schools); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (upholding constitutionality of property tax-based public school financing despite drastic discrepancies in funds allocated to white and minority schools). See generally
SPANN, supra note 5, at 73-82 (discussing Supreme Court failure to desegregate northern
schools); id. at 109, 116 (discussing Supreme Court tolerance of racially disproportionate school
funding and consequent inferiority of minority schools).
40. See Charles Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 317-44 (1987). Professor Lawrence has emphasized the
unconscious nature of much contemporary racial discrimination.
41. See SPANN, supra note 5, at 120-22 (discussing underrepresentation of racial minorities
in allocation of societal resources).
42. See id. (discussing lower levels of health and safety to which racial minorities are
vulnerable).
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isting advantages that the white majority has over racial minorities.4 3
Once affirmative action programs have neutralized this unfair advantage, those programs can be terminated and all races can coexist on
equal terms in a colorblind society."

2. Opponents
Opponents of affirmative action also begin with the proposition
that racial discrimination is wrong because race is rarely, if ever, a
legitimate basis on which to rest governmental classifications. 4" It is
true that there have been ugly periods in American history during
which the nation has failed to honor this fundamental principle of racial equality by tolerating the institutions of slavery and official segregation. 46 It is also true that the Supreme Court has been implicated in
unfortunate acts of racial discrimination through the issuance of decisions such as Dred Scott, Plessy and Korematsu.47 Those decisions
serve as embarrassing reminders that the nation must exercise con-

43. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 473-74 (1980) (opinion of Burger, C.J.)
(Constitution permits remedies to prevent perpetuation of past discrimination); Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 326-27, 336, 355-73 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in
judgment in part and dissenting in part) (race neutrality is an aspiration rather than literal goal;
race-conscious remedies for past discrimination are constitutional); id. at 395-402 (opinion of
Marshall, J.).
44. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2129-30 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (contending that affirmative action will permit minorities to "graduate" into a status
where they can compete on equal terms); Fulilove, 448 U.S. at 485-89 (opinion of Burger, C.J.)
(stating that the Constitution permits affirmative action no broader than necessary to achieve
legitimate remedial goals); id. at 507-08 (Powell, J., concurring) (stating that the Constitution
does not permit Congress to enact a bare racial preference); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 400-02 (opinion
of Marshall, J.) (asserting that affirmative action is needed for minorities to achieve equality).
45. See, e.g., Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2106 (majority opinion of O'Connor, J.) ("The Court
observed-correctly-that 'distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by
their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of
equality,' and that 'racial discriminations are in most circumstances irrelevant and therefore prohibited."' (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)); id. at 2118-19 (Scalia,
J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (maintaining that government cannot have a
compelling interest in creating racial classifications, even to compensate for past discrimination);
id. at 2119 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (racial distinctions are
immoral and unconstitutional); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 518 (1989)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) ("The moral imperative of racial
neutrality is the driving force of the Equal Protection Clause."); id. at 521 (Scalia, J., concurring
in judgment) ("'[d]iscrimination on the basis of race is illegal, immoral, unconstitutional, inherently wrong, and destructive of democratic society."' (quoting ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE MoRALfrY OF CONSENT 133 (1975)).

46. See supra text accompanying notes 30-39.
47. See id.
[VOL.
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stant vigilance to avoid a recurrence of the racial discrimination that
characterized the dark side of the nation's history. 48
The principle of racial equality reflects the need to treat people as
individuals rather than as mere members of racial groups.4 9 Accordingly, the disadvantages that individual members of racial minority
groups have suffered as a result of identifiable acts of past discrimination should be neutralized through the implementation of make-whole
remedies that will fully compensate those individuals for the racial discrimination that they have been forced to endure." Remedies that go
beyond compensation for identifiable acts of racial discrimination,
however, and accord preferential treatment based on mere membership in a racial minority group, constitute the very same type of racial
51
discrimination that caused the need for a remedy in the first place.
In addition, such remedies harm the beneficiaries of affirmative action
by promoting dependence on government largess rather than self-sufficiency, and by stigmatizing beneficiaries as undeserving of the benefits and accomplishments that they secure.52
The types of official racial discrimination that existed in the past
unconstitutional and have been unconstitutional since 1954
now
are
48. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2117 (holding that vigilant strict scrutiny is necessary to prevent recurrence of racial discrimination such as that wrongly tolerated in Korematsu).
49. See, e.g., id. at 2111,2112-13 (the right to be free from racial discrimination is an individual rather than a group right, (citing Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 299 (1978)
(opinion of Powell, J.) (citing Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948))); Metro Broadcasting v.
FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 602, 609-10 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-94
(opinion of O'Connor, J.).
50. See, e.g., Croson, 488 U.S. at 518-19 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment) (rule limiting
racial preferences to what is necessary to compensate actual victims of discrimination is appealing); id. at 524-25 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (state can use racial classifications only to
compensate actual victims of state's own discrimination); cf. Local 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters
v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 535-45 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (Title VII remedies
that override seniority must be limited to actual victims of discrimination); Local 28, Sheet Metal
Workers Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 500 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Firefighters
Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 578-83 (1984).
51. See, e.g., Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113-14 (holding that overly broad race-based remedies
will foster resentment and delay the time when race will become a truly irrelevant factor); id. at
2118-19 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (race-based remedies
designed to "make up" for past discrimination reinforce racial discrimination); id. at 2119
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (racial discrimination is immoral
and unconstitutional whether invidious or benign); Croson, 488 U.S. at 524-28 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (racial remedies that go beyond what is necessary to
benefit actual victims of discrimination reinforce and perpetuate discrimination).
52. See, e.g., Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298-99 (opinion of Powell, J.) (affirmative action can harm
intended beneficiaries through stigmatization); cf. id. 438 U.S. at 358-62 (opinion of Brennan,
J.); United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 172-74 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring in part);
DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 340-41 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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when the Supreme Court rejected Plessy in Brown.53 As a result,
present affirmative action programs that divert resources from whites
in order to benefit members of historically disadvantaged racial minority groups actually end up punishing innocent whites who were not

the perpetrators of pre-Brown racial discrimination, to benefit contemporary minority group members who were not the actual victims
of pre-Brown discrimination.54 Such a race-conscious allocation of societal resources produces resentment in the minds of the innocent
whites who are burdened and feelings of inferiority and self-doubt in
the minds of the racial minority group members who benefit from

such arbitrary governmental action. This, in turn, generates friction
between whites and minority groups, as well as intergroup friction between the various minority groups that must compete with each other
for the resources set aside under race-based affirmative action programs."5 Ultimately, such frictions exacerbate rather than ameliorate
race-relations problems in contemporary culture. 6
Opponents of affirmative action contend that toleration of affirmative action programs that go beyond what is necessary to compensate
actual victims of discrimination spawns a vision of society that is
highly unappealing. Individuality becomes subordinated to group
identification, and the concept of merit becomes supplanted by quo-

53. See Brown 1, 347 U.S. 483 (1955) (overruling separate-but-equal doctrine of Plessy).
54. See, e.g., Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 612-17, 621-23, 630-31 (1990)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (objecting to over-and under-inclusiveness of remedies that do not
narrowly compensate for past discrimination as impermissibly burdening innocent whites); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 279-84 (1986) (opinion of Powell, J.) (opposing layoffs as an impermissible burden on innocent whites); id. at 294-95 (White, J., concurring in
judgment) (opposing layoffs of innocent whites to benefit minorities who were not actual victims
of discrimination); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 294-99 (1978) (opinion of
Powell, J.) (opposing racial preferences that impermissibly burden innocent whites); cf. Firefighters. 478 U.S. at 535-45 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (Title VII remedies that override seniority
must be limited to actual victims of discrimination); Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S at 500 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Stotts, 467 U.S. at 578-83.
55. See, e.g., Metro Broadcasting,497 U.S. at 603-04 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (danger of
racial classifications is that they contribute to racial hostility and reinforce stereotypes in way
that stigmatizes beneficiaries); Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-94 (opinion of O'Connor, J.); Bakke, 438
U.S. at 298-99 (opinion of Powell, J.); cf. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 313-19 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(recognizing but rejecting stigmatization and hostility arguments); United Jewish Orgs., 430 U.S.
at 172-74 (Brennan, J., concurring in part).
56. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2113-14 (1995) (overly
broad race-based remedies will foster resentment and delay time when race will become truly
irrelevant factor); id. at 2118-19 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (racebased remedies designed to "make up" for past discrimination reinforce racial discrimination);
Croson, 488 U.S. at 524-28 (racial remedies going beyond what is necessary to benefit actual
victims of discrimination reinforce and perpetuate discrimination).
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tas. 57 In the Brave New World58 of racial engineering, population proportionality will be politically correct, but jobs will cease to be
performed by those who are best qualified to perform them.5 9 In addition, educational opportunities will cease to go to those who are best
equipped to make good use of them,6" and political representation will
be distorted by the artificial elevation of racial considerations over
more substantive interests.6" The forced racial proportionality that
exists in such a society will have been purchased at the price of internal disaffection and racial Balkanization.6 2

3. Equipoise
The arguments favoring affirmative action and the arguments opposing it both have considerable appeal. Moreover, both sets of arguments seem equally consistent with the general principles of equality
and race neutrality. If one views equality as a concept that is to be

measured against a baseline established during the era of slavery or
official segregation, race-conscious affirmative action seems necessary
to equalize initial imbalances, thereby promoting equality more effectively than would simple prospective neutrality. If one elects, however, to establish the baseline for making equality determinations at a
point after the elimination of official segregation, thereby taking preexisting differences in the allocation of resources as a given, affirmative action seems like a racially discriminatory deviation from the
57. See, e.g., Croson, 488 U.S. at 507-08 (opinion of O'Connor, J.) (quotas reflect stereotyped thinking about racial minorities); id. at 526-27 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (quotas
derogate human dignity and individuality (citing BICKEL, supra note 45, at 133)); Bakke, 438
U.S. at 272-75, 315-19 (opinion of Powell, J.) (permitting consideration of race but opposing
quotas).
58. See generally ALDOUS HuxLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (1932) (source of Brave-New-

World metaphor).
59. Cf Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2102-04 (describing affirmative action program as encouraging the award of construction contracts to minority subcontractors rather than to low bidders
able to perform them most cheaply); Croson, 488 U.S. at 477-86 (describing minority set aside
program requiring award of construction contracts to minority subcontractors rather than to low
bidders able to perform them most cheaply); Wygant, 476 U.S. at 270-73 (opinion of Powell, J.)
(describing affirmative action program requiring layoffs of more experienced teachers in order
to retain less experienced minority teachers).
60. Cf. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 272-81 (opinion of Powell, J.) (describing affirmative action program reserving medical school seats for disadvantaged minority applicants rather than making
them available for better qualified white applicants).
61. Cf. Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2483-85 (1995) (describing voter districting
scheme intended to elect minority candidates rather than the best candidates); Shaw v. Reno,
113 S. Ct. 2816, 2820-22 (1993) (same).
62. This is the view that has animated California's proposed anti-affirmative action initiative. See Lemann, supra note 11, at 40 (discussing proposed California anti-affirmative action
initiative).
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principle of prospective neutrality. As the current controversy sur-

rounding affirmative action attests,6 3 one's stake in the outcome is
likely to affect which conception of equality has the greater appeal.
The intractability of the affirmative action issue, and the intensity of
the political debate surrounding it, have made it difficult for the
Supreme Court to achieve a satisfactory resolution of the affirmative
action problem.
B.

Cases

The Supreme Court has considered eighteen racial affirmative action cases since it first confronted the issue in 1974. 4 These eighteen
cases, their outcomes, and the votes of the individual justices who par63. See supra text accompanying notes 8-17.
64. The 18 affirmative action cases are: Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995); United
States v. Hays, 115 S. Ct. 2431 (1995); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995);
Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993); Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Ass'n Gen. Contractors
of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 113 S. Ct. 2297 (1993); Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S.
547 (1990); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Johnson v. Transportation
Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987); Local 93, Int'l Ass'n
of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501 (1986); Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers Int'l
Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986);
Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S.
448 (1980); United Steel Workers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979); Regents of the Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977); DeFunis
v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974); see also Voting Chart infra Part I(B)(2). The affirmative action program at issue in one of these cases contained both race and gender preferences, but the
Supreme Court's consideration and ultimate approval of the plan arose in the context of a gender-based rather than a race-based Title VII challenge. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 616.
Technically, the school desegregation cases that permitted race-conscious pupil assignment
are affirmative action cases because of the Supreme Court's intent to benefit minority students
by issuing those decisions. See, e.g., North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43,4546 (1971) (effectively requiring race-conscious pupil assignment to remedy prior school segregation). Because those cases are not typically treated as affirmative action cases, however, they
have not been included in the present compilation of statistics concerning the Court's affirmative
action cases.
The Court has also decided a series of statutory cases under section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988)). See, e.g., Johnson v.
De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. 2647 (1994); Holder v. Hall, 114 S. Ct. 2581 (1994); Voinovich v. Quilter,
113 S. Ct. 1149 (1993); Growe v. Emison, 113 S. Ct. 1075 (1993). Although these cases also
technically constitute affirmative action cases because they decrease white voting strength in
order to enhance minority voting strength, this species of Voting Rights Act cases that is decided
on statutory rather than equal protection grounds is not typically viewed as involving affirmative
action and has similarly been excluded from the present statistical compilation. Arguably, raceconscious districting is distinguishable from more traditional forms of affirmative action because,
in the absence of intentional vote dilution, districting does not have immediately identifiable
victims and does not entail any departure from a merits-based allocation system. But cf Miller,
115 S. Ct. at 2487, 2488 (objecting to departure from traditional, race-neutral districting principles). On the other hand, Miller, Hays, Shaw, and United Jewish Organizationsare Voting Rights
Act cases that presented the Court with constitutional challenges under the Equal Protection
Clause and thus have been included in the present statistical compilation.
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ticipated in each case are set out in the Voting Chart included as Part
I(B)(2) of this article. Of these eighteen cases, fourteen concerned

constitutional challenges made to affirmative action plans under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, or the equal

protection component of the Fifth Amendment. 65 The remaining four
challenges to affirmative action programs
cases involved statutory
66
under Title VII.

The affirmative action cases that the Supreme Court has considered have arisen in a variety of contexts. Eleven of the cases have
involved employment, where white workers or applicants challenged

affirmative action plans giving a preference to minority workers in hiring, promotions, or layoffs, or where white contractors challenged the
allocation of government-funded construction contracts under minority preference or set-aside programs.6 7 Other challenges have been
made to educational affirmative action programs designed to increase
student diversity by giving admissions preferences to minority applicants, 68 remedial voting rights plans designed to increase minority voting strength through the use of racially gerrymandered voting
districts,69 and broadcast license programs designed to increase broadcast diversity by creating enhancements and incentives for increased
minority ownership of broadcast outlets and licenses."
The Court resolved three of the cases that it considered on justiciability grounds without addressing the merits. 71 Of the remaining
65. The 14 cases raising constitutional challenges to affirmative action plans are Miller,
Hays, Adarand, Shaw, Northeastern Florida, Metro Broadcasting, Croson, Paradise, Sheet Metal
Workers, Wygani; Fullilove, Bakke, United Jewish Organizations, and DeFunis. See Voting Chart
infra Part I(B)(2).
66. The four Title VII cases are Johnson, Firefighters, Stotts, and Weber. Of these four
cases, one involved a gender-based challenge to an affirmative action plan that contained both
race- and gender-based preferences. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 625; see also Voting Chart infra
Part I(B)(2).
67. The 11 cases that arose in an employment context are Adarand, Northeastern Florida,
Croson, Johnson, Paradise, Firefighters, Sheet Metal Workers, Wygant, Stotts, Fullilove, and
Weber. Of these 11 cases, one involved a race- and gender-based affirmative action plan that was
challenged in an employment context on the grounds of unlawful gender discrimination in violation of Title VII. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 616.
68. The two cases that arose in an educational context are Bakke and DeFunis.
69. The four cases that arose in a remedial voting rights context are Miller, Hays, Shaw, and
United Jewish Organizations.
70. The one case that arose in the context of a preferential broadcast license program is
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
71. The Court dismissed one constitutional challenge to a remedial voter redistricting plan
on the grounds of standing. See United States v. Hays, 115 S. Ct. 2431 (1995). The Court dismissed one constitutional challenge to a law school affirmative action program on the grounds of
mootness. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974). In addition, the Court addressed only
the issue of standing in another case that presented a constitutional challenge to a minority
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fifteen cases that it did resolve on the merits, 72 the Court upheld the
challenged affirmative action plans in eight cases, 73 and invalidated or
limited the challenged plans in seven.74 Of the eleven constitutional
cases decided on the merits,75 the Supreme Court upheld the challenged affirmative action plans in five cases,76 and invalidated
the challenged plans in six.7 7 Of the four Title VII cases that the
Court resolved on the merits, the Court upheld the challenged
plans in three,7 and adopted a narrow construction of a con-

construction set-aside program, remanding the case for resolution of the merits. See Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Ass'n Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 113 S. Ct. 2297
(1993); see also Voting Chart infra Part l(B)(2).
72. The 15 affirmative action cases that the Court resolved on the merits are Miller,
Adarand, Shaw, Metro Broadcasting, Croson, Johnson, Paradise, Firefighters, Sheet Metal Workers, Wygant, Stotts, Fullilove, Weber, Bakke, and United Jewish Organizations. See Voting Chart
infra Part I(B)(2). The affirmative action program at issue in one of these cases contained both
race and gender preferences, but the Supreme Court's consideration and ultimate approval of
the plan arose in the context of a gender-based Title VII challenge rather than a race-based
challenge. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
73. The eight cases in which the Court upheld the challenged affirmative action plans are
Metro Broadcasting,Johnson, Paradise,Firefighters, Sheet Metal Workers, Fullilove, Weber, and
United Jewish Organizations. See Voting Chart infra Part l(B)(2). Of these eight cases, one
involved a challenge to a race- and gender-based affirmative action plan that was upheld by the
Court after a challenge that asserted unlawful gender discrimination in violation of Title VII.
See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 616.
74. Of these seven cases, the Court invalidated the affirmative action programs presented to
it in six. See Miller, Adarand, Shaw, Croson, Wygant, and Bakke. In the seventh case, the Court
adopted a narrow interpretation of a Title VII consent decree in order to protect seniority rights
found by the Court to be entitled to greater protection under Title VII than race. See Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984); see also Voting Chart infra Part l(B)(2).
75. The 11 cases decided on constitutional grounds are Miller, Adarand, Shaw, Metro
Broadcasting,Croson, Paradise,Sheet Metal Workers, Wygani, Fullilove, Bakke, and United Jewish Organizations. See Voting Chart infra Part I(B)(2).
76. The five constitutional cases in which the Court upheld the challenged affirmative action plans are Metro Broadcasting, Paradise,Sheet Metal Workers, Fullilove, and United Jewish
Organizations. See Voting Chart infra Part I(B)(2).
77. The six constitutional cases in which the Court invalidated the challenged affirmative
action plans are Miller, Adarand, Shaw, Croson, Wygant, and Bakke. See Voting Chart, infra
Part l(B)(2). Adarand has been included as a case in which the challenged affirmative action
plan was invalidated because the Court applied strict scrutiny. No racial classification has withstood strict scrutiny since Korematsu, and the justices who voted to apply strict scrutiny in
Adarand always vote to invalidate affirmative action plans in constitutional cases. See infra text
accompanying notes 88-92 (discussing Supreme Court voting blocs on affirmative action). Nevertheless, it is technically true that the Adarand majority did not finally resolve the case, but
rather remanded for further consideration under its newly adopted strict-scrutiny standard. See
Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2118.
78. The three Title VII cases in which the Court upheld the challenged affirmative action
plans are Johnson, Firefighters, and Weber. See Voting Chart infra Part I(B)(2). One of these
three cases involved a challenge to a race- and gender-based affirmative action plan that was
upheld by the Court after a gender-based Title VII challenge. See Johnson v. Transportation
Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
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sent decree that was unfavorable to the minority beneficiaries in
one.

79

The Court's overall record in ruling on the merits of affirmative
80
action plans has been eight to seven in favor of affirmative action.
Although the Court has typically rejected statutory challenges, ruling
in favor of affirmative action three to one in Title VII cases,81 8it2 has
ruled against affirmative action six to five in constitutional cases. Of
the eleven constitutional cases that the Court has decided on the merits, the Court was able to issue majority opinions in only its five most
recent decisions.83 The first six constitutional cases that the Court
considered were resolved by plurality opinions.8 4 Of the five majority
opinions that the Court was able to issue, 5 the four most recent were
decided by votes of8 7five to four,86 and the fourth was decided by a
vote of six to three.
79. The Court adopted a narrow construction of a Title VII consent decree in order to
protect seniority rights, finding that, under Title VII, seniority rights are entitled to greater protection than is freedom from racial discrimination. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts,
467 U.S. 561 (1984).
80. See supra text accompanying notes 73-74; Voting Chart infra Part I(B)(2).
81. See supra text accompanying notes 78-79; Voting Chart infra Part I(B)(2).
82. See supra text accompanying notes 76-77; Voting Chart infra Part I(B)(2).
83. See Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995) (majority opinion by Kennedy, J.);
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2101 (1995) (majority opinion by O'Connor,
J.); Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816,2819 (1993) (majority opinion by O'Connor, J.); Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 550 (1990) (majority opinion by Brennan, J.); City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,475 (1989) (majority opinion by O'Connor, J.). There is
a sense in which Adarand is more like a plurality than a majority opinion. Justice Scalia, whose
vote was necessary to the five-vote majority, signed the majority opinion, see Adarand, 115 S. Ct.
at 2101 (listing votes of justices); but he joined that opinion only to the extent that it was not
inconsistent with his concurring opinion. See id. at 2118 (Scalia, J. concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
84. See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 153 (1987) (plurality opinion of Brennan,
J.); Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 424 (1986) (plurality opinion of
Brennan, J.); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 268 (1986) (plurality opinion of
Powell, J.); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 452 (1980) (plurality opinion of Burger, C.J.);
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 267 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.); United
Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 146 (1977) (plurality opinion of White, J.); see also Voting
Chart infra Part I(B)(2). Technically, Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke was not a plurality opinion, because no other justice joined it. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 267 (opinion of Powell, J.). Nevertheless, subsequent Supreme Court opinions have regularly treated Justice Powell's opinion as if
it were a plurality opinion that stated a widely held rationale for the Bakke Court's decision.
See, e.g., Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2482 (same) (citing opinion of Powell, J., in Bakke as authoritative);
Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2108, 2111 (same); Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-94, 496-98 (plurality opinion
of O'Connor, J.) (same).
85. The five most recent cases, which the Supreme Court was able to resolve with majority
opinions, were Miller, Adarand, Shaw, Metro Broadcasting, and Croson. See Voting Chart infra
Part I(B)(2).
86. The four five-to-four decisions were Miller, Adarand, Shaw, and Metro Broadcasting.
See Voting Chart infra Part I(B)(2).
87. The one six-to-three decision was Croson. See Voting Chart infra Part l(B)(2).
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1. Voting Blocs
However tentative the approach taken by the Court as a whole
has been, the views of most justices on affirmative action have been
very consistent. Individual Supreme Court justices have tended to
vote in affirmative action cases in ways that correlate with their own
overall political views. Accordingly, conservative justices have typically voted against affirmative action programs, and liberal justices
have typically voted in favor of affirmative action. A five-justice conservative block has formed, comprised of justices who, with only one
exception, have never voted to uphold an affirmative action plan in a
case that the Court has decided on constitutional grounds. The members of this conservative bloc are Chief Justice Rehnquist,' and Justices O'Connor,8 9 Scalia,9" Kennedy, 9 and Thomas. 2 Similarly, a
88. Chief Justice Rehnquist voted against the affirmative action plans at issue in ten affirmative action cases that were decided on constitutional grounds. See Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct.
2475, 2482 (1995) (joining majority opinion); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097
2101 (1995) (joining majority opinion); Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2819 (1993) (joining majority opinion); Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 602 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J.); City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 476 (1989)
(joining majority opinion); Paradise,480 U.S. at 196 (O'Connor, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J.); Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S. at 500 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Wygant, 476 U.S. at
268 (1986) (opinion of Powell, J., joined by Rehnquist, J.); Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 522 (opinion of
Stewart, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 408 (opinion of Stevens, J., joined by
Rehnquist, J.); see also Voting Chart infra Part l(B)(2). The only arguable exception to Chief
Justice Rehnquist's perfect voting record against affirmative action is his 1977 vote in one Voting
Rights Act case to uphold a New York redistricting plan that was designed to enhance black
voting strength by diluting the voting strength of Hasidic Jews. However, then Associate Justice
Rehnquist may have viewed that dispute as a contest between affirmative action for blacks and
affirmative action for Hasidic Jews. See United Jewish Orgs., 430 U.S. at 147 (opinion of White,
J., joined by Rehnquist, J.).
89. Justice O'Connor participated in, and voted against the affirmative action plans at issue
in, eight affirmative action cases that were decided on constitutional grounds. See Miller, 115 S.
Ct. at 2497 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2101 (author of majority opinion);
Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2819 (author of majority opinion); Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 602
(O'Connor, J., dissenting); Croson, 488 U.S. at 476 (author of majority opinion); Paradise,480
U.S. at 196 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S. at 489 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Wygant, 476 U.S. at 284 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part
and concurring in judgment); see also Voting Chart infra Part I(B)(2).
90. Justice Scalia participated in, and voted against the affirmative action plans at issue in
six affirmative action cases that were decided on constitutional grounds. See Miller, 115 S. Ct. at
2482 (joining majority opinion); Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2118 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment); Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2819 (joining majority opinion); Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 602, 631 (O'Connor, J., dissenting, joined by Scalia, J., and Kennedy, J., dissenting, joined by Scalia, J.); Croson, 488 U.S. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment); Paradise,
480 U.S. at 196 (O'Connor, J., dissenting, joined by Scalia, J.); see also Voting Chart infra Part
I(B)(2).
91. Justice Kennedy participated in, and voted against the affirmative action plans at issue
in, five affirmative action cases that were decided on constitutional grounds. See Miller, 115 S.
Ct. at 2482 (majority opinion); Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2101 (joining majority opinion); Shaw, 113
S. Ct. at 2819 (joining majority opinion); Metro Broadcasting,497 U.S. at 631 (Kennedy, J.,
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three-justice liberal bloc existed for many years consisting of justices
who had always voted to uphold the affirmative action plans at issue
in cases that the Court resolved on constitutional grounds. The members of this liberal bloc were Justices Brennan, 93 Marshall,9 4 and
Blackmun. 5
The three justices in the liberal bloc are now retired from the
Court.96 All five justices in the conservative bloc, however, are presently serving on the Court.97 In addition to these five conservativebloc justices, the four remaining justices presently sitting on the
dissenting); Croson, 488 U.S. at 518 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); see also Voting Chart infra Part l(B)(2).
92. Justice Thomas participated in, and voted against the affirmative action plan at issue in,
three affirmative action cases that were decided on constitutional grounds. See Miller, 115 S. Ct.
at 2482 (joining majority opinion); Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2119 (Thomas, J., concurring in part
and concurring in judgment); Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2819 (joining majority opinion); see also Voting
Chart, infra Part I(B)(2).
93. Justice Brennan participated in, and voted in favor of the affirmative action plan at issue
in, eight affirmative action cases that were decided on constitutional grounds. See Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 550 (author of majority opinion); Croson, 488 U.S. at 528 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting, joined by Brennan, J.); id. at 561 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, J.);
Paradise,480 U.S. at 153 (opinion of Brennan, J.); Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S. at 426 (author
of majority opinion); Wygant, 476 U.S. at 295 (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, J.);
Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 517 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment, joined by Brennan, J.); Bakke,
438 U.S. at 324 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part); United
Jewish Orgs., 430 U.S. at 168 (Brennan, J., concurring in part); see also Voting Chart infra Part
I(B)(2).
94. Justice Marshall participated in, and voted in favor of the affirmative action plan at issue
in, seven affirmative action cases that were decided on constitutional grounds. See Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 550 (joining majority opinion); Croson. 488 U.S. at 528 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Paradise,480 U.S. at 153 (joining majority opinion); Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S. at 426
(joining majority opinion); Wygant, 476 U.S. at 295 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Fullilove,448 U.S.
at 517 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 324, 387 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part, and separate opinion of Marshall, J.). Although
Justice Marshall was on the Court when United Jewish Organizations was decided, he did not
participate in that decision. See United Jewish Orgs., 430 U.S. at 146; see also Voting Chart infra
Part I(B)(2).
95. Justice Blackmun participated in, and voted in favor of the affirmative action plan at
issue in nine affirmative action cases that were decided on constitutional grounds. See Shaw, 113
S. Ct. at 2843 (Blackmun J., dissenting); Metro Broadcasting,497 U.S. at 550 (joining majority
opinion); Croson, 488 U.S. at 561 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Paradise,480 U.S. at 153 (opinion
of Brennan, J., joined by Blackmun, J.); Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S. at 426 (joining majority
opinion); Wygant, 476 U.S. at 295 (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by Blackmun, J.); Fullilove, 448
U.S. at 517 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment, joined by Blackmun, J); Bakke, 438 U.S. at
324, 402 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part, and separate opinion of Blackmun, J.); United Jewish Orgs., 430 U.S. at 147 (opinion of White, J., joined by Blackmun, J.); see also Voting Chart infra Part I(B)(2).
96. See GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW B-6 (12th ed. 1991) (specifying term of
Justice Brennan); FREDERICK SCHAUER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW SUPPLEMENT 451 (1995) (specifying terms of Justices Marshall and Blackmun).
97. See GurNrrwR, supra note 96, at B-7 (specifying terms of Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy); SCHAUER, supra note 96, at 451 (specifying term of
Justice Thomas).
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Supreme Court are Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. 98
over the
The affirmative action votes of Justice Stevens have varied
9 Justices Souter, t ° Ginsburg, 1 1
participated.
has
cases in which he
and Breyer' 0 2 have voted to uphold each affirmative action program
that they considered in a constitutional case, but each Justice has participated in only two or three decisions. Accordingly, the present
Court contains a solid five-justice majority that has consistently opposed affirmative action on constitutional grounds and an emerging
minority of three or four justices who ordinarily reject constitutional
challenges to affirmative action.
2.

Affirmative Action Voting Chart

The voting chart below shows how individual Supreme Court justices voted in the significant affirmative action cases on which they sat.

98. See GUNTHER, supra note 96, at B-7 (specifying terms of Justices Stevens and Souter);
SCHAUER, supra note 97, at 452 (specifying terms of Justices Ginsburg and Breyer).
99. Justice Stevens participated in eleven affirmative action cases that were decided on constitutional grounds. He voted in favor of the affirmative action plans at issue in eight of these
cases. See Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2497 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2120 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Shaw, 113 S. Ct.
at 2834 (White, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, J.); Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 601 (Stevens, J., concurring); Paradise,480 U.S. at 189 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment); Sheet
Metal Workers, 478 U.S. at 426 (1986) (joining majority opinion); Wygant, 476 U.S. at 313 (Stevens, J., dissenting); UnitedJewish Orgs., 430 U.S. at 147 (opinion of White, J., joined by Stevens,
J.). He voted against the affirmative action plans at issue in three cases. See Croson, 488 U.S. at
469 (joining majority opinion); Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 532 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Bakke, 438
U.S. at 408 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part); see also Voting
Chart infra Part I(B)(2).
100. Justice Souter participated in three affirmative action cases that were decided on constitutional grounds, and he voted in favor of the affirmative action plans at issue in all three cases.
See Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2499 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting, joined by Souter, J.); Adarand, 115 S. Ct.
at 2131 (Souter, J., dissenting); Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2845 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also Voting
Chart infra Part I(B)(2).
101. Justice Ginsburg participated in two affirmative action case that were decided on constitutional grounds, and she voted to uphold the affirmative action plans at issue in both of those
cases. See Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2499 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2134 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Voting Chart infra Part l(B)(2).
102. Justice Breyer participated in two affirmative action case that were decided on constitutional grounds, and he voted to uphold the affirmative action plans at issue in both of those
cases. See Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2499 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting, joined by Breyer, J.); Adarand, 115
S. Ct. at 2131 (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by Breyer, J.); id. at 2134 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting,
joined by Breyer, J.); see also Voting Chart infra Part I(B)(2).
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C. Issues
Although the Supreme Court has addressed the issue of affirmative action in eighteen race cases, 10 3 it has had great difficulty determining when affirmative action programs are constitutionally and
statutorily permissible. Those eighteen cases have, however, dis103. See supra note 64 (listing Court's 18 racial affirmative action cases).
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cussed three sets of issues that appear relevant to the lawfulness of
affirmative action. First, the Court has focused most heavily on the
standard of review that is to be applied to affirmative action programs,
whether the standard of review varies with the federal or local nature
of the affirmative action program in question, and whether the strict
scrutiny standard that it now applies to all racial affirmative action
programs can ever be satisfied. Second, the Court has debated what
justifications are adequate for affirmative action, what findings are
necessary to substantiate those justifications, and whether set asides
and quotas constitute permissible means of pursuing the otherwise
permissible goals of an affirmative action program. Third, the Court
has discussed the levels of stigmatization and racial stereotyping entailed in a program, as well as the burden that a program imposes on
innocent whites. The magnitude of permissible burdens may vary
with whether an affirmative action plan is public or private, and with
whether it is voluntary or court-ordered. The Court's most recent decision in Adarand has nominally resolved some, but not all, of these
issues. The doctrinally nebulous nature of the issues, however, makes
any resolution tentative and highly dependent upon the Court's personnel at particular points in time.
1. Standard of Review
The issue that has attracted the most attention in Supreme Court
affirmative action cases has been the appropriate standard of review.
Because racial affirmative action programs employ race-based classifications to make resource allocation decisions, they are arguably subject to strict judicial scrutiny under Korematsu v. United States, which
holds that racial classifications are "immediately suspect" and subjects
them to "the most rigid scrutiny."1 4 However, because affirmative
action programs are benign rather than invidious, in that they are intended to promote equality by neutralizing the effects of prior discrimination, they should arguably be exempt from the strict scrutiny to
which racial classifications that burden racial minorities are subject.
The standard-of-review issue may well be dispositive, because since
104. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). The test traditionally required under the strict scrutiny standard is that, in order to be valid, the classification under
review must advance a compelling state interest and must be necessary to the advancement of
that interest. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); cf. Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
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classification has withstood strict
the Korematsu decision, no racial
10 5
scrutiny by the Supreme Court.
The Court began considering the affirmative action issue in
1974106 but was unable to achieve majority agreement on an appropriate standard of review until its 1989 decision in City of Richmond v.
IA. Croson Co.' 7 In an opinion by Justice O'Connor, the Court held
that strict scrutiny applied to a municipal affirmative action program
that set aside thirty percent of the municipality's government contracting funds for minority construction contractors.10 Four justices
believed that it was inappropriate to apply strict scrutiny to benign
affirmative action programs."° Justice O'Connor limited her opinion
to state and local affirmative action programs because a 1980 Supreme
Court decision, Fullilove v. Klutznick,110 had previously upheld the
constitutionality of a virtually identical federal set-aside program."'
105. See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL, CONSTruTIONAL LAW 572 (2d ed. 1991); see also Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment) (strict scrutiny
is "strict in theory, but fatal in fact"). Korematsu's tolerance of the race-based internment of
Japanese-American citizens is now generally regarded as the product of wartime hysteria, and
the result is widely discredited. See, e.g., Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2106, 2117 (criticizing result in
Korematsu); id. at 2121 (Stevens, J. dissenting); STONE ET AL., supra, at 572. As is discussed
below, Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in Adarand stresses that the strict scrutiny that it
envisions is not necessarily fatal scrutiny. See infra text accompanying notes 123-142 (discussing
issue of whether Adarand strict scrutiny is fatal scrutiny).
106. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (dismissing affirmative action case as
moot).
107. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (majority opinion invalidating minority set-aside).
108. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 477-86. Justice O'Connor wrote a majority opinion for the
Court on many issues; but only four justices signed Part III-A of Justice O'Connor's opinion,
which adopted the strict scrutiny standard of review for non-congressional affirmative action
plans. See id. at 493-98 (opinion of O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White and
Kennedy, JJ.). Nevertheless, Justice Scalia provided a fifth vote for the proposition that strict
scrutiny should be applied to affirmative action programs. See id. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring in
judgment), see also Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2110 (identifying five justices who applied strict scrutiny in Croson). Although Justice Stevens declined to sign Part III-A of Justice O'Connor's
opinion, which endorsed strict scrutiny in the abstract, he nevertheless joined Parts III-B and IV
of her opinion,which actually applied Justice O'Connor's ends-means analysis to invalidate the
Richmond set-aside plan. See id. at 475 (enumerating votes of justices); id. at 498-508 (majority
opinion of O'Connor, J., joined by Stevens, J.).
109. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 535-36 (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan and Blackmun, JJ.) (arguing for intermediate scrutiny); cf. id. at 511-12, 514 (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and concurring in judgment) (focusing on prospective benefit of racial classification and discounting the importance of the standard of review). Note, however, that Justice Stevens did vote
to invalidate the Richmond set aside program because it had not been shown to offer sufficient
promise of prospective societal benefit. See id. at 511-18.
110. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
111. See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 453-54, 468-72 (opinion of Burger, C.J.) (describing federal
plan at issue in Fullilove). In an effort to ensure the constitutional validity of the Richmond
plan, the Richmond City Council had modeled its plan on the congressional set-aside plan whose
constitutionality the Supreme Court had previously upheld in Fullilove. See Croson, 488 U.S. at
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Justice O'Connor's Croson opinion distinguished Fullilove on the
grounds that Congress possessed special powers under section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment to remedy12racial discrimination that state and
local legislatures did not possess."
Notwithstanding Croson, the Court's 1990 decision in Metro
Broadcasting v. FCC"3 upheld the constitutionality of two FCC minority preference plans that had been designed to increase broadcast
diversity." 4 Metro Broadcasting held that only intermediate scrutiny
applied to federal affirmative action programs-or more specifically,
to affirmative action plans authorized by Congress in the exercise of
its power to remedy discrimination under section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment." 5 Justice Brennan's majority opinion distinguished
Croson as involving a local rather than a congressional affirmative action program 16-just as Justice O'Connor's Croson opinion had invoked that factor as a basis for distinguishing Fullilove.l '
Realistically, the justices seem simply to have been voting in accordance with their political views about affirmative action."" Only Justice White actually believed that the distinction between congressional
and local affirmative action programs was important.19
477-80, 505-06 (discussing similarities between Richmond minority set-aside plan and congressional plan upheld in Fullilove, as well as belief of City's legal counsel that plan would be constitutional under Fullilove decision); id. at 528-29 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (asserting that
Richmond set-aside plan was patterned upon plan upheld in Fullilove). The congressional plan
that the Court upheld in Fullilove contained a 10% set-aside, see Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 453-56,
whereas the Richmond plan that the Court invalidated in Croson contained a larger 30% setaside. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 477-86. The Richmond City Council, however, had apparently
selected a larger set-aside percentage to correspond to the larger, 50% black population of Richmond. See id. at 479-80 (citing 50% black population of Richmond).
112. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 486-93 (emphasizing special congressional powers under section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
113. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
114. See Metro Broadcasting,497 U.S. at 566, 600-01. One plan gave a preference to minority-owned broadcasters in the award of FCC broadcast licenses, and the other plan provided
certain tax advantages to marginal licensees who sold their stations to minority-owned broadcasters. See id. at 555-58.
115. See id. at 563-66. Intermediate scrutiny is typically viewed as requiring that a classification be substantially related to an important governmental interest, see id. at 564, rather than
necessary to advance a compelling governmental interest, as is required under strict scrutiny. Cf.
supra note 104 (describing traditional strict scrutiny standard of review).
116. See Metro Broadcasting,497 U.S. at 565-66.
117. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 486-493 (1989) (emphasizing
special congressional powers under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
118. See supra text accompanying notes 88-102 (describing Supreme Court voting blocs on
issue of affirmative action).
119. Justice White has often favored federal regulation under circumstances in which he disfavored analogous state regulation, see SPANN,supranote 5, at 128-29 (discussing Justice White's
greater receptivity to federal than local regulation), and Justice White was one of the swing votes
in the Croson and Metro Broadcastingcases. The other swing vote was Justice Stevens. Compare
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Adarand overruled Metro Broadcasting and established a single
strict scrutiny standard of review for all affirmative action programs,
whether congressional or local in nature. 20 Justice O'Connor's majority opinion simply extended the reasoning that she had adopted in
Croson.1 21 Although this seems at least superficially to have settled
the standard-of-review issue, four justices dissented in Adarand, arguing that congressional affirmative action plans are entitled to greater
deference than local plans. 22 Moreover, Adarand has left it unclear
whether the strict scrutiny the majority envisions is fatal scrutiny.
All nine of the justices who participated in the Adarand decision
appear to view strict scrutiny as permitting some forms of affirmative

action. Justice O'Connor's majority opinion-joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas-expressly
states that strict scrutiny is not "fatal in fact,"' 23 but is intended
merely to insure that affirmative action programs are benign rather
than invidious.' 2 4 In addition, Justice Stevens points out that the majority purported to adopt the concept of strict scrutiny articulated by
25
Justice Powell in Regents of the University of Californiav. Bakke,1 _
a case invalidating a racial preference in a medical school admissions
Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 550 (Justices White and Stevens joined the majority opinion
holding that the FCC policies did not violate the Equal Protection Clause) with Croson, 488 U.S.
at 475 (Justices White and Stevens joined the majority opinion holding that the city's plan violated the Equal Protection Clause). Justice Stevens tended to focus on the presence or absence
of legislative findings of prospective benefit in determining the validity of an affirmative action
plan. See Metro Broadcasting,497 U.S. at 601-02 (Stevens, J., concurring) (focusing on prospective benefit of racial classification); Fullilove v. Klutznick 488 U.S. 488, 511-12 (1980) (Stevens,
J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (same).
120. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S.Ct. 2097, 2111-13, 2117 (1995) (overruling Metro Broadcasting and applying unitary strict scrutiny standard).
121. See id. at 2110-11 (discussing Croson).
122. The four dissenters in Adarand were Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.
See id. at 2123-26 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Ginsburg, J.) (Congress is entitled to special
deference); id. at 2132-34 (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ.) (Fullilove
deference to Congress controls); id. at 2134, 2136 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting, joined by Breyer, J.)
(Congress is entitled to deference, and a non-fatal standard of review is appropriate). Ironically,
now that Metro Broadcastinghas been overruled, the four dissenters may have actually come to
believe in the importance of a distinction between federal and local affirmative action programs.
123. See id. at 2114, 2117 ("[W]e wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is 'strict in
theory but fatal in fact."'). Justice O'Connor reiterated this point in Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S.
Ct. 2038 (1995), a school desegregation case that was decided the same day as Adarand. See
Jenkins, 115 S.Ct. at 2061 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("But it is not true that strict scrutiny is
'strict in theory, but fatal in fact.'").
124. See Adarand, 115 S.Ct. at 2112, 2113 (explaining that the purpose of strict scrutiny is to
ascertain whether affirmative action is legitimate).
125. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287-91 (1978) (opinion of Powell,
J.) (arguing for strict scrutiny).
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program126 -which Justice Powell found to have been satisfied in Fullilove. 127 And Justice Souter believed that the affirmative action program at issue in Adarand was adequate to survive the majority's strict
scrutiny on remand.'28 Justice Ginsburg, however, believed that strict
scrutiny is fatal for invidious racial classifications but not for benign
Breyer joined
classifications in affirmative action programs. 129 Justice
30
the dissents of both Justices Souter and Ginsburg.
Although the five justices in the Adarand majority signed Justice
O'Connor's majority opinion stating that strict scrutiny was not necessarily fatal scrutiny, there is some reason to be skeptical about the
degree of their commitment to this principle. Justice Scalia seems to
have rejected the suggestion that an affirmative action program could
ever survive strict scrutiny. He expressly limited the degree to which
he was joining the majority opinion by including the unusual proviso
that he was willing to "join the opinion of the Court... except insofar
as it may be inconsistent with" the views expressed in his concurrence.'3 ' His concurrence goes on to assert that the desire to remedy
the effects of past discrimination could never constitute a compelling
governmental interest. 132 In addition, Justice Scalia has in the past
favored limiting affirmative action to the actual victims of discrimination-a limitation that does not recognize the legitimacy of race-based
affirmative action at all.' 33 Justice Kennedy has also been receptive

to the actual-victim limitation,"M and Chief Justice Rehnquist has en126. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 272-81 (opinion of Powell, J.) (describing admissions program for
University of California at Davis medical school, which reserved 16 of 100 seats in entering class
for disadvantaged minority applicants).
127. See Adarand, 115 S.Ct. 2128 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Ginsburg, J.) (discussing
Justice Powell's positions in Bakke and Fullilove); cfid. at 2120-21 n.1 (objecting to term "strict
scrutiny" on grounds that it has traditionally been understood to be fatal).
128. See id. at 2132-34 (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ.) (arguing
that the Adarand program was still controlled by Fullilove).
129. See id. at 2136 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting, joined by Breyer, J.) (distinguishing between
invidious and benign racial classifications under a strict scrutiny standard of review).
dissenting, joined by Breyer, J.); id. at 2136 (Ginsburg. J.,
130. See id. at 2132-34 (Souter, J.,
dissenting, joined by Breyer, J.)
131. See id. at 2118-19 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
132. See id. at 2118-19 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) ("[1]t is
unlikely, if not impossible, that the challenged program would survive under this understanding
of strict scrutiny.").
133. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 524-25 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (state can use racial classifications only to compensate actual victims of state's
own discrimination).
134. See id. at 518-19 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment) (finding rule limiting racial preferences to what is necessary to compensate actual victims of discrimination appealing).
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dorsed this limitation in Title VII cases. 1 35 Justice Thomas forcefully
asserted in Adarand that all racial classifications were immoral,
whether invidious or benign, terming affirmative action "racial paternalism."'1 36 In Missouri v. Jenkins,1 37 however, which was decided the
same day as Adarand, Justice Thomas expressed a certain fondness for
historically black schools.138 This might cause him to view strict scrumaintenance
tiny as less than fatal if necessary to permit the voluntary
39
of historically black schools in black neighborhoods.
It may turn out that after Adarand, strict scrutiny will remain "fatal in fact" because a majority of the Court will never find an affirma-

tive action program adequate to meet the strict scrutiny standards that
are theoretically capable of being satisfied. This would be consistent
with the history of equal protection jurisprudence since Korematsu,
and it would satisfy the draconian pronouncements of Justices Scalia
and Thomas. Because the program at issue in Adarand is a mild one,
consisting ultimately of only a rebuttable presumption that minority
contractors are disadvantaged, 4 ' the fate of Adarand on remand may
be telling. If the Adarand program is invalidated, its invalidation will
serve as a strong indication that the Court's holding is indeed sweep-

ing, and that Justice O'Connor is mistaken in her assertion that strict
scrutiny will not always be fatal scrutiny.
Assuming, however, that Justice O'Connor is sincere in her assertion that strict scrutiny is not fatal scrutiny,' 4 ' her vote, plus the votes
of the four Adaranddissenters, may provide a bare majority to uphold
135. See Local 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 561.535-45 (1986)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (contending that Title VII remedies that override seniority must be
limited to actual victims of discrimination); Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC,
478 U.S. 421, 500 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Firefighter Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts,
467 U.S. 561, 578-83 (majority opinion of White, J., joined by Rehnquist, J.).
136. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S.Ct. 2097, 2119 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (asserting that there exists no "racial paternalism" exception to principle of equal
protection).
137. Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S.Ct. 2038 (1995).
138. See Jenkins, 115 S.Ct. 2065 ("Despite their origins in 'the shameful history of stateenforced segregation,' these [historically black] institutions can be 'both a source of pride to
blacks who have attended them and a source of hope to black families who want the benefits of
...learning for their children."' (quoting United States v. Fordice, 112 S.Ct. 2727, 2746 (1992)
(Thomas, J., concurring)); see generally Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2064-66 (discussing benefits of
historically black schools).
139. See Jenkins, 115 S.Ct. at 2065-66 (expressing the view that historically black schools in
black neighborhoods are not unconstitutional).
140. This aspect of the Adarand decision is discussed more fully in Part II(B) infra.
141. Note that like the other justices in the Adarand majority, Justice O'Connor has never
voted to uphold an affirmative action program in a constitutional case. See supra note 89
(enumerating votes of Justice O'Connor in constitutional affirmative action cases).
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at least some affirmative action programs. In fact, it may be that the
Adarand majority's conception of strict scrutiny will turn out to be the
functional equivalent of Metro Broadcasting's intermediate scrutiny,
and that the ultimate significance of Adarand will be more rhetorical
than substantive. It may also turn out that in practice the Court will
give more deference to Congress than it gives to state and local legislatures, thereby ironically preserving the operative distinction between Croson and Metro Broadcasting that Adarand nominally
overruled. 142 Because Adarand was a five-to-four decision, resolution
of this issue may remain tentative, shifting with subsequent Supreme
Court appointments.
2. Justifications, Findings, and Quotas
If Adarand is ultimately interpreted to permit some affirmative
action programs to survive strict scrutiny, it remains unclear what justifications for affirmative action the Court will recognize as legitimate.
In the past, the Court has distinguished between two types of justifications and has treated them differently. The Court held in Croson that
when strict scrutiny applies, permissible affirmative action is limited to
that which is necessary to remedy particularized acts of past discrimination, and is not available merely to remedy the effects of general
societal discrimination that has caused the underrepresentation of racial minorities in particular occupations or social roles. 14 3 However, in
Metro Broadcasting,the Court held that the pursuit of prospective diversity was a permissible goal for a congressional affirmative action
program. 1 " The prospective-diversity justification upheld in Metro
Broadcastingis very similar to the general-societal-discrimination justification that the Court rejected in Croson, in that it de-emphasizes
the importance of particularized acts of past discrimination and permits affirmative action addressed to the underrepresentation of minorities in particular aspects of the culture. But, Metro Broadcasting
142. Cf Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2120-23 (1995) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (enumerating reasons that congressional affirmative action programs are entitled to
greater deference than state and local programs).
143. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 488-89 (1989); see also Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 610-14 (1995) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Wygant v.
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 288 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Johnson v. De
Grandy, 480 U.S. 2647, 2648-53 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
144. See Metro Broadcasting,497 U.S. at 566-68 (recognizing broadcast diversity as permissible goal for affirmative action).
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was decided under the relatively more tolerant standard of intermedi146
ate scrutiny' 4 5 that the Court expressly rejected in Adarand.
Adarand notwithstanding, it is uncertain how meaningful the general-societal-discrimination restriction will prove to be. It is likely that
the four dissenters in Adarand would permit an affirmative action
plan that they found otherwise acceptable to be justified on the
grounds that it sought to remedy general societal discrimination. Justice Stevens voted to uphold the FCC prospective diversity plan in
Metro Broadcasting,1 47 and he has often stated his preference for prospective benefit over identifiable past discrimination as a justification
for affirmative action) 4 8 Justice Ginsburg joined the opinion of Justice Stevens expressing this preference in Adarand149 The tone of
Justice Souter's dissenting opinion in Adarand suggests receptivity to
prospective benefit as a justification for affirmative action in its emphasis on the need to eliminate forces that "skew the operation of
public systems" and its insistence that the prospectively oriented Fullilove decision controlled the affirmative action program at issue in
Adarand.151 Justice Breyer, too, may be receptive to the prospective
benefit justification for affirmative action, as evidenced by his decision
1 51
to join Justice Souter's dissent, which Justice Ginsburg also joined.
In addition to the Adarand dissenters, even Justice O'Connorthe author of the Adarand and Croson majority opinions and of the
primary Metro Broadcastingdissent-has recognized the legitimacy of
using prospective diversity as a justification for affirmative action in
educational contexts. 5 ' Justice O'Connor also appears to believe,
however, that there is a distinction between the permissible promotion of prospective diversity and the impermissible effort to remedy
general societal discrimination.' 53 What this shows is not so much that
145. See id. at 564-65 (applying intermediate scrutiny).
146. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2112-13 (overruling Metro Broadcasting with respect to its
standard of review).
147. See Metro Broadcasting,497 U.S. at 601-02 (Stevens, J., concurring).
148. See, e.g., Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2127-28 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Metro Broadcasting,
497 U.S. at 601-02 (Stevens, J., concurring); Wygant, 476 U.S. at 313 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
149. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2120 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Ginsburg, J.).
150. See id. at 2133-34 (Souter, J., dissenting). Note, however, that Justice Souter also described his concerns as being relevant to the provision of a remedy for past discrimination. See
id. at 2133-34.
151. See id. at 2131 (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by Ginsburg and Breyer, J.J.).
152. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 286 (1986). (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
153. See id. at 288 n.* (characterizing "role model" justification for affirmative action as relevant to general societal discrimination rather than to prospective diversity).
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Justice O'Connor may change her mind on the remedy-for-past-discrimination versus general-societal-discrimination issue, but that the
issue is more rhetorical than substantive. An affirmative action program can be characterized as serving either justification without much
difficulty. Accordingly, Justice O'Connor was able to characterize the
Fullilove set-aside plan as a program designed to remedy past discrimination, while characterizing the seemingly indistinguishable Croson
set-aside plan as a program designed to remedy general societal discrimination.15 4 In thus characterizing these two programs, Justice
O'Connor credited congressional findings of past discrimination that
are notoriously cursory, 1 55 and disregarded the well-known history of
56
past discrimination in Richmond, Virginia.'
Closely related to the issue of what goals constitute legitimate
justifications for affirmative action is the issue of what findings are
required for an affirmative action plan to be valid. If affirmative action is to be limited to the provision of narrow remedies for identifiable acts of prior discrimination, the Court must know both that there
were such acts of prior discrimination and how widespread the past
157
discrimination was to ensure that a remedy is sufficiently narrow.
The Supreme Court has frequently addressed the need for formal
findings of past discrimination, but the actual importance of formal
findings is difficult to assess. In Croson, the Court relied heavily on
both the absence of reliable findings of past discrimination and the
absence of narrow tailoring in invalidating the Richmond set-aside
plan.15 1 Moreover, the Metro Broadcastingcase stressed the presence
of congressional findings in upholding the FCC affirmative action

154. Compare City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 488-89 (1989) (characterizing the Fullilove plan as a remedy for past discrimination) with id. at 498-99 (finding that the
Croson plan was a remedy for general societal discrimination).
155. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 548-54 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing congressional findings).
156. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 498-506 (finding insufficient evidence of discrimination in Richmond construction trades); cf id. at 561 (Blackmun, J., dissenting,) (emphasizing that Richmond
was the "cradle of the Old Confederacy"); id. at 528 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that
Richmond was the capital of the Confederacy).
157. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2112, 2113-14 (1995) (citing
Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (opinion of O'Connor, J.) (contending that strict scrutiny is needed to
distinguish benign from illegitimate discrimination and to a ensure tight "fit" between prior discrimination and remedy)).
158. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (opinion of O'Connor, J.) (contending that strict scrutiny is
needed to distinguish benign from illegitimate discrimination and to ensure a tight "fit" between
prior discrimination and remedy).
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plans at issue in that case. 159 This suggests that the presence or absence of reliable findings may continue to be dispositive. The Court,
however, was unreceptive to the evidence of extensive congressional
deliberations that was before it in Adarand;160 yet it had been quite
deferential to the cursory congressional consideration that occurred in
Fullilove.161 In addition, the findings in Metro Broadcasting, whose
existence the Court stressed so heavily in upholding the FCC broadcast-diversity affirmative action plans, ultimately prove to be rather
chimerical. 62 This suggests that findings are less relevant as an actual
basis for decision than they are as a post-hoc justification for judicial
outcomes that have been reached on other grounds. Justice Powell,
159. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 566-84 (1990) (discussing congressional findings).
160. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2130, 2130 n.18 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (describing the congressional deliberations preceding adoption of affirmative action program at issue in Adarand).
161. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 548-54 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing cursory congressional consideration).
162. The FCC affirmative action programs that Justice Brennan found to have been authorized by Congress in Metro Broadcastingwere actually programs that had been developed by the
FCC. See Metro Broadcasting,497 U.S. at 569-71. As political controversy concerning affirmative action increased during the Reagan Administration. Congress failed to enact pending legislation that would have codified the FCC programs. It was able only to adopt a series of
appropriations riders that preserved the status quo while Congress continued to debate the affirmative action issue. See id. at 559 n.8, 572-79. Judge Williams termed the appropriations riders
"a kind of mental standstill" when Metro Broadcasting was before the Court of Appeals, see
Winter Park Comm's v. FCC, 873 F.2d 347, 364 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Williams, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part), although Justice Brennan disagreed with this characterization in his
Metro Broadcastingmajority opinion. See Metro Broadcasting,497 U.S. at 578 n.29 (appropriations riders were not mere "mental standstill"). Not only was the program more an FCC program than a program authorized by Congress in the exercise of its powers under section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, but the FCC program had ceased even to be supported by the FCC.
During the Reagan Administration, the FCC shifted policy and wished to abandon the FCC
affirmative action programs that had been implemented during the Carter Administration, citing
doubts about the FCC's jurisdiction to engage in such affirmative action. See id. at 558-61, 57677 (discussing FCC inquiry into validity of its own minority preference programs); see also Winter Park, 873 F.2d at 350-51. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit declined to cooperate with the Reagan FCC strategy for curtailing affirmative
action and held that the FCC did in fact possess the requisite jurisdiction. See Steele v. FCC, 770
F.2d 1192, 1196 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Metro Broadcasting,497 U.S. at 559 n.8. Accordingly, the FCC
programs can be deemed judicially authorized programs as readily as they can be deemed congressionally authorized programs. The FCC was opposed to them, and Congress lacked the
votes needed to codify them. Only the D.C. Circuit favored them. Ultimately, the deference to
Congress that Justice Brennan purported to be exhibiting in Metro Broadcasting may really have
been deference to the D.C. Circuit. Congress has now repealed the FCC distress sale program.
See Deduction for Health Insurance Costs of Self-Employed Individuals, Pub. L. 104-7, § 2, 109
Stat. 93-94 (1995); and in the wake of the Adarand decision, the FCC has begun to substitute
race-neutral disadvantaged-applicant programs for its minority preference programs. See Raceand Gender-BasedProvisionsfor the Auctioning of C Block BroadcastPersonalCommunications
Service Licensees, Elimination,60 Fed. Reg. 34200, 34202, 34205 (FCC 1995) (Further Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, in light of Adarand, to amend 47 CFR, Parts 20 & 24, by eliminating race
and gender preferences in FCC cellular spectrum auction program).
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who was the Court's strongest proponent of formal findings 163 is no

longer on the Court.

6

Moreover, Justice O'Connor-who wrote the

majority opinions in Adarand and Croson, and the primary dissent in
Metro Broadcasting-hasin the past stated that formal findings are
unnecessary. 165 Because the entities that adopt affirmative action programs in the wake of recent Supreme Court decisions will be on notice

to buttress their programs with elaborate findings, the significance of

1 66
findings in future cases may well dissipate.
Assuming that some remedial affirmative action programs will be
upheld if they are accompanied by adequate findings of particularized
past discrimination, the degree to which the Court will permit the use
of racial quotas remains another unresolved issue. "Quota" has, of
course, become the pejorative term of choice for political opponents
of affirmative action. 167 But quotas have proven to be judicially unpopular as well. In his Adarand dissent, Justice Stevens justified voting in favor of the Adarand preference despite voting against the
Fullilove set aside on the grounds that Fullilove involved a numerical
quota whereas Adarand did not. 168 The Croson Court viewed quotas
as undesirable because they treat citizens as mere members of a group
rather than as individuals. 69 Further, even the Metro Broadcasting

163. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307-10 (1978) (opinion of
Powell, J.) (stressing importance of findings).
164. See GUNTHER, supra note 96, at B-6 (specifying term of Justice Powell).
165. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 286-93 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring). But see Croson, 488 U.S. at 498-506 (discussing inadequacy of Richmond City Council's
informal finding of past discrimination without reaffirming argument that formal findings are
unnecessary).
166. In this regard, the elaborate congressional deliberations that were before the Court in
Adarand may well have been a reaction to the Croson decision. See Adarand, 115 S.Ct. at 2130,
2130 n.18 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (describing congressional deliberations preceding adoption of
affirmative action program at issue in Adarand).
167. Conservative Republicans successfully opposed President Clinton's selection of Lani
Guinier to be Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice by dubbing her a "Quota Queen" in light of her support for cumulative voting as
a means of increasing minority voting strength. See Stephen Buckley, Voting Rights Ruling
Called Death Knell for Exclusion; Ex-Clinton Nominee Hails Order in Maryland,WASH. POST,
Apr. 7, 1994, at BI; Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home; Anatomy of a Smear, N.Y. TIMES, June 4,
1993, at A31; Clarence Page, 'Cumulative Voting' Takes Lani Guinier into the Mainstream, Cinc.
TRIB., Mar. 30, 1994, at 23.
168. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2130 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (distinguishing Adarand and
Fullilove).
169. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 507-08 (opinion of O'Connor, J.) (quotas reflect stereotyped
thinking about racial minorities); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 272-75,
315-19 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.) (permitting consideration of race but opposing quotas).
Although Justice Scalia did not sign the four-justice plurality portion of Justice O'Connor's
Croson opinion that opposed quotas, his opposition to racial quotas is subsumed in his general
opposition to affirmative action. See Croson,448 U.S. at 520, 524-28; 526-27 (Scalia, J., concur-
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majority felt compelled to assert that the preferences and set asides
that it was upholding did not constitute quotas.170 Nevertheless, the
71
Court has been willing to uphold racial quotas on several occasions;
and despite the Court's contrary assurances, the "distress sale" setto have
aside that the Court upheld in Metro Broadcasting appears
172
been a quota in every meaningful sense of the term.
The Supreme Court's sometime aversion to quotas is traceable to
Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke,173 where the Court invalidated a
sixteen-percent minority preference in a medical school admissions
program but nevertheless upheld the use of race as a permissible basis
for affirmative action in appropriate cases.1 74 Justice Powell opposed
ring in judgment) (opposing affirmative action not necessary to compensate actual victims of
discrimination, and opposing quotas).
170. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 599 (1990). Justices Brennan and
Marshall also attempted to recast the Court's general opposition to quotas as opposition to
"quota[s] in the invidious sense of a ceiling" that is imposed on minority participation. See
Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 521 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 375
(opinion of Brennan, J.)).
171. The Court upheld the "distress sale" program in Metro Broadcasting, which the dissent
characterized as a rigid quota and a 100% set-aside, Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 630
(O'Connor, J., dissenting), although the majority rejected that characterization. See id. at 599.
But cf. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2112-13 (overruling another aspect of Metro Broadcasting,relating
to standard of review). In addition, the Court upheld quotas in United States v. Paradise, 480
U.S. 149, 153-66 (1987) (opinion of Brennan, J.), Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n v.
EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 426-40 (1986), and Fullilove,448 U.S. at 453-54,468-72 (opinion of Burger,
C.J.). But see Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S. at 475-81 (opinion of Brennan, J.) (characterizing
hiring goals as benchmarks rather than quotas). The Court also upheld the percentage targets
used as the basis for the reapportionment plan in United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144,
155-62 (1977) (opinion of White, J., joined by Stevens, Brennan, and Blackmun, JJ.); id. at 17179 (Brennan J., concurring in part). It may be that United Jewish Organizationswas tacitly overruled in Miller, which reached the opposite result under very similar facts. Whether this seems
true or not depends upon how seriously one takes Justice Kennedy's efforts in Miller to distinguish United Jewish Organizations. See infra text accompanying notes 311-13 (discussing distinction between Miller, Shaw, and United Jewish Organizations).
172. Compare Metro Broadcasting,497 U.S. at 599 (rejecting characterization of "distress
sale" program as quota) with id. at 624 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (characterizing "distress sale"
program as quota).
173. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 272-75 (opinion of Powell, J.) (opposing quotas).
174. A five-justice majority voted to invalidate the particular plan that was before the Court
in Bakke, while a different five-justice majority voted to uphold the use of racial preferences in
appropriate circumstances. Four justices-Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Stevens, Stewart
and Rehnquist-declined to reach the constitutional question, finding that the Davis plan violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits federally funded programs from
excluding or denying benefits to any person on the grounds of race. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 41221 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part, joined by Burger, C.J., and
Stewart and Rehnquist, JJ.). These four justices would have sidestepped the constitutional issue,
finding that it was not properly before the Court. See id. at 411-12. The fifth vote to invalidate
the plan was provided by Justice Powell, who would have invalidated it on equal protection
grounds. See id. at 305-20 (opinion of Powell, J.). Because Justice Powell found the Title VI
prohibition to be coextensive with that of the Equal Protection Clause, he found it necessary to
reach the constitutional issue. See id. at 281-87. Four justices-Justice Brennan, White, Mar-
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rigid quotas but approved of the consideration of race as a factor, favorably citing the Harvard College admissions criteria. 1 75 Presumably, such opposition to quotas is based upon their mechanistic
inflexibility and their potential to generate divisive resentment, both
of which may decrease as consideration of race becomes less visible.
Nevertheless, both proponents and targets of affirmative action may
well secretly favor quotas because they are administratively convenient. Quotas clearly convey the degree of minority representation
that is appropriate in particular circumstances, and they provide a safe
harbor from potential liability for racial discrimination. Yet quotas
also constitute a blatant admission that race is an important social category, thereby belying the aspirational claim that the United States is
a colorblind nation. Once again, characterization of an affirmative action program as involving a disfavored quota or a permissible guideline that treats race as a factor is likely to be determined by how a
justice otherwise feels about the desirability of the particular affirmative action program at issue.
3.

Stigmas, Stereotypes, and Burdens

The question of whether an affirmative action plan stigmatizes or
stereotypes either its intended beneficiaries or the innocent whites
who are forced to bear its burden is a question that the Supreme
1 76
Court discusses in virtually all of its affirmative action decisions.
Nevertheless, this too appears to be an issue that is of rhetorical,
rather than operative, importance. The general stigmatization argument is that affirmative action will ultimately backfire: it will brand
shall, and Blackmun-believed that the preference was valid as a racial classification designed to
remedy disadvantages imposed upon minorities by past societal discrimination. See id. at 324-26,
355-62 (opinion of Brennan, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part, joined by
White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.). Because, like Justice Powell, these four justices found the
scope of the Title VI prohibition to be coextensive with the Equal Protection Clause, they too
deemed it necessary to reach the constitutional issue. See id. Justice White believed that Title VI
gave no cause of action to private litigants to enforce its funding restrictions. See id at 379-87
(opinion of White, J.).
175. See id. at 315-20 (opinion of Powell, J.) (approving of the Harvard plan).
176. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2119 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment); Metro Broadcasting,497 U.S. at 579-84; id. at
601-02 (Stevens, J., concurring); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-98
(1989) (opinion of O'Connor, J.); id. at 526-28 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment); Wygant v.
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 313-19 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Fullilove v. Klutznick,
448 U.S. 448, 519-21 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 294-99
(opinion of Powell, J.); United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 165-68 (1977) (opinion of
White, J.); id. at 172-74 (opinion of Brennan, J.); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 343 (1974)
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
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the intended beneficiaries of an affirmative action plan as inferior because of their inability to compete successfully on the merits; and it
will fuel latent racial tensions as innocent whites come to resent having to bear the burdens of affirmative action. A version of this argument was first articulated by Justice Douglas in DeFunis v.
Odegaard1 77 and then reasserted, by Justice Brennan in United Jewish
Organizationsv. Carey178 and by Justice Powell in Bakke. 1 79 The argument has not been asserted in a case in which it appears to have
been dispositive. 18 ° Moreover, to the extent that stigmatization is
deemed to be synonymous with racial stereotyping, the Metro Broadcasting Court's acceptance of both the proffered broadcast diversity
rationale and the asserted nexus that exists between station ownership
and broadcast diversity seems to have constituted acceptance of a relatively high degree of racial stereotyping."" In theory, an affirmative
action plan can also be invalidated because of the manner in which it

177. DeFunis, 416 U.S. at 340-41 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
178. United Jewish Orgs., 430 U.S. at 172-74 (Brennan, J., concurring in part); see also Bakke,
438 U.S. at 358-62 (opinion of Brennan, J.).
179. See Bakke, 438 U.S, at 298-99 (opinion of Powell, J.).
180. Note, for example, that Justice O'Connor referred to, but the Court did not rely upon,
the general stigmatization argument in her opinion invalidating the Richmond set-aside plan in
Croson, see Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-94 (opinion of O'Connor, J.) (discussing stigmatization in
dicta rather than holding, in a portion of the opinion joined only by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices White and Kennedy), or in her opinion dissenting from the Court's opinion upholding
the FCC plans in Metro Broadcasting. See Metro Broadcasting,497 U.S. at 603-04 (O'Connor J.,
dissenting) (discussing stigmatization and racial stereotyping in dissent). Moreover, Justice Stevens, who is sensitive to the stigmatization argument. chose not to accept that argument as a
basis for invalidating the preferential teacher layoff plan in Wygant. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 31319 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In Adarand, Justice O'Connor argued that strict scrutiny was necessary to distinguish legitimate affirmative action programs from illegitimate racial stereotyping,
but she did not place any particular stress on the danger of stigmatization. See Adarand, 115 S.
Ct. at 2112, (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.) (discussing need
for strict scrutiny)).
181. See Metro Broadcasting,497 U.S. at 566-79 (minority ownership will promote broadcast
diversity). But see id. at 579-84 (holding that an acceptance of a nexus between broadcast ownership and broadcast diversity does not constitute racial stereotyping).
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been
stigmatizes whites. 182 Again, however, no plan has actually
183
found invalid because of the imposition of such a stigma.

The degree of burden that an affirmative action plan places on
innocent whites is likely to be a significant factor.'as Metro Broadcasting upheld a plan that interfered only with the prospective expectations of innocent whites and did not burden whites with any change in
the status quo, 8 5 while Wygant v. Board of Education, invalidated a
plan that called for the layoff of white teachers rather than minority
teachers with less seniority." 8 Although the distinction between frustrated expectations and reduction of the status quo may not ultimately
have much meaning, 87 some justices have treated it as outcome-de182. See Metro Broadcasting,497 U.S. at 601-02 (Stevens, J., concurring); Croson, 488 U.S. at
514-16 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448
U.S. 448 , 521 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 519-21 (opinion
of Powell, J.); United Jewish Orgs., 430 U.S. at 165-68 (opinion of White, J.); id. at 174 (opinion
of Brennan, J.). The argument appears to be that, to the extent that affirmative action is used to
remedy the effects of past discrimination, affirmative action stigmatize whites by charging them
with having engaged in past racial discrimination. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 514-16 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Sometimes the issue of stigmatization or stereotyping that adversely affects whites seems to be conflated with the issue of burden on whites.
See, e.g., Bakke, 438 U.S. at 294-99 (opinion of Powell, J.); United Jewish Orgs., 430 U.S. at 17274.
183. United Jewish Organizations presented perhaps the strongest case for invalidating an
affirmative action plan because of the stigma that it imposed on whites. Although the reapportionment plan there at issue benefited black voters by diluting the voting strength of white
Hasidic Jews, the Court nevertheless chose to uphold the plan. See United Jewish Orgs., 430 U.S.
at 172-74 (opinion of Brennan, J.).
184. The Court almost always discusses the burden imposed on innocent whites by an affirmative action plan that it is reviewing. See, e.g., Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113 (quoting Croson, 488
U.S. at 516-17 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)); id. at 2120-22, 2125
n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting), id. at 2133-34 (Souter, J., dissenting); Metro Broadcasting,397 U.S.
at 596-600; id. at 630-31 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S.
616, 637-38 (1987); Local 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 531-35
(1986) (White, J., dissenting); id. at 535-45 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of
Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 279-84 (1986) (opinion of Powell, J.); id. at 294-95 (White, J., concurring in
judgment); id. at 306-10 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 484-85 (opinion of Burger, C.J.); United Steel Workers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979); Bakke, 438 U.S. at
294-99 (opinion of Powell, J.); United Jewish Orgs., 430 U.S. at 165-68 (opinion of White, J.); id.
at 171-79 (Brennan. J., concurring in part). Curiously, the majority opinion in Croson did not
explicitly discuss the burden on innocent whites. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 507-08 (discussing
narrowness requirement without discussing burden on innocent whites).
185. See Metro Broadcasting,497 U.S. at 596-600 (discussing burden imposed on nonminorities by FCC affirmative action plans); Wygant v. Board of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
186. Four of the five justices who voted to invalidate the Wygant plan focused on the burden
that the plan imposed on white teachers. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 268, 279-84 (opinion of Powell,
J., joined by Burger, CJ., and Rehnquist, J.) (objecting to layoff plan as insufficiently narrow);
id. at 294-95 (White, J., concurring in judgment) (objecting to layoff of white teachers in order to
retain minority teachers).
187. The deprivation of an economic opportunity such as a prospective salary is the same
whether it was first promised and then denied, or never promised at all. This point was recognized by Justice Stevens in Wygant. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 319 n.14. Outside economic circles,
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terminative." 8 Among currently sitting justices, Chief Justice Rehnquist has viewed the distinction as dispositive, 1 89 and Justice
O'Connor has endorsed the distinction without endorsing its dispositive character. 190 In addition, the Court's Title VII affirmative action
cases indicate that the Court is quite attentive to both the nature and
scope of the burden imposed upon innocent whites, including whether
the burden is voluntarily assumed or court-imposed.' 9 '
It is unclear whether the court will ultimately prove more recep-

tive to voluntary or court-ordered affirmative action plans. The
Court's Title VII cases state that, for statutory purposes, voluntary
affirmative action plans can be implemented free from restrictions
that would apply to court-ordered plans. 19 2 The issue is most likely to
it is probably true that deterioration of the status quo is psychologically viewed as more serious
than lost expectations. See, e.g., Lon L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in
ContractDamages 1, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 53-57 (1936) (asserting that under "ordinary standards of
justice," restitution and reliance claims are stronger than lost expectation claims). Nevertheless,
although differential levels of reliance might arguably accompany the two types of deprivations,
reliance would seem to be unjustifiable whenever there is advance notice of a future deprivation,
as there is under most affirmative action plans. Moreover, it is unclear why the legislature
should not be able to conclude that the public interest in promoting affirmative action outweighs
the public interest in protecting the reliance of its citizens.
188. Several justices have stressed their opposition to the use of layoffs, as opposed to prospective hiring goals, in affirmative action plans. See, e.g., Wygant, 476 U.S. at 294-95 (White, J.,
concurring in judgment); id. at 282-84 (opinion of Powell, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J.); cf. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 574-76 (1984); (majority
opinion of White, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor, JJ.) (arguing
in favor of protecting seniority). But see Firefighters,478 U.S. at 531-35 (White, J., dissenting)
(arguing that Title VII precludes prospective race-conscious promotions when not necessary to
benefit actual victims of discrimination); id. at 535-45 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also Weber,
443 U.S. at 208 (majority opinion of Brennan, J., joined by Stewart, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.) (emphasizing that preferential training plan did not require discharge of white
workers).
189. See Firefighters, 478 U.S. at 535-45 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that Ttle VII
precludes prospective race-conscious promotions when not necessary to benefit actual victims of
discrimination); Wygant, 476 U.S. at 282-84 (opinion of Powell, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.)
(expressing aversion to layoffs); cf Stotts, 467 U.S. at 574-76; (majority opinion of White, J.,
joined by Rehnquist, J.) (arguing in favor of protecting seniority under Title VII).
190. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 293-94 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (discussing layoff provisions
and hiring goals).
191. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 637-40 (1987) (considering burden
on innocent whites); Firefighters, 478 U.S. at 515-24 (remedial powers of court in approving
burdens contained in voluntary consent decree are broader than court's power to issue remedy
itself); Weber, 443 U.S. at 208-09 (Title VII permits voluntary affirmative action plans that do
not unnecessarily trammel interest of whites); see also Wygant, 476 U.S. at 317-18 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (emphasizing the fact that the burden on whites was voluntarily assumed through full
participation in procedures by which the plan was adopted).
192. See Johnson,480 U.S. at 632-33 (voluntary affirmative action plan can be adopted without prima facie showing of past discrimination under Title VII); Firefighters,478 U.S. at 515-30
(court-approved consent decree can exceed scope of permissible court-ordered remedies under
Tile VII); Weber, 443 U.S. at 208-09 (adjudicated Title VII violation is not a prerequisite to
voluntary affirmative action plan as it would be for court-imposed remedy).

1995]

Howard Law Journal
be relevant with respect to the burden borne by innocent whites. If a
burden has been voluntarily assumed, it may be acceptable without
evidence of prior discrimination or narrow tailoring even though a
court could not have imposed that burden as part
of a remedial order
193
in the absence of such a voluntary assumption.
The voluntary affirmative action issue is directly related to the
often-imposed requirement that the affirmative action plan be justified as a remedy for part discrimination. If it turns out that acceptable
affirmative action in particular contexts is limited to plans that seek to
remedy the effects of past discrimination, 94 evidence of past discrimination may be required before voluntary affirmative action is permitted. This view was rejected by the Court in United Steelworkers of
America v. Weber,' 95 which permitted voluntary affirmative action
plans even in the absence of a showing of prior unlawful discrimination. 196 Nevertheless, the holding of Weber is rather fragile. Four justices-Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White, O'Connor, and
Scalia-have expressed the view that Weber was incorrectly decided
and that voluntary affirmative action should not be permitted in the
absence of grounds for court-ordered affirmative action. 9 7 In addition, Justices Kennedy and Thomas, who were not on the Court when
Weber was decided, have never voted in favor of an affirmative action
program.1 98 This creates a five-justice majority-consisting of Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and
Thomas-who may be willing to disallow the voluntary affirmative action that the Supreme Court authorized in Weber. Moreover, these are
the same five justices who comprised the majority in Adarand,199 and
2 00 indicates that they
their willingness to overrule Metro Broadcasting
193. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 317-18 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that the burden on
whites was voluntarily assumed by full participation in adoption procedure).
194. See supra text accompanying notes 143-166 (discussing permissible justification for affirmative action).
195. United Steel Workers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
196. See Weber, 443 U.S. at 208-09 (holding that prior unlawful discrimination not precondition to voluntary affirmative action), see also Johnson, 480 U.S. at 632-33 (extending Weber to
municipal employers).
197. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 647-57 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment); id. at 669-77
(Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White, J.).
198. See supra text accompanying notes 91-95 (listing votes of justices in affirmative action
cases).

199. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2101 (1995) (listing votes of
justices).
200. See id. at 2112-13 (overruling Metro Broadcasting).
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may also be willing to overrule Weber.2° ' In fact, it may be that
Adarand itself renders unconstitutional any reading of Title VII that
does not insist on demonstrable prior discrimination as a prerequisite
to voluntary affirmative action.2 "2 In addition, to the extent that
Weber was rooted in the belief that affirmative action is subject to less
demanding scrutiny because of its benign nature,20 3 Weber seems to be
in direct conflict with the Adarand holding that the benign nature of
2°
affirmative action does not provide immunity from strict scrutiny.
Finally, it is interesting to note that the Court first flirted with and
then rejected the notion that no race-conscious burden could ever be
imposed upon innocent whites unless necessary to provide a remedy
to an actual victim of discrimination. 20 5 An actual-victim limitation
201. For the general views of Justices O'Connor and Kennedy on the doctrine of stare decisis, see id. at 2114-17. It is not clear what inference should be drawn from the refusal of Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas to join the stare decisis portion of Justice
O'Connor's opinion in Adarand, but it is likely that those three justices are more rather than less
willing to overrule cases than are Justices O'Connor and Kennedy. Both Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy were unwilling to overrule Roe v. Wade in the joint opinion that they authored with
Justice Souter in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2804 (1992).
This was true despite their political opposition to abortion. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2116
(explaining the decision not to overrule Roe in Casey). Justice O'Connor has in the past stated
that she disagrees with the holding of Weber but that it is now so well settled that she would not
overrule it. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 647-48. That statement, however, was made in 1987, prior to
Justice O'Connor's opinions in Adarand, Metro Broadcasting,and Croson; and it is not clear that
she will continue to embrace the position that she adopted in Johnson.
202. The financial incentive at issue in Adarand encouraged private parties to consider race
in the selection of subcontractors. See Adarand. 115 S. Ct. at 2102-04 (describing Adarand's
affirmative action program). If such official encouragement of private race-consciousness in the
absence of a demonstrated need to remedy prior discrimination violates the Equal Protection
Clause in the Adarand bidding context, see id. at 25-26 (requiring strict scrutiny of Adarand
financial incentive plan), it may be that the similar official encouragement to engage in raceconscious employment decisions in order to avoid a potential Title VII violation would also
violate the Equal Protection Clause-at least in the absence of a showing that such race consciousness was a narrowly tailored remedy for past discrimination. This is an issue that the
Supreme Court did not address in Weber. See United Steel Workers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S.
193, 208-09 (1979) (declining to demarcate line between permissible and impermissible voluntary affirmative action plans).
203. See Weber, 443 U.S. at 200-04, 208-09 (focusing on benign nature of affirmative action
plan at issue).
204. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 15-22.
205. See Local 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 515-28 (1986)
(authorizing use of race-conscious remedies in Title VII consent decree when not necessary to
provide remedy to actual victims of discrimination); Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n v.
EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 471-75 (1986) (opinion of Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, Blackmun and
Stevens, JJ.) (arguing that Title VII authorized court to order race-conscious remedies not intended to provide make-whole relief to actual victims of discrimination); id. at 483-84 (Powell, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (arguing that Title VII authorized court to order
race-conscious remedies not intended to provide make-whole relief to actual victims of discrimination, at least where defendant's conduct was egregious). But see Firefighters Local Union No.
1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561,578-83 (1984) (suggesting that race-conscious Title VII remedies are
limited to actual victims of discrimination).
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would constitute a rejection of the concept of affirmative action. It
would rely solely on tort-type remedies to compensate victims of discrimination, without any effort to overcome the limitations of the tort
system in dealing with widespread undifferentiated injuries.2 °6 Nevertheless, at least two justices currently on the Court appear to approve
of the actual-victim limitation: Justices Rehnquist and Scalia.2" 7 In addition, up to three other justices-Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and
Thomas-may come to adopt the actual-victim view, as evidenced by
the fact that they always vote against affirmative action. 2°
4. The Doctrinal Effect of Adarand
Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in Adarand makes it clear
that strict scrutiny now applies to all race-based affirmative action
programs, whether federal, state, or local.20 9 It is less clear, however,
whether the Adarand escalation from intermediate to strict scrutiny
for congressional programs-and the analogous Croson escalation for
state and local programs 2 1 -will have any significant doctrinal effect.
As has been discussed, 211 if strict scrutiny remains "fatal in fact," this
escalated scrutiny will indeed prove to be significant in those cases to
which it applies. It will be outcome determinative, and affirmative
action initiatives such as the Metro Broadcasting preference and the
Fullilove set aside will no longer be constitutional. However, Justice
O'Connor's assurance that strict scrutiny is no longer fatal scrutiny,2 12
206. Justice Scalia has argued that a state can use race-conscious remedies to undo past discrimination in which the state itself has engaged, as, for example, when it raises the salaries of
minority workers who are being paid less that white workers doing comparable jobs. See City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,522-28 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). It
is unclear whether Justice Scalia views such a remedy as a race-based affirmative action plan or
as a plan that compensates actual victims of discrimination, in part because it is unclear whether
there is ultimately any difference between the two.
207. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 664-68 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J.) (arguing that Title VII precludes race-conscious affirmative action not required to compensate actual victims of discrimination); Firefighters, 478 U.S. 535-45
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S. at 500 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
208. See supra text accompanying notes 89, 91-92 (listing votes of justices in affirmative action cases). Justice Kennedy has also expressed some receptivity to the actual-victim limitation.
See Croson, 488 U.S. at 518-19 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment) (rule limiting racial preferences to what is necessary to compensate actual victims of discrimination is appealing).
209. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2111-13 (1995) (applying strict
scrutiny to federal as well as non-federal affirmative action programs).
210. See Croson,488 U.S. at 477-86 (applying strict scrutiny to non-federal affirmative action
programs).
211. See supra text accompanying notes 120-42 (discussing whether Adarand strict scrutiny is
fatal in fact).
212. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2114, 2117 (advancing the view that strict scrutiny is not
"fatal in fact").
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raises the possibility that at least five members of the present Court
will vote to uphold some affirmative action programs under Adarand's
new strict scrutiny standard.2 13 Regardless of what strict scrutiny
comes to mean, however, it is likely that many existing affirmative
action programs can be restructured so that they will remain constitutionally permissible even after Adarand and Croson.
The strict scrutiny that the Supreme Court invoked in Adarand
and Croson applies only to affirmative action programs that intentionally utilize racial classifications to advance their objectives.2 14 This is
because under Washington v. Davis, 215 the Equal Protection Clause
prohibits only intentional discrimination; it does not prohibit the use
of race-neutral classifications that have an unintended racially disparate impact. 21 6 Typically, pre-Adarand affirmative action programs
contained explicit racial preferences, thereby providing strong evidence of intentional discrimination within the meaning of Washington
v. Davis. 217 Yet, if those programs are restructured in a way that accords preferential treatment to individuals on the basis of social or
economic disadvantage, without explicit reference to race, those pro-

213. See supratext accompanying notes 120-42 (discussing whether Adarandstrict scrutiny is
fatal in fact).
214. The Supreme Court has held that gender-based classifications are subject to intermediate scrutiny rather than the strict scrutiny that is normally applied to race-based classifications.
See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). As a result, Adarand does not require the application of
strict scrutiny to gender-based affirmative action programs as it does for race-based programs.
Justice Stevens pointed out in his Adarand dissent that this creates the perverse result of making
it easier under the Equal Protection Clause to adopt a valid gender affirmative action plan than
it is to adopt a valid racial affirmative action plan, even though the primary purpose of the Equal
protection Clause was to end the history of discrimination against blacks. See Adarand, 115 S.
Ct. at 2122 (Stevens, J., dissenting). This anomaly takes on added potential significance when
one recalls that Justice O'Connor-the author of the majority opinion in Adarand-has never
voted to uphold a non-judicial race-based affirmative action program on the merits. The only
affirmative action program that she has voted to uphold on the merits was presented to the
Court as a gender-based program. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 647
(1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
215. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-48 (1976) (requiring proof of intentional discrimination to establish a constitutional violation).
216. Cf. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971) (finding disparate impact
sufficient to establish Title VII violation).
217. See, e.g., Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. at 566, 600-01 (1990) (racial preferences for minority broadcasters in award of broadcast licenses); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469, 477-86 (1989) (minority set aside for construction contracts); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 270-73 (1986) (opinion of Powell, J.) (preference for minority
teachers in avoiding layoffs); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 453-54, 468-72 (1980) (opinion
of Burger, C.J.) (minority set aside for construction contracts); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 272-81 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.) (medical school admissions preference
for disadvantaged minority applicants).
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grams should not be subject to heightened scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause, because they will not utilize racial classifications.
Restructuring a race-based affirmative action program to be a
disadvantage-based program will inevitably have a racially disparate
impact, because racial minorities are disproportionately represented
among those who suffer social and economic disadvantage.2 18 In Personnel Administrator v. Feeney,219 however, the Supreme Court held
that mere knowledge of such disparate impact was not sufficient to
establish the type of intentional discrimination that Washington v. Davis demands to trigger strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection
Clause. Feeney held that the intent necessary for an equal protection
violation was "because of" actuating intent, not merely "in spite of"
tolerance of a known consequence.2 20 It would seem to follow, therefore, that a restructured affirmative action plan that was genuinely intended to aid those who are socially or economically disadvantaged
would be constitutional despite its racially disparate impact, while a
plan that was drafted in race-neutral terms relating to "disadvantage,"
but that was really intended to aid minorities because of their race,
would not be constitutional. Most intentional efforts to aid racial minorities stem from the disproportionate levels of disadvantage being
suffered by racial minorities. Accordingly, most affirmative action
plans can honestly be described as plans that rest on an intent that is
constitutionally permissible under Washington v. Davis and Feeney.
Indeed, the long history of the disadvantages suffered by racial minorities in the United States is central to what it means to be a racial
minority in the United States. It is what accounts for the cultural significance of race, and it is what makes race different from eye color or
hair color. As a result, it is not clear that the contending conceptions
of intent that arguably lie beneath a disparate-impact classification are
metaphysically different in the context of race. 221 It is clear, however,

218. Although restructured programs are likely to have a racially disparate impact, it is also
likely that, in absolute terms, many such programs will provide more benefits to whites than to
racial minorities.
219. Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 278-80 (1979).
220. See id. Although Feeney was a gender discrimination case, see id. at 261-64 (describing
gender-based challenge to veterans preference program), its required proof of intent seems
equally applicable to racial discrimination.
221. The difference between discriminatory intent and discriminatory effect is ultimately
problematic. See infra note 320 (discussing difference between discriminatory intent and effect).
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as
that most affirmative action programs can, with sincerity, be recast
222
programs that are designed to assist disadvantaged individuals.
Title VII poses a special problem for affirmative action plans that
are restructured to be race-neutral. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,223
the Supreme Court held that Title V1I-unlike the Equal Protection
Clause-does prohibit the use of classifications that have a racially
disparate impact. As a result, it might be that a restructured, raceneutral affirmative action program that did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution would nevertheless violate Title
VII. Such a result, however, seems ultimately unsound.
The Supreme Court held in Weber" 4 that race-conscious affirmative action programs do not violate Title VII. It would seem to follow,
therefore, that race neutral affirmative action programs with a racially
disparate impact would also be valid under Title VII. The problem is
that the reasoning of Weber is in tension with the reasoning of
Adarand. In Weber, the Court concluded that the benign nature of
affirmative action was a sufficient justification for the racially disparate impact of an affirmative action program that did not excessively
burden whites.2 25 As has been discussed, 226 it may be that the Weber
reading of Title VII does not survive Adarand, precisely because the
present Court no longer views the distinction between benign and invidious discrimination as dispositive. It is more likely, however, that
Title VII will be construed to permit affirmative action programs that
are permissible under the equal protection clause.
To the extent that affirmative action programs are congressional
programs-such as the programs at issue in Adarand, Metro Broadcasting and Fullilove-they should be valid under Title VII because it
is difficult to conclude that Congress intended Title VII to invalidate
its own programs. To the extent that state and local programs mirror
222. Affirmative action is sometimes criticized as benefiting those racial minorities who are
relatively prosperous rather than those racial minorities who are disadvantaged. At any given
level of socio-economic accomplishment, however, it seems clear that racial minorities are disadvantaged relative to whites at that same level of accomplishment. Accordingly, this objection to
affirmative action confuses affirmative action programs with subsistence income redistribution
programs. If affirmative action is viewed as a remedy for racial discrimination, it would not seem
to matter whether the beneficiaries of an affirmative action program are indigent or wealthy.
223. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971) (finding disparate impact sufficient to establish Title VII violation).
224. United Steel Workers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208-09 (1979).
225. See iii at 200-04, 208-09; cf. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 210811 (1995) (rejecting benign motive as justification for less than strict scrutiny).
226. See supra text accompanying notes 194-204 (discussing the impact of Adarand on
Weber).
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congressional programs in the way that the Croson set aside mirrored
the Fullilove set aside, it is similarly difficult to conclude that Congress
intended Title VII to invalidate those programs, precisely because of
their similarity to the congressional programs. To the extent that affirmative action programs are private, voluntary programs to which
the Equal Protection Clause does not apply, the Weber Court's finding
that Congress did not intend Title VII to preclude such programs
would still seem to be controlling. If the Supreme Court did not interpret Title VII in these ways, Congress could amend the statute, in a
way that it cannot amend the Equal Protection Clause, to permit the
desired degree of affirmative action. It is only if the Supreme Court is
willing to hold that a Weber-type reading of Title VII-a reading that
allows benign affirmative action-is itself a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause that restructured programs would be invalid. Such
a holding, however, would be a peculiar contortion of the Equal Protection Clause. The Supreme Court would be substituting a disparate
impact standard, in the context of affirmative action, for the Washington v. Davis intentional discrimination standard, on which it insisted in
the context of invidious discrimination. It is difficult to see how the
constitutional standard applied to a discrimination remedy could
properly be more demanding than the standard applied to the discrimination itself.
The uncertainty that surrounds Justice O'Connor's new strict
scrutiny makes it difficult to predict what doctrinal impact Adarand
will ultimately have. If strict scrutiny results in the unsalvageable invalidation of affirmative action programs that were valid prior to
Adarand, the doctrinal effect of the decision will have been significant.
If, however, Adarand strict scrutiny turns out to be largely a replication of pre-Adarand intermediate scrutiny, 2 7 or if pre-Adarand affirmative action programs can be salvaged by restructuring them as
race-neutral programs, the doctrinal effect of the case will prove to be
negligible. Regardless of the doctrinal effect that Adarand ultimately
has, the case has already had a significant rhetorical effect. Adarand
signifies a political alignment of the Supreme Court with the increasingly conservative mood of the nation concerning the issue of affirmative action.22 s Whether this constitutes appropriate or inappropriate
227. See supra text accompanying notes 141-42 (suggesting that non-fatal strict scrutiny may
be the functional equivalent of intermediate scrutiny).

228. As has been noted, the increasing conservatism of the American public seems to rest on
a deep ambivalence about affirmative action. The American public seems to favor some ill-de-
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conduct on the part of the Supreme Court is infinitely debatable.2 29
But what is clear is that the Adarand majority-like a significant segment of the electorate-has a conception of contemporary race relations in the United States that is difficult to defend.
II. DISCRIMINATION
The Supreme Court's decision in Adarand effectively proclaims
that the history of pervasive racial discrimination in the United States
has now come to an end, thereby rendering continued use of affirmative action remedies for such discrimination inappropriate. The Court
still professes to recognize a compelling governmental interest in the
provision of remedies for past discrimination, but that recognition has
now become more hypothetical than authentic. In the Court's view,
present instances of racial injustice are either isolated acts of unlawful
discrimination, for which isolated remedies are preferable to systemic
affirmative action, or they are the effects of general societal discrimination, which is too subtle and diffuse to be legally cognizable. This is
an artificial view, born of extravagant commitment to doctrinal abstraction and considered indifference to actual experience. Nevertheless, the Court's depiction of contemporary culture as having evolved
to a post-discriminatory stage of social development not only serves as
the basis for the Adarand decision, but it also underlies the other race
cases that the Court decided during its 1994 Term. The Court has
seemingly determined that resolution of the nation's continuing racerelations problems lies beyond the responsibility and the competence
of government, and that efforts to address those problems are both
unnecessary and unconstitutional.
A.

Adarand

The facts of the Adarand case are straightforward. A private general contractor was awarded a prime contract by the Department of
Transportation to construct a highway in Colorado. The prime contractor selected a Latino subcontractor to perform certain guardrail
work for the highway project, even though that subcontractor had
submitted the second lowest bid for the work, rather than the lowest
bid. The prime contractor selected this contractor because a provifined changes in affirmative action but is unwilling to abolish affirmative action completely. See
supra note 17 (documenting ambivalence about affirmative action).
229. For an argument that the Supreme Court is institutionally incapable of doing anything
other than reflecting majoritarian political preferences, see SPANN, supra note 5.
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sion in its contract with the Department of Transportation provided
for a bonus to the prime contractor equal to ten percent of the value
of any subcontracts that the prime contractor awarded to a subcontractor certified by a specified state or federal agency as being socially
and economically disadvantaged. The bonus was subject to certain
specified ceilings. Because the Latino subcontractor was certified as
disadvantaged and the lowest bidder was not, the bonus enabled the
general contractor to earn more money by awarding the guardrail
contract to the Latino subcontractor.230
The Department of Transportation in its prime contract included
this bonus provision pursuant to federal statutes and agency regulations that required most federal agency contracts to include such
clauses as a means of assisting disadvantaged small businesses. 231 The
Small Business Act 232 established a national policy of assisting small
business enterprises, including small businesses that were owned and
controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals.
The Act defined "socially disadvantaged individuals" as "those who
have been subjected to racial or ethnic prejudice or cultural bias because of their identity as a member of a group without regard to their
individual qualities,"'23 3 and it defined "economically disadvantaged
individuals" as "those socially disadvantaged individuals whose ability
to compete in the free enterprise system has been impaired due to
diminished capital and credit opportunities as compared to others in
the same business area who are not socially disadvantaged. '234 The
Act set a goal of awarding to such disadvantaged enterprises "not less
than 5 percent of the total value of all prime contract and subcontract
awards for each fiscal year.""2 3
In addition, the Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation
Assistance Act of 1987 2 36-the statute under which the contract at
issue in Adarand was awarded-required that at least ten percent of
the federal highway funds appropriated by that Act go to enterprises
230.
federal
231.
232.

See'Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S.Ct. 2097, 2102-04 (1995) (describing
affirmative action program).
See id. at 2102 (recognizing general federal contracting requirement).
The Small Business Act, Pub. L. No. 85-536, 72 Stat. 384 (codified as amended at 15

U.S.C. §§ 631-6201 (1994)).
233. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2102 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(5)).
234. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(6)(A)).

235. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 644(g)(1)). The five percent minimum applicable to all affected
federal programs is stated to be a goal rather than a requirement. See id.
236. The Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 10017, 100 Stat. 145 (codified as amended at 23 U.S.C. §§ 101-160 (1994)).
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owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals. 237 The Surface Transportation Act adopted the definitions
of social and economic disadvantage that were contained in the Small
Business Act.238 The Surface Transportation Act also provided a
mechanism for state agencies to certify small business concerns as disSmall Business Act mechaadvantaged, thereby supplementing the
23 9
nisms for federal agency certification.
Nothing in the affirmative action programs for socially and economically disadvantaged small businesses that has been described thus
far poses any equal protection problem. Equal protection difficulties
are raised by the fact that both the Small Business Act and the Surface
Transportation Act presume that racial minorities are disadvantaged.
The Small Business Act requires federal prime contracts to state that
"[t]he contractor shall presume that socially and economically disadvantaged individuals include Black Americans, Hispanic Americans,
Native Americans, Asian Pacific Americans, and other minorities or
any other individual found to be disadvantaged by the [Small Business] Administration. '24 0 The Surface Transportation Act also adopts
the Small Business Act presumption. 24 1 The presumptions of minority
disadvantage were not conclusive, but rather were rebuttable presumptions. Individuals who were not members of the enumerated
groups could nevertheless prove that they were entitled to certification as disadvantaged, and third parties such as disappointed bidders
could present evidence to rebut the presumption of disadvantage for
particular individuals who were members of the enumerated
groups.2 4 2 It is only this rebuttable presumption of minority disadvantage that gives rise to equal protection concerns.
Under the statutory scheme, both social and economic disadvantage must be established before a bonus becomes available. The rec237. 23 U.S.C. § 101(1).
238. Id. § 101(2)(A).
239. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S.Ct. 2097, 2103-04 (1995) (citing 23 U.S.C.
§ 101(4)). The ten percent minimum applicable to Department of Transportation contracts issued under the Surface Transportation Act appears to be a statutory requirement rather than
merely a goal. See id. at 2103.
240. See id. at 2102 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 637(d)(3)(C)(ii)). Small Business Administration
regulations contain additional, similar presumptions adopted by the agency to facilitate implementation of the Small Business Act. See id. at 2102-03 (citing regulations).
241. See id. at 2103 (quoting 23 U.S.C. § 101(2)(B)). The Surface Transportation Act also
adds that "women shall be presumed to be socially and economically disadvantaged individuals
for purposes of this subsection." See id. (quoting 23 U.S.C. § 101(2)(B)).
242. See id. at 2103-04 (presumption of disadvantage was rebuttable (citing 49 C.F.R. § 23.69
(1994))).
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ord in Adarand does not disclose the degree to which the statutory
presumption, as opposed to direct proof, was responsible for certification of the Latino subcontractor as disadvantaged.24 3 Nevertheless,
the disappointed low bidder filed suit in federal district court challenging the constitutionality of the affirmative action incentive program
that had cost it the desired guardrail subcontract. The United States
District Court for the District of Colorado and the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit rejected the challenge and upheld the affirmative action program on the government's motion for
summary judgment, after applying an intermediate-scrutiny standard
of review. 244 Although the essence of the challenge in the lower
courts concerned only the power of an agency to exceed congressional
affirmative action goals without specific findings of discrimination,2 45
the Supreme Court used the case as an opportunity to announce a
new standard of strict scrutiny for congressionally authorized affirmative action programs, and seemingly to invalidate a central aspect of
the program at issue in Adarand.24 Even if the Adarand program is
itself upheld on remand, the Supreme Court presumably intended to
preclude some affirmative action programs that were permissible
under the intermediate scrutiny standard that the Court overruled. 47
B.

Presumption

The feature of the affirmative action program at issue in Adarand
that made it constitutionally suspect was the presence of the rebuttable presumption that racial minorities are socially and economically
243. See id. at 2103, 2118 (application of presumption unclear). Presumably, this is one of the
issues that the lower courts will have to clarify on remand. See id. at 2118.
244. See id. at 2104 (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Skinner, 790 F. Supp. 240 (D. Colo.
1992), aff'd, 16 F.3d 1537, 1547 (10th Cir. 1995)).
245. See id. at 2131 (Souter, J., dissenting) (describing challenges to findings in lower courts).
In fact, after the case was argued in the Supreme Court, there was speculation that the Court
would have to dispose of the case on justifiability grounds because it could not appropriately
address the merits of the affirmative action presumption. See Linda Greenhouse, Detours on the
Road to Legal Precedents, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1995, § 4, at 3.
246. It is possible that on remand the Adarand program will be able to survive the new form
of strict scrutiny that the Court states is not necessarily fatal. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2117
(asserting that strict scrutiny is not "fatal in fact"). But see supra text accompanying notes 123142 (discussing whether strict scrutiny is "fatal in fact").
247. In United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995), the same five-justice majority that
decided Adarand stressed that, in order to be meaningful, a legal standard must have the capacity to invalidate some imaginable legislative enactment that fails to satisfy the standard. See id.
at 1632-33.
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disadvantaged. 214 Because the presumption was available to minority
contractors but not to white contractors, it constituted a racial classification, which the Supreme Court found to be suspect under the equal
protection component of the Fifth Amendment.24 9 Although the congressional presumption seems to be self-evidently valid, the Court rejected this self-evident validity for constitutional purposes, thereby
creating an artificial disjunction between the world of ordinary experience and the world that is relevant to constitutional analysis. In fact,
it is precisely because the statutory presumption of minority disadvantage seems so reasonable that the Supreme Court's strict scrutiny of
that presumption seems so striking. In essence, the Supreme Court
appears to have held in Adarand that it is unconstitutional to believe
that racial minorities continue to be socially and economically disadvantaged in contemporary culture.
A legal presumption is an evidentiary short cut. It is a generalization about the world that enables a legal fact finder to infer a factual
conclusion from a proven premise with which the conclusion is highly
correlated.2 5 ° When the correlation is very high, the presumption is
sometimes deemed conclusive or irrebuttable. 251 Realistically, such irrebuttable presumptions reflect more than the mere belief in a high
correlation between premise and conclusion. Irrebutable presumptions also reflect a policy preference in favor of attaching a legal consequence to the premise conduct even in those marginal cases where
the premise and the conclusion do not correlate. 2
When the correlation between premise and conclusion is less
high, or the policy preference underlying a presumption is less strong,
the presumption may be rebuttable rather than conclusive. This
means that proof of the premise will permit inference of the conclusion, but that additional factual evidence will be considered in determining whether the premise actually correlates with the conclusion in
that particularcase, notwithstanding the correlation that is believed to
exist in the general case.253 Where a presumption is rebuttable rather
than conclusive, the presumption does not constitute a rule of deci248. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2105 (1995) (focusing on the
presumption).
249. See id. at 2112-13 (holding strict scrutiny applicable).
250. See generally 2 JoHN W. STRoNo ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §§ 342 ff. (4th ed.
1992) (discussing evidentiary presumptions).
251. See id. at § 342 (discussing conclusive presumptions).
252. See id. at §§ 342, 343 (discussing reasons for creation of presumptions).
253. See id. at §§ 342, 344 (discussing effect of presumptions in civil cases).
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254
sion, but merely constitutes a rule governing the burden of proof.

The rebuttable presumption, however, can still be dispositive in those
the relevant factual issue is by its nature incapable of
cases where
5
proof.

25

The Adarand decision involved a congressional presumption of
minority disadvantage embodied in the Small Business and Surface
Transportation Acts,2 56 which the Supreme Court held to be constitutionally suspect.257 The presumption reasoned from the premise of
racial minority status to the conclusion of social and economic disadvantage by relying on both the history of past discrimination to which
minorities have been subject, and the present skew in the distribution
of societal resources that disfavors racial minorities. 25 8 It was a rebuttable presumption, rooted in particular beliefs about the causal connection between the history of racial discrimination in the United
States and the lingering effects of past discrimination in contemporary
culture.
In civil cases that are governed by the preponderance standard of
proof, a presumption is valid as a matter of evidentiary law so long as
the connection between the premise and the conclusion is more likely
to be true than false. 259 That standard certainly seems to be satisfied

with respect to the congressional presumption of minority disadvantage. In terms of factual correlation, there is nothing controversial
about the presumption. Members of racial minority groups are statistically worse off than whites at every socio-economic level. 260 Even
Justice O'Connor's majority opinion recognized the "unfortunate reality" that there presently remain lingering effects of past discrimina-

254. See id.
255. See id.
256. See supra text accompanying notes 234-36.
257. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2105 (1995) (focusing on
presumption).
258. This is the relevance of the extensive legislative history to which Justice Stevens referred, that caused him to vote in favor of the Adarand preference even though he had voted
against the minority preference in Fullilove. See id. at 2130 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing legislative history).
259. See 2 STRONG ET AL., supra note 244, §§ 342, 344 (discussing effect of presumptions in
civil cases).
260. See id. at 2135-36 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing advantages that whites have over
racial minorities in the distribution of societal resources). See generally, Spann, supra note 5, at
120-24 (discussing the statistical disadvantage of racial minorities with respect to matters including income, employment, health, crime, and political power).
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tion, 61 and Justice Ginsburg offered additional elaboration on the
subtle forms of discrimination that continue to plague racial minorities. 262 Moreover, because the presumption was rebuttable, it could
be displaced in particular cases by evidence that particular instances
of minority disadvantage were not the result of past discrimination but
resulted from some other cause. Technically, the congressional presumption did nothing more than allocate the initial burden of proof
with respect to the issue of minority disadvantage; and in so doing, it
easily seems to satisfy the evidentiary criteria for a valid presumption.
Controversy concerning the congressional presumption stems not
from its evidentiary nature but from its policy implications. The connection between past discrimination and present disadvantage, while
undeniable in the abstract, is something that is often incapable of direct proof in particular cases, because the diverse effects of past discrimination have generalized throughout the society in ways that are
pervasive yet undifferentiated. It is typically impossible to prove
which individual acts of prior discrimination are responsible for which
particular instances of present disadvantage. As a result, the congressional presumption, while technically doing nothing more than allocating the initial burden of proof with respect to the issue of social and
economic disadvantage, has substantive impact, because the allocation
of the burden of proof will often be dispositive. In adopting its presumption, therefore, Congress was adopting a legislative policy with
respect to that class of cases in which direct proof of discriminationproduced minority disadvantage was unavailable. In such cases, Congress chose to recognize and attempt to remedy the continuing effects
of what the Supreme Court has denominated "general societal
263
discrimination.
When the congressional presumption is viewed in this light, the
Supreme Court's actions in Adarand become doctrinally curious.
There is no basis for rejecting the congressional presumption on evi261. See Adarand, 115 S.Ct. at 2117 ("The unhappy persistence of both the practice and the
lingering effects of racial discrimination against minority groups in this country is an unfortunate
reality, and government is not disqualified from acting in response to it.").
262. See id. at 2135-36 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting subtle forms of discrimination to

which racial minorities remain subject).
263. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 488-89 (1989) (stating that

affirmative action is unavailable to remedy effects of general societal discrimination); see also
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547,610-14 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Wygant
v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 288 (1986) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring); Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 647-53 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment); Regents
of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307-10 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.).
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dentiary grounds, because the correlation between minority status and
present disadvantage is high enough to satisfy the preponderance
standard that applies in a civil affirmative action case. Accordingly,
what the Supreme Court must have been doing in Adarand was rejecting the congressional policy preference favoring affirmative action
in cases where particularized proof is unavailable. In essence, the
Supreme Court replaced the congressionally adopted rebuttable presumption that minorities are disadvantaged in general-societal-discrimination cases with an irrebuttable presumption of its own that
minorities are not disadvantaged in such cases. The Supreme Court's
presumption is irrebuttable precisely because the Court refuses to recognize general societal discrimination as legally relevant."6 Although
the Court disagreed with the legislative policy preference that was embodied in the congressional presumption, Supreme Court disagreement should be inconsequential. The policy preference underlying the
congressional presumption is legislative rather than judicial in nature;
it concerns the politically appropriate allocation of societal resources,
which is an issue over which the politically accountable Congress has
greater relative institutional competence than the politically insulated
Supreme Court.
The reason that the Supreme Court rejected the congressional
presumption is that the Court has adopted a theoretical vision of the
world, where racial minorities are not disadvantaged. In an abstract
doctrinal sense, the repeal of segregation laws, and the concomitant
enactment of antidiscrimination laws, transformed the United States
from a discriminatory culture into a post-discriminatory culture. Because the culture is now officially race-neutral, there can no longer
exist in the United States any general societal discrimination of sufficient magnitude to be legally cognizable. And although bad actors
may still commit occasional acts of unlawful discrimination,2 65 those
are discrete, individualized acts in which the society at large shares no
culpability. Indeed, the society at large cannot be implicated in those
acts, precisely because the society at large has made them unlawful.
To the extent that lingering effects of past discrimination persist into
the present, 266 those effects are too subtle, and their connection with
264. See cases cited supra note 263 (illustrating the Supreme Court's refusal to recognize the
relevance of general societal discrimination).
265. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2117 (conceding the continued existence of racial
discrimination).
266. See id. (conceding the existence of lingering effects of past discrimination).
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past discrimination too attenuated, to serve as the basis for legal recognition in the absence of some connection to a more particularized
act of discrimination. To the extent that purely private conduct is re-

sponsible for minority disadvantage, such conduct is not unconstitutional and at times is even protected by the associational safeguards of
the Constitution.2 6 7 Accordingly, affirmative action intended to remedy general societal discrimination is inappropriate-because there is
68
no longer any general societal discrimination to remedy.
This formalist vision of the world is, of course, artificial, and its
contrast to the non-abstract world of actual resource allocation is jarring. The continuing statistical disadvantage of racial minorities in almost every area of social and economic life makes the artificiality of
the Supreme Court's formal vision starkly apparent. 269 Moreover, the
Court's vision feels contrived. It is precisely the same elevation of
form and disregard of substance that permitted the Court in Plessy to
conclude that separate-but-equal public facilities did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, even though
the statute at issue in Plessy had both a discriminatory purpose and
2 70

effect.

If Congress had adopted the presumption of minority disadvantage when it adopted the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868,271 the
Court presumably would not have questioned the validity of the congressional presumption. 272 The Civil War would recently have ended,
slavery would recently have been abolished, and Congress would have
adopted a series of Reconstruction statutes and constitutional amend267. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-63 (1958) (holding that freedom of association is protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution).
268. See cases cited supra note 263 (citing cases stating that affirmative action is unavailable
to remedy general societal discrimination).
269. See supra note 260 (discussing statistical disparities between minorities and whites).
270. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding racially segregated public facilities under separate-but-equal doctrine). But see id. at 557-64 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (noting
actual discriminatory purpose of statute at issue).
271. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (prohibiting states from denying to any person the equal protection of the laws).
272. In fact, the legislative history of the Reconstruction legislation that was enacted contemporaneously with the Fourteenth Amendment did contain such presumptions. See Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA. L. REV.
753, 755-83 (1985) (discussing the legislative history of Reconstruction legislation). The contending positions in the congressional debates that surrounded the Reconstruction legislation were
strikingly similar to the contemporary debate surrounding affirmative action. See id at 755. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court did not question the validity of the presumptions of racial disadvantage on which the Reconstruction legislation was based, even in the process of narrowly
construing and ultimately invalidating portions of that legislation. See cases cited supra notes 3133 (discussing cases limiting and invalidating Reconstruction statutes and amendments).
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ments designed to eliminate the vestiges of slavery by guaranteeing
formal legal equity.27 3 It is difficult to see how the presumption at
issue in Adarand differs in any qualitative respect from an 1868 presumption. Although the social and economic condition of racial minorities has improved since 1868, minorities are far from achieving
parity with whites. All that has changed since 1868 is the degree of
minority disadvantage, not its existence. Accordingly, even a theoretical vision of contemporary culture as free from general societal discrimination is difficult to accept.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court adhered to this formal vision of
the United States as a post-discriminatory culture in its other 1994
Term racial discrimination cases. In Adarand, the Court's post-discriminatory vision was readily apparent, because the Court simply
told Congress that Congress was not permitted to view contemporary
culture as racially discriminatory. That was the effect of holding the
congressional presumption of minority disadvantage subject to strict
scrutiny, rather than simply deferring to the legislative findings of
Congress as the Supreme Court typically does.27 4 In the Court's other
1994 Term race decisions, this formal vision of post-discriminatory cultural evolution was less explicit, but equally present beneath the surface of the Court's decisions.
Missouri v. Jenkins,2 7' handed down the same day as Adarand,
was another five-to-four decision, with the same alignment of justices
in the majority and dissent. In Jenkins, the Supreme Court held that
the district court lacked the authority to order certain school desegregation remedies for the Kansas City, Missouri, school district, which
prior to the 1954 decision in Brown had been officially segregated by
operation of state law.276 Because there were too few white students
living in the urban Kansas City school district to permit meaningful
integration, the district court had ordered the establishment of magnet
programs designed to attract white students from the suburbs and the
continuance of remedial programs designed to improve the under-av-

273. See SPArN, supranote 5, at 42-43 (setting out a chronology of the Civil War and subse-

quent Reconstruction statues and amendments).
274. See STONE ET AL., supra note 31, at 536-41 (explaining why the Supreme Court typically
must defer to congressional policy determinations).
275. Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995).
276. See id. at 2052 n.6 (prior to 1954, Missouri law required segregated schools); id. at 2074
(Souter, J., dissenting) (outlining history of state-mandated segregation of Missouri schools).
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erage achievement levels of students in the inner-city district.27 7 The
Supreme Court majority opinion, written by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
held these remedies to be beyond the scope of the district court's authority, because the district court had pursued an improper goal.
Chief Justice Rehnquist first emphasized that a school desegregation
plan should not have the goal of seeking to remedy general societal
discrimination. 278 He then went on to stress that the presence of onerace schools in the Kansas City district did not preclude the district
from being formally desegregated, and thereby from achieving the
unitary status required by Brown, even though those schools remained
segregated in fact.279 The presence or absence of school desegregation-just like the presence or absence of minority disadvantage in
Adarand-was determined by formal legal considerations rather than
by empirical experience.
The Jenkins majority opinion also held that the district court's
effort to attract white students from the suburbs in order to achieve
actual desegregation in the inner-city schools was improper, because
the suburban schools were not guilty of past de jure segregation, and
interdistrict remedies could not be ordered in the absence of an interdistrict constitutional violation.28 ° In addition, the majority held
277. See id. at 2042-45 (describing desegregation plan). The magnet programs were also
designed to attract students from private schools in the inner city. See id. at 2083 n.4 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
278. Chief Justice Rehnquist cited Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1,
22-23 (1971), for the proposition that school desegregation remedies should not seek to achieve
the broader social purpose of eliminating other forms of societal discrimination. See Jenkins, 115
S. Ct. at 2048; see also id. at 2060 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (agreeing that school desegregation
plan should not seek to remedy general societal discrimination); id. at 2073 (Thomas, J., concurring) (school desegregation plan should not seek to remedy discrimination that does not violate
Constitution).
279. See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2048 ("We also rejected '[t]he suggestion ... that schools which
have a majority of Negro students are not "desegregated," whatever the makeup of the school
district's population and however neutrally the district lines have been drawn and administered."' (quoting Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 474 (1992)) (ellipsis in original)).
280. See id. at 2048, 2051-52 (citing Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 746-47 (1974) (Milliken
1) (holding interdistrict remedy improper in the absence of interdistrict constitutional violation)). The majority and the dissent engaged in a vigorous debate about whether the effort to
attract white students from the suburbs through the use of magnet programs was an impermissible effort to implement an interdistrict remedy indirectly, see id. at 2051-52, or a permissible
effort to remedy the effects of intradistrict segregation that had mere incidental effects on suburban schools outside of the inner-city district. See id. at 2087-88 (Souter, J., dissenting). The
majority asserted that the answer depended on whether white flight to the suburbs was caused
by prior de jure segregation, which would make interdistrict effects permissible under Hills v.
Gautraux, 425 U.S. 284 (1975), or by the threat of desegregation after Brown, which would make
interdistrict effects impermissible. See Jenkins., 115 S. Ct. at 2052-54. Justice Souter sensibly
pointed out that the distinction was meaningless, because segregation had caused the need for a
desegregation remedy, making both segregation and the ensuing threat of desegregation joint
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that the district court could not continue to require state funding of
remedial programs to counteract the underachievement of minority
students that had existed since the era of pre-Brown segregation. Remedial programs could not be continued indefinitely simply because
of continued underachievement by minority students. 28 1 Finally, the
opinion suggested that the Kansas City school district may have become at least partially unitary under Brown, as construed by Freeman
court jurisdicv. Pitts, 28 2 thereby making the relinquishment of district
28 3
appropriate.
control
local
of
restoration
tion and the
The holding in Jenkins is noteworthy for both its artificiality and
its circularity. Prior to Brown, the Missouri schools were segregated
by state law.284 This meant that the inner-city schools were de jure
segregated, because race-conscious pupil assignment had been required in order to comply with the state segregation laws. Race-conscious pupil assignment had not been necessary in the white suburbs,
however, because residential discrimination meant that minority students did not live in the white suburbs.2 85 After Brown, white students fled to the de facto segregated suburban schools in order to
escape the inner-city desegregation required by Brown.2 86 This left
too few white students to permit meaningful desegregation of the inner-city schools. 28 However, interdistrict desegregation remedies
that included the white suburban schools were impermissible because
the de facto segregated suburban schools were never de jure segrecauses of the interdistrict effects of the district court's magnet program. See id. at 2085-86 (Souter, J., dissenting). Legal technicalities aside, it is not clear why the Supreme Court should object
to an effort to make inner-city magnet schools attractive to white students residing in the suburbs. It is as if the Court simply cannot conceive of a black school being attractive to whites-or
at least cannot approve of such an attraction.
281. See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2055 (invalidating continued state funding of remedial programs). But see id. at 2074-75 (Souter, J., dissenting) (discussing the lingering underachievement
of minority students since the pre-Brown era of de jure segregation).
282. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992) (recognizing partial unitary status).
283. See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2055-56 (suggesting achievement of partial unitary status).
284. See supra note 276 (emphasizing that Missouri's pre-Brown segregation was required by
state law).
285. See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2050 (finding de jure segregation in inner-city but not in suburban schools).
286. See id. at 2052-53 (acknowledging that white flight was caused by desegregation).
Although this is the traditional account of the white-flight phenomenon, a recent study suggests
that population growth and immigration patterns rather than actual white flight are responsible
for residential segregation. See GARY ORFIELD, THE GROWTH OF SEGREGATION IN AMERICAN
SCHOOLS: CHANGING PATTERNS OF SEPARATION AND POVERTY SINCE 1968, at 13 (1993).
287. See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2043 (recognizing existence of too few white students for
meaningful desegregation of inner-city schools).
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gated, and were therefore unitary under Brown.28 8 Moreover, the
one-race inner-city schools were now as integrated as they could be,
given the lack of white students remaining in the inner-city. As a result, the inner-city schools could now be considered formally desegregated, entitling the inner-city schools to unitary status under Brown as
well.289 Accordingly, the pre-Brown dual school system in Kansas
City had now been replaced with a post-Brown school system that
could be unitary even though the racial complexion of both the innercity and suburban schools remained the same.
What the Supreme Court did in Jenkins was to validate the constitutionality of the very separate-but-equal schools that it had invalidated in Brown-it replicated the one-hundred-year-old, discredited
decision that it had first rendered in Plessy. In Jenkins, one-race white
schools and one-race minority schools could both be declared desegregated, because there need no longer be a correspondence between the
world of empirical experience and the world of doctrinal formality in
which Supreme Court adjudication occurs. The only significant difference that exists between the one-race schools that the Court permitted in Jenkins and the one-race schools that were permissible under
the separate-but-equal principle of Plessy is that the separate schools
in Jenkins no longer have to be equal.2 9 ° Thus, the Court held, in
effect, that the district court was not authorized to continue statefunded remedial programs to compensate for the underachievement
of inner-city students. Now, not only do the Kansas City schools remain segregated, but the education that the inner-city schools offer to
minority students is inferior to the education offered to white students
in the suburbs. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court still seems to view
29 1
the schools as equal, with no lingering effects of past discrimination.
288. See id. at 2051-52 (interdistrict remedy inappropriate in absence of interdistrict
violation).
289. See id. at 2048 (one-race schools can nevertheless be unitary). The Supreme Court did
not actually reach the question of whether the inner-city schools had become unitary, but remanded for a determination of this question after suggesting that they may have achieved unitary status. See id. at 2055-56 (suggesting achievement of at least partial unitary status).
290. A close reading of Plessy and subsequent decisions reveals that even under Plessy, separate public facilities did not have to be equal in order to be constitutionally permissible. See
STONE ET AL, supra note 31, at 490-92 (discussing the absence of an equality requirement in
Plessy).

291. The fact that Justice Thomas favors this result is saddening. It is understandable that
Justice Thomas would find value in the preservation of historically black schools. See Jenkins,

115 S. Ct. at 2061-62, 2065 (rejecting the suggestion that black institutions are inherently inferior,
and finding value in historically black schools). It is, however, disheartening that he would acqui-

esce in a holding that perpetuated the historical under-funding of such schools, thereby guaranteeing the very inequality that he so strenuously resists. For an argument that the effect, if not
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A similar vision of post-discriminatory culture appears to have
motivated the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in Kirwan v.
Podberesky,29 2 where the Court permitted to stand a lower court decision that invalidated a University of Maryland scholarship program
for black students. 9 3 The program was challenged on constitutional
grounds by a Latino student who was ineligible for the program because of the program's racial restriction.29 4 Although the Supreme
Court does not normally write opinions accompanying its denials of
certiorari, the Fourth Circuit opinion that the Supreme Court left
standing held that there were insufficient lingering effects of Maryland's past de jure segregation to permit the program to withstand the
strict scrutiny required under Croson.29 5 The district court found four
present effects of the University's prior discrimination: the University's poor reputation in the black community; the underrepresentation of blacks in the student population; the low retention and
graduation rates of black students who did enroll; and the perceived
hostile atmosphere on campus toward black students. 96 The Court of
Appeals rejected these four findings, repeatedly rebuking the district
court for attempting to remedy general societal discrimination.2 " Unlike the district court, the Fourth Circuit had learned from the
Supreme Court that general societal discrimination is not legally
cognizable.
In Miller v. Johnson,29 8 decided a few weeks after Adarand, the
Court held, with the same five-to-four Adarand split, that a new congressional voting district in Georgia was unconstitutionally apportioned because race had been the "predominant" factor in drawing
the intent, of Brown was to perpetuate racially correlated inequality in public schools, see Louis
M. Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CAL L. REV. 673 (1992).
292. Kirwan v. Podberesky, 115 S. Ct. 2001 (1995).
293. Technically, a denial of certiorari does not constitute an expression of the Supreme
Court's views on the merits of the case in which certiorari was denied. See United States v.
Carver, 260 U.S. 482,490 (1923) ("ITIhe denial of a writ of certiorari imports no expression upon
the merits of the case, as the bar has been told many times."). Nevertheless, the Court's denial
of certiorari in Podberesky was widely viewed as significant. See, e.g., Jan Crawford Greenberg
& Janan Hanna, Race Based Scholarship Eliminated; Blacks.Only Plan Denied an Appeal, Cmc.
TRI., May 23, 1995, at 3; Jason B. Johnson, High Court Ruling Seen as Blow to Affirmative
Action, BOSTON HERALD, May 23, 1995, at 4; Andrea Stone, Court Kills Blacks-Only Scholarship, USA TODAY, May 23, 1995, at Al.
294. See Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147, 151-52 (4th Cir. 1994).
295. See id. at 152-57.
296. See id. at 153.
297. See id. at 151. The Court of Appeals made numerous characterizations of the district
court's decision as an effort to remedy general societal discrimination. See, e.g., id. at 154-57,
161.
298. Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
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district lines intended to enhance minority voting strength. 2" Apply-

ing the Court's 1993 decision in Shaw v. Reno,3 °° Justice Kennedy's

majority opinion in Miller held that when "race was the predominant
factor motivating the legislature's decision to place a significant
number of voters within or without a particular district," the legislature's apportionment plan was subject to strict scrutiny. 301 Under the
facts of Miller, strict scrutiny could not be satisfied because the Georgia legislature's goal of receiving preclearance from the United States
Department of Justice under the Voting Rights Act was not a compelling state interest, and the Justice Department policy of maximizing
the number of majority-minority voting districts in states covered by
the Act was not a narrowly tailored effort to eliminate the effects of
past discrimination. 3°2 Justice Kennedy's opinion was careful to distinguish the Shaw-based claim that it was considering in Miller from a
more typical vote-dilution claim. The Shaw-based claim in Miller was
not based on a reduction in the relative strength of the plaintiffs'
votes, but rather was simply a claim that the plaintiffs had a constitutional right not to be assigned to voting districts on the basis of racejust as they had a right not to be assigned to a public school on the
basis of race.3 °3 Justice Kennedy relied upon this distinction to avoid
299. Id. at 2490.
300. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
301. See Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2488,2490 (adopting "predominant factor" test). The Court also
held that a district's bizarre shape, the focus of attention in Shaw, was not a requirement for
strict scrutiny but was only one of a variety of forms of evidence that could be relied on to show
that race was a motivating factor. See id. at 2488. The same day that Miller was decided, the
Supreme Court also summarily affirmed a three-judge district court decision upholding a 1992
California reapportionment plan that created a number of majority-minority voting districts. The
district court had distinguished Shaw on the grounds that race was only one of a number of
factors that had motivated adoption of the California plan. See DeWitt v. Wilson, 115 S. Ct. 2673
(1995), aff'g 856 F. Supp. 1409 (E.D. Cal. 1994) (three-judge court).
302. See Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2491-92. The Court found that the Justice Department policy of
maximizing the number of majority-minority. voting districts was not compelled by the Voting
Rights Act. See id. It did not reach the question of whether compliance with an actual requirement of the Act would constitute a sufficiently compelling state interest to survive strict scrutiny.
See id. at 2493. The Court did, however, note the tension between the race-consciousness of the
Voting Rights Act and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id.
303. See id. at 2485-86 (viewing Shaw claim as the same as claim of segregation in public
facilities). In fact, Justice Kennedy's characterization of Miller as a racially motivated voter assignment case is inaccurate in a way that is quite revealing. The plaintiffs in Miller were not
assigned to an election district based upon their race. Rather, the five white plaintiffs lived in the
majority-black Eleventh Voting District before adoption of the challenged reapportionment plan
and continued to live in the Eleventh District, which remained majority-black, after adoption of
the plan. Under the challenged plan, some black voters were eliminated from the Eleventh District and other black voters were added, but the plaintiffs were not reassigned. See id. at 2483-85
(describing reapportionment plan). Therefore, any injury suffered by the white plaintiffs must
have resulted not from their assignment to an election district, but from the fact that the Elev-
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the seemingly contrary precedential effect of United Jewish Organizations,3" which had upheld the constitutionality of a similarly motivated redistricting plan in New York.3"'
A curious aspect of the Miller decision is its holding that race is a
constitutionally permissible factor in legislative apportionment considerations, but that once race becomes the predominant factor, consideration of race becomes unconstitutional. 3 6 If some consideration of
race is constitutional why is not all consideration of race constitutional? The answer cannot be that the Supreme Court is simply striking a different balance when race is predominant than it strikes when
race is subordinate. Any Supreme Court balancing that may be appropriate occurs after strict scrutiny has been triggered.30 7 The "predominance" inquiry, however, goes to the analytically prior
issue of
38
whether such strict-scrutiny balancing will even take place.
enth District was racially gerrymandered to produce a black member of Congress. However, in
order to view this as an injury to the white plaintiffs the Court would have to view the political
preferences of individual voters as being racially determined-which, as Justice Stevens emphasized in his dissent, is the precise view that the Court so strenuously rejected as the basis for its
Miller decision. See id at 2497-98 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (majority's theory of injury suffers
from same racial stereotyping that majority opinion purports to abhor).
304. United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
305. See Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2487-88 (distinguishing United Jewish Organizations). In her
dissenting opinion, Justice Ginsburg argued that United Jewish Organizationswas best understood as a Shaw-type voter apportionment challenge rather than as a vote-dilution case, because
the plaintiffs in United Jewish Organizationshad made no claim of vote dilution. See id. at 2505
n.11 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The distinction between a Shaw-based voter assignment claim
and a traditional vote-dilution claim also seems to have been the basis for the Miller Court's
grant of standing to the white plaintiffs who challenged the Georgia apportionment scheme,
despite the Court's denial of standing the same day to similar plaintiffs challenging a similar
Louisiana apportionment scheme in United States v. Hays, 115 S. Ct. 2431 (1995). In Hays, the
plaintiffs were challenging the apportionment of a voting district that was not the district in
which they themselves resided. See Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2485 (citing Hays); see also Hays, 115 S.
Ct. 2436 (distinguishing between voters who live within and without challenged voting district
for purposes of standing); cf id. at 2439-40 (Stevens, J., concurring) (plaintiffs lack standing
because they have not alleged and proven vote dilution).
306. The Court noted in Miller that "[w]here these [traditional districting principles] or other
race-neutral considerations are the basis for redistricting legislation, and are not subordinated to
race, a state can 'defeat a claim that a district has been gerrymandered on racial lines."' Miller,
115 S. Ct. at 2488 (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2827 (1993)).
307. See id at 2482 (strict scrutiny is intended to determine if racial classifications are justifiable); see also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2113-14 (1995) (citing City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,493 (1989) (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.) (purpose of strict scrutiny is to distinguish benign from invidious racial classifications)).
308. See Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2488 (predominant racial motivation is threshold requirement);
cf id. at 2497 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (maintaining that Shaw's high "predominance" threshold is required in order to avoid challenges to the vast majority of existing congressional districts). Note that in this regard, Adarand may be inconsistent with Miller. Because the
presumption of minority disadvantage in Adarand was a rebuttable presumption, see Adarand,
115 S. Ct. at 2102-04 (describing presumptions), race may not have been the predominant factor
in designing the affirmative action program in Adarand. Rather, economic and social disadvan[VOL.
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What the Court seems to be doing with its "predominance"
threshold is permitting the consideration of race as a factor in reapportionment so long as racial considerations will not be dispositive. If
racial considerations prove to be outcome-determinative, however,
they will be disallowed by the Court as having predominated the other
factors that have traditionally entered into legislative apportionment
deliberations. 30 9 The Court enumerates several such traditional factors "including but not limited to compactness, contiguity, respect for
political subdivisions or communities defined by actual shared interests,' 3 10 as factors that cannot be predominated by race. 31 1 That is
simply a way of saying that race can be taken into account so long as
taking race into account does not matter. But once race does begin to
matter, the consideration of race becomes unconstitutional. This view
is consistent with the Supreme Court's general Adarand declaration
that cognizable racial discrimination in contemporary culture has now
come to an end.
If voting discrimination still existed in the United States, it would
be appropriate for racial considerations to be dispositive in remedial
redistricting plans. Indeed, that is precisely the theory on which the
Voting Rights Act is based.3 1 But the Supreme Court's emphasis on
the Act as a mechanism for prohibiting "retrogression ' 313 presupposes
that present levels of voting discrimination are sufficiently low that
they do not call for remedial action. If voting discrimination remained
a present problem, it would have made sense to construe the Act to
permit affirmative efforts to eliminate that discrimination-efforts
like the Justice Department policy favoring maximization of majorityminority districts. The Court, however, was able to invalidate the Justice Department policy precisely because, in the Court's view, there is
no present voting discrimination problem. Minority voters do not
need enhanced voting strength any more than minority college stutage may have been the predominant factors. See id. (noting that the presumption was intended

to facilitate identification of contractors who were socially and economically disadvantaged).
309. I am not sure what I mean by "outcome determinative" in the apportionment context,
where racial factors might have a minor effect on the location of a particular district line or a

major effect on which candidate gets elected. I suppose that what I ultimately mean by "outcome determinative" is an effect that the Supreme Court deems to be more significant than is
appropriate.
310. See Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2488 (enumerating typical apportionment factors).
311. See id. (holding that traditional apportionment principles cannot be supplanted by
race).

312. See id. at 2493 (stating that the purpose of the Voting Rights Act is to prevent retrogression to the era of voting discrimination).
313. See id.
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dents need scholarships, minority public school students need remedial education, or minority contractors need government contracts. If
there is any lingering voter discrimination in Georgia, it is-once
again-simply general societal discrimination that is too subtle to be
legally cognizable.
Perhaps the most artificial aspect of the Miller decision is its view
of racial minorities as sufficiently assimilated into the white majority
culture that they lack shared minority interests. One of the traditional
apportionment factors that the Supreme Court held could not be
subordinated to race was "communities defined by actual shared interests."3 1 Racial interests are obviously among the most potent and
most cohesive political interests that there are in contemporary
United States politics.3 15 Why, then, cannot racial groups constitute
"communities defined by actual shared interests" that can legitimately
be considered in drawing district lines? The Supreme Court's answer
is that the act of presuming that racial minority group members share
similar political interests constitutes the very sort of racial stereotyping that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits. 316 This stereotyping in
turn treats citizens as mere members of a group, rather than as individuals, and thereby violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.3 17 Accordingly, in Miller the Supreme Court was
confronted with a choice between reinforcing abstract racial stereotypes while enhancing actual minority voting strength, or resisting abstract racial stereotypes while diluting actual minority voting strength.
The Court held that the Constitution permitted this choice to be made
only one way: actual political strength had to be sacrificed in favor of
resistance to abstract racial stereotyping. Once again, the Supreme
Court read the Constitution to govern a hypothetical world that does

314. See id. at 2488 (enumerating typical apportionment factors).
315. See id. at 2504-05 (Ginsburg J., dissenting) (discussing political cohesiveness of ethnic
groups and the tradition of drawing voting districts along ethnic lines).
316. The Supreme Court makes numerous references to impermissible stereotyping in the
Miller opinion. See id. at 2486-87, 2490, 2494. Justice Stevens points out, however, that the
majority's reasoning is circular because the conclusion that white voters are harmed by majorityminority districts depends upon the same stereotypes about racial cohesion and identity of political interest that the majority refuses to accept when such stereotyping would help minority
rather than white voters. See id. at 2498 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (describing circular stereotyping
necessary to uphold standing of plaintiffs).
317. See id. at 2485-86 (requiring government to treat citizens as individuals rather than as
simply members of a racial group). In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg argued that voter apportion-

ment is inherently a group phenomenon in which individual merit or achievement is irrelevant.
See id. at 2505-06 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

[VOL. 39:1

Affirmative Action and Discrimination
not correspond to the actual world in which racial discrimination is
concrete rather than merely theoretical. 3 18
The Fourteenth Amendment was enacted after the Civil War in
order to ensure that Congress possessed the constitutional authority
to eliminate the vestiges of racial discrimination against blacks who
had systematically been disadvantaged by state laws and official practices that treated blacks as inferior.31 9 Congress, and ultimately the
states themselves, began to implement the goals of the Fourteenth
Amendment by enacting affirmative action legislation intended to
remedy the effects of prior discrimination. Ironically, the Supreme
Court has now begun to use the Fourteenth Amendment as the basis
for invalidatingthe very types of remedial actions that the Fourteenth
Amendment was adopted to permit. The Court has justified this reconstruction of the Fourteenth Amendment by declaring that the era
of racial discrimination in the United States has come to an end. Any
remaining effects of prior discrimination are simply attributable to
general societal discrimination, which is too diffuse and subtle to warrant legal recognition. The Court made this declaration explicitly in
Adarand, by reading the Fourteenth Amendment to preclude Congress from presuming that racial minorities remain socially and economically disadvantaged. The Court then reinforced its declaration in
the other race cases that it decided the same Term, by invalidating
affirmative action programs that would seem unobjectionable as efforts to ameliorate the effects of past discrimination. Although the
Court's declaration seems jarringly artificial when juxtaposed to the
world of everyday experience-a world on which racial discrimination
remains rampant-the Court was able to offer its artificial characterization of contemporary culture with a doctrinal straight face by inverting the legal concepts of affirmative action and discrimination.
III. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND DISCRIMINATION
The Supreme Court's proclamation in Adarand, that the history
of pervasive racial discrimination in the United States has now come
to an end, rests on a confusion inherent in the related concepts of
affirmative action and discrimination. The Supreme Court exploited
318. In her dissenting opinion, Justice Ginsburg traces the history of voting discrimination in
a way that highlights the gap between the majority's theoretical word and the actual world of
black voters in Georgia. See id. at 4738 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
319. See STONE ET AL., supra note 31, at 481-88 (discussing the purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
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that confusion in a way that permitted it to invert the concepts of affirmative action and discrimination so that each acquired the connotations previously associated with the other. This inversion then
enabled the Court to appropriate societal resources allocated by the
political process to racial minorities and reallocate them to the white
majority-solely on the grounds of race. Moreover, this judicial elevation of the interests of whites over the interests of racial minorities
stigmatizes racial minorities in the precise way that Brown declares to
be unconstitutionally discriminatory. In short, the Supreme Court's
rejection of the Adarand presumption itself constituted an act of racial
discrimination sufficient to establish the validity of the presumption
that the Court rejects.
The structural consequence of the Supreme Court's ruling in
Adarand has been to shift the locus of power in the formulation of
race-relations policy from the politically accountable branches of government to the politically less-accountable Supreme Court. This is
consistent with an increase in judicial activism that the present
Supreme Court has exhibited in other substantive areas as well. Racerelations issues, however, are ultimately governed by standards that
are political rather than judicial in nature. As a result, the Supreme
Court's decision in Adarand has ironically implicated the Court in the
undemocratic usurpation of legislative power.
A.

Inversion

The concepts of affirmative action and discrimination are closely
related. 32 0 Affirmative action makes benign use of race-based classifications to offset the effects of past discrimination, and to promote prospective racial equality. Racial discrimination makes invidious use of
race-based classifications to replicate the effects of past discrimination
and to promote prospective racial inequality. Both entail the conscious use of race; both rest on the assumption that race is relevant in
320. Affirmative action is almost always intentional, whereas discrimination can consist of
intentional racial differentiation or unintentional racially disparate impact. Compare Washington
v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-48 (1976) (requiring intentional discrimination for constitutional violation) with Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971) (finding disparate impact
sufficient to establish Title VII violation). For present purposes, the term "discrimination" is
used to mean intentional discrimination, because the Supreme Court has held that intentional
discrimination is what is relevant to constitutional analysis under the Equal Protection Clause.
See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 238-48. Ultimately, however, the distinction between discriminatory intent and disparate impact breaks down, because discriminatory intent can be inferred from known, or even unknown, disparate impact. See SPANN, supra note 5, at 37-41
(discussing the distinction between discriminatory intent and discriminatory effect).
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contemporary culture; and both reject the view that race neutrality is
an appropriate mechanism for resource allocation. Affirmative action
and discrimination differ only in their motives. The goal of affirmative
action is ultimate racial equality, and the goal of racial discrimination
is ultimate racial subordination. But, because ultimate goals are easily
camouflaged, it can often be difficult to distinguish affirmative action
from discrimination. And to the extent that goals can be unstable and
motives can be mixed, there may sometimes 32be
no difference between
1
all.
at
discrimination
and
action
affirmative
The Supreme Court has declined to treat motive as relevant in its
affirmative action cases, thereby disregarding the only distinction that
exists between affirmative action and discrimination. Justice
O'Connor's opinion in Adarand emphatically rejects the argument
that constitutional scrutiny of racial classifications should vary with
the benign or invidious nature of the classification at issue, applying
strict scrutiny to both types of classifications. 22 Motive is, therefore,
irrelevant to the level of scrutiny that the Court will apply in a racial
classification case. To the extent that strict scrutiny remains fatal in
equal protection cases, as it has been since the Court's 1944 decision
in Korematsu,3 23 motive is also irrelevant to the outcome in a racial
classification case.
Justice O'Connor has stated that motive is relevant, and that the
very purpose of applying strict scrutiny is to determine whether a racial classification is, in fact, benign or whether it is motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority.3 2 4 This assertion, however,
seems disingenuous. Justice O'Connor and the other members of the
321. It is logically possible to favor racial separation without favoring racial stratification or
subordination. Indeed, this is the nominal position that the Supreme Court adopted in Plessy.
See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding racially segregated public facilities under
separate-but-equal doctrine). It is unlikely, however, that this position has many actual, as opposed to rhetorical, adherents. The sincerity of this position was questioned even in Plessy itself,
See id. at 557-64 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (pointing out the actual discriminatory purpose of the
statute at issue). It is also possible to argue that the effect rather than the motive of a racial
classification should be what distinguishes racial discrimination from affirmative action. Washington v. Davis, however, seems to preclude such an approach, and the distinction between intent and effect ultimately seems untenable. See supra note 320 (discussing Washington v. Davis
and the difference between discriminatory intent and effect).
322. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2111-12 (1995) (imposing a
requirement of "consistency" in strict-scrutiny standard of review, regardless of benign or invidious nature of racial classification).
323. See supra Part I(C)(1) (discussing the standard of review).
324. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2112, 2113-14 (citing City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488
U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.)) (holding that strict scrutiny is needed to
distinguish benign from illegitimate classifications).
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Adarand majority virtually always vote to invalidate an affirmative
action program if they reach the merits of the constitutional issues
presented by that program.3 25 This means that any motive that might
be relevant in theory has never been relevant in fact. Moreover, Justice O'Connor has endorsed the proposition that "more than good
motives should be required when government seeks to allocate
its re326
sources by way of an explicit racial classification system.
The strict scrutiny standard that Justice O'Connor elaborates similarly has nothing to do with motive. Justice O'Connor's strict scrutiny
327
requires a compelling state interest and a narrowly tailored remedy.
Justice O'Connor now believes that only the goal of providing a remedy for identifiable prior discrimination can constitute a compelling
state interest, and that only discrete discriminatory acts, rather than
general societal discrimination, can qualify as "prior discrimination"
under this standard.32 8 In addition, Justice O'Connor has insisted on
an extremely tight fit between the identifiable prior discrimination
329
and the remedy at issue to satisfy the narrow-tailoring requirement.
325. See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text (setting out affirmative action voting
records of Justices in Adarand majority). Justice O'Connor somewhat misleadingly creates the
impression that she approved of the affirmative action program that the Court upheld in United
States v. Paradise. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2135-36. In fact, she voted to invalidate the affirmative action program at issue in that case. See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 196-201
(1987) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
326. See Adarand, 115 S.Ct. at 2112 (quoting Drew S.Days, Fullilove, 96 YALE L.J. 453, 485
(1987)).
327. See Adarand, 115 S.Ct. at 2113 (defining the strict scrutiny standard).
328. See Metro Broadcasting Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 610-12, 613-14 (1990)(O'Connor, J.,
dissenting); Croson, 488 U.S. at 498-99; Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 288
(1986) (O'Connor, J.,concurring in part and concurring in judgment); Johnson v. Transportation
Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 649-53 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor appears to
have abandoned her earlier belief that the prospective societal benefit of an affirmative action
program could constitute a compelling state interest. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 286 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (goal of promoting prospective racial diversity
can constitute compelling state interest).
329. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2118; Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 610-12, 613-14
(O'Connor, J., dissenting); Croson, 488 U.S. at 499-504; Wygant, 476 U.S. 293-94 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment). The narrow tailoring test used by the Court has
been quite stringent. For example, in discussing whether a 30% minority set aside of municipal
construction funds was narrowly enough tailored to the scope of past discrimination in Croson,
Justice O'Connor ignored a factual finding that the population of the City of Richmond was 50%
minority, but only 0.67% of the construction contracts had been awarded to minority firms. She
viewed the disparity as irrelevant because there had been no showing of how many minority
contractors were qualified to be awarded construction contracts. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 499504. She also deemed "unsupported" the assumption that white prime contractors in Richmond,
Virginia would have discriminated against minority firms. See id. at 503-04. Similarly, in Wygant,
Justice O'Connor disregarded a showing of racial disparities between the minority student population and the number of minority teachers in the school district, asserting that the appropriate
comparison was between the number of minority teachers and the number of qualified minorities in the teaching pool. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 293-94 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
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This means that the narrow-tailoring requirement cannot be satisfied
by a remedy that is intended to redress pervasive discrimination
rather than isolated discriminatory acts, because such a remedy would
cross the line into 3the
realm of prohibited remedies for general socie30
tal discrimination.
In adopting Justice O'Connor's strict scrutiny, what the Court has
done is adopt a policy disfavoring affirmative action, preferring instead reliance on discrete remedies for isolated acts of discrimination. 331 Whatever the merits or shortcomings of such a policy, the
policy has nothing whatsoever to do with the intent of the racial classification being scrutinized. Accordingly, Justice Stevens criticized the
Adarand majority for not distinguishing between a benign "desire to
foster equality in society" and an invidious "engine of oppression, subjugating a disfavored group to enhance or maintain the power of the
majority. ' 332 He characterized Justice O'Connor's opinion as being
unable to detect333"the difference between a 'No Trespassing' sign and a
welcome mat.

Once the Supreme Court made the intent of a racial classification
legally irrelevant, it eliminated the only difference that exists between
affirmative action and discrimination. This left the Court free to characterize racial classifications in any way that it deemed expedient,
without the need to have its characterization correspond to any referent other than the Court's own preferences. Operating in this unconstrained doctrinal environment, the Court has chosen to invert the
distinction that is typically thought to exist between affirmative action
and discrimination. With a sleight of hand reminiscent of postmodern
concurring in judgment). Such emphasis on the pool of qualified minorities disregards the racial
discrimination that may have prevented more minorities from ever entering the pool. The technical demands that Justice O'Connor has imposed on the use of statistical evidence are at times
so stringent as to appear impossible to satisfy. See SPANN, supra note 5, at 37-41 (discussing
Justice O'Connor's transformation of Title VII discriminatory-effect standard into discriminatory-intent standard through imposition of stringent proof requirements).
330. See Metro Broadcasting,497 U.S. at 610-14 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Croson, 488 U.S.
at 498-99; Wygant, 476 U.S. at 288 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); Johnson, 480 U.S. at 649-53 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
331. But see Wygant, 476 U.S. at 287 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment) ("[i]t is agreed that a plan need not be limited to the remedying of specific instances
of identified discrimination for it to be deemed sufficiently 'narrowly tailored,' or 'substantially
related,' to the correction of prior discrimination."). Justice O'Connor now seems to have abandoned this view, as she abandoned her earlier view that prospective diversity could constitute a
compelling state interest. See id. at 286 (stating that the goal of promoting prospective racial
diversity can constitute a compelling state interest).
332. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2120 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
333. See id. at 2121 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

1995]

Howard Law Journal
deconstruction, 3 4 the Court severed the negative, invidious connotations typically associated with the concept of racial discrimination and
re-associated them with affirmative action; and it severed the positive,
remedial connotations typically associated with the concept of affirmative action and re-associated them with racial discrimination. Stated
more simply, the Court transformed "good" affirmative action into
"bad" racial discrimination, and "bad" racial discrimination into
"good" affirmative action.
Using the definitions of affirmative action and discrimination set
out above,335 it is possible to highlight the Supreme Court's inversion
of affirmative action and discrimination. In the past, affirmative action has been viewed by the Court as good: Affirmative action uses
race-based classifications to offset the effects of past discrimination,
thereby promoting prospective racial equality. Similarly, racial discrimination has been viewed by the Court as bad: Racial discrimination makes invidious use of race-based classifications in order to
replicate the effects of former de jure discrimination, thereby promoting prospective racial inequality. According to the present Supreme
Court majority, however, it is really affirmative action that is bad and
racial discrimination that is good. The Court's reasoning seems to go
something like this:
Contrary to common understanding, affirmative action entails the
invidious use of race-based classifications in order to replicate the
effects of past discrimination. Although affirmative action is typically viewed as benign, it actually consists of the self-serving appropriation by racial minorities of societal resources that would
otherwise go to innocent whites. The Croson thirty-percent setaside program for minority construction contractors for instance, illustrates that when racial minorities acquire political power, as they
did in gaining control of the Richmond City Council, they will use
that power to claim resources to which they would not be entitled
through normal market allocations undistorted by minority political
intervention.336 And even when affirmative action programs are
adopted by majority-controlled political bodies, such as the
334. For a description and illustration of deconstruction entailing the inversion of hierarchies, see SPANN, supra note 5, at 58-82.
335. See supra text accompanying notes 320-21.
336. Cf. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 495-96 (1989) (opinion of
O'Connor, J.) (noting that minorities controlled the Richmond City Council that adopted the
minority set-aside program); id. at 523-24 (Scalia J., concurring in judgment) (stating that the
dominant political group in Richmond adopted the affirmative action program to benefit its own
members).
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Adarand minority preference program that was adopted by Congress, those programs still distort normal market allocations in response to the exertion of minority political power. Although racial
minorities may not be able to control the United States Congress,
they do possess sufficient political power to compel occasional legislative concessions from Congress. As public choice theory
predicts, 33 7 Congress makes these concessions because the political
power of the minority special interest lobby outweighs the political
power of the individual white victims who are disadvantaged by minority preference plans. That is why it is essential to extend the
Equal Protection Clause to members of the white majority, despite
its genesis in the protection of former black slaves. As the language
of the Equal Protection Clause makes clear, 338 the equal protection
guarantee extends to individuals, not simply to groups that have historically been victims of discrimination. 339 Accordingly, affirmative
action can be seen to possess the undesirable qualities typically associated with racial discrimination. All that changes is the race of
the victim against whom the discrimination is directed.

Opposition to affirmative action is often characterized as a form
of perpetuated racial discrimination because opponents are willing to
freeze the illegitimate gains that whites have made over minorities as
a result of past racial discrimination.34 ° In fact, it can be argued that
insistence on the race neutrality that opponents of affirmative action
favor actually promotes the use of hidden racial classifications that are
embedded in the status quo. For example, if schoolteacher seniority
of the type that was at issue in Wygant correlates with race because of
337. Stated briefly, "public choice theory" is a political economics theory positing that, because of "free rider" problems, governmental decision making will tend to favor special interest
groups rather than the more diffuse majority interest. Under this view, an affirmative action
program that benefited racial minority special interests would stand a better chance of enactment than a majoritarian effort to prevent enactment of the special interest program. For a
general discussion of public choice theory, see WILLIAM ESKRIDGE & PmLP FRICKEY, CASE
AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 367-98

(1988).
338. "No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
339. Cf. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2111-13 (1995) (holding that
right to be free from racial discrimination is individual rather than group right (citing Regents of
the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 299 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.) (citing Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948))); Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 602, 609-10
(1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-94 (opinion of O'Connor, J.).
340. Cf Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448,473-74 (1980) (opinion of Burger, C.J.) (holding
that the Constitution permits remedies to prevent the perpetuation of past discrimination);
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 326-27, 336, 355-73 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (race neutrality is aspiration rather than literal goal; race-conscious remedies for past
discrimination are constitutional); id. at 395-402 (opinion of Marshall, J.).
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disparities in seniority caused by past discrimination in teacher hiring,
use of the purportedly neutral standard of seniority to make layoffs,
without any correction for past discrimination, actually constitutes use
of the racial categories with which seniority correlates. Whether intentionally or incidentally, seniority becomes a surrogate for race, and
the allocation of layoffs on the basis of seniority becomes a racially
discriminatory allocation. 34 1 The Supreme Court's reasoning in inverting this argument seems to go something like this:
If opposition to affirmative action does constitute a form of perpetuated racial discrimination, it is a benign rather than an invidious
form of discrimination. It makes beneficial use of whatever racebased classifications may be submerged in the status quo in order to
offset the discrimination against whites that has become prevalent
with the emergence of affirmative action racial preferences. If compensation for past discrimination is the justification for affirmative
action programs that punish whites, those programs are tolerable
only when the victim and the perpetrator of a discriminatory act can
be identified. The use of affirmative action to remedy general societal discrimination in the absence of an identifiable perpetrator and
victim violates the equal protection rights of the innocent whites
who are burdened in order to advance the interests of racial minority group members who were not themselves the direct victims of
discrimination. 4 2 Opposition to affirmative action, therefore, promotes racial equality by precluding minorities from taking advantage of whites who are denied access to affirmative action resources
solely because of their race, 34 3 and by refusing to reinforce raceconscious modes of thought that will continue to exacerbate racial
341. One who is tempted to argue that seniority is the operative basis for the discrimination,,
and that the racially disparate impact is merely incidental-an argument that the Supreme Court
appears to have endorsed in Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 278-80 (1979) (holding
that intent necessary for equal protection violation is "because of" actuating intent, not merely
"in spite of" tolerance of a known consequence)-should remember that the concept of seniority is almost always tainted by past racial discrimination. Ignoring this fact does not make the
taint less real; it merely makes the taint something that is being ignored.
342. See Croson,488 U.S. at 518-19 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (agreeing that the rule limiting racial preferences to what is necessary to compensate
actual victims of discrimination is appealing); id. at 524-25 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment)
(state can use racial classifications only to compensate actual victims of state's own discrimination); cf. Local 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 535-45 (1986)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (Title VII remedies that override seniority must be limited to actual
victims of discrimination); Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 500 (1986)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 578-83 (1984).
343. Cf Croson, 488 U.S. at 495-96 (opinion of O'Connor, J.) (minorities controlled Richmond City Council that adopted minority set-aside program); id. at 523-24 (Scalia J., concurring
in judgment) (dominant political group in Richmond adopted affirmative action program to benefit its own members).
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tensions. 3" Accordingly, any perpetuated discrimination that may
be inherent in one's opposition to affirmative action can be seen to
possess the benign qualities that have mistakenly been associated
with affirmative action programs in the past. Prospective race neutrality is the "affirmative action" remedy for the victims of past affirmative action. All that changes is the race of the beneficiary
toward whom the affirmative action is directed.
That the concepts of affirmative action and discrimination, once
detached from the distinguishing feature of motive, became free-floating and subject to inversion does not alone have much significance.
Legal doctrine is often indeterminate, requiring a judicial infusion of
normative content before the doctrine can be found to generate a resuit. 4 5 What is significant, however, is that the Court chose to invert
the concepts of affirmative action and discrimination in the course of
proclaiming that pervasive racial discrimination had become a relic of
the past. This juxtaposition is significant because the Court's inversion
of affirmative action and discrimination itself constitutes an act of pervasive racial discrimination of the very type that the Court found no
longer to exist.
The effect of the Court's inversion of affirmative action and discrimination in Adarand was to make race-based affirmative action
constitutionally suspect and subject to strict scrutiny in the same way
that racial discrimination traditionally has been.'
Accordingly, at
least some race-based affirmative action programs will turn out to be
unconstitutional as a result of the Adarand inversion. If strict scrutiny
remains fatal after Adarand, the number of unconstitutional affirmative action programs will be large. If strict scrutiny turns out to be
capable of satisfaction, the number of unconstitutional programs will
be smaller, consisting only of those programs that are unable to satisfy
344. Compare Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 603-04 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (stating that the danger of racial classifications is that they contribute to racial hostility
and reinforce stereotypes in a way that stigmatizes beneficiaries); Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-94
(opinion of O'Connor, J.); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298-99 (opinion of Powell, J.) with Wygant v.
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 313-19 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (recognizing but rejecting stigmatization and hostility arguments). Cf. United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 US. 144,
172-74 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring in part).
345. See generally SPANN, supra note 5 (arguing that institutional considerations compel the
Supreme Court to give normative content to indeterminate legal doctrines in a way that reflects

majoritarian preferences).
346. It may be possible to circumvent the effect of Adarand by restructuring race-based affirmative action programs to be race-neutral, disadvantage-based programs. See supra Part
(I)(C)(4) (discussing the possible restructuring of affirmative action programs in light of
Adarand).
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the exacting standards of strict scrutiny. 4 7 In either event, the consequence of Adarand will necessarily be to divert some societal resources from racial minorities to whites. The racial minorities who
would have received societal resources under an affirmative action
program that Adarand invalidates will no longer receive them; they
will instead go to members of the white majority.
This diversion of resources from racial minorities to whites that
Adarand effectuates is good, old-fashioned racial discrimination, pure
and simple. It disadvantages racial minorities to advance the interests
of whites. It does so through the use of an explicit racial classification
that distinguishes affirmative action programs from other resource allocation programs. 34 8 It is the product of an official government body
taking an official government action, with full knowledge of the ad-

verse impact that its action will have on the interests of racial minorities. It inflicts a type of harm on racial minorities that, by design and
effect, is both widespread and pervasive. And it ultimately stigmatizes

racial minorities in a way that brands them as inferior to whites.
I have characterized the invalidation of an affirmative action program as the diversion of societal resources from racial minorities to
the white majority. One could dispute this characterization, arguing
that the Supreme Court's invalidation of an affirmative action program terminates the diversion from whites to racial minorities of the
societal resources encompassed by the plan. This raises the issue of
what constitutes the proper baseline for determining entitlement to a
347. See supra text accompanying notes 123-42 (discussing whether strict scrutiny remains
fatal after Adarand).
348. The Court's affirmative action classification is strikingly similar to the racial classification prohibiting miscegenation that the Supreme Court held unconstitutional in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (invalidating Virginia miscegenation statute on equal protection
grounds, and stating that "[t]here can be no question but that Virginia's miscegenation statutes
rest solely upon distinctions drawn according to race."). One could argue that the Supreme
Court's special treatment of racial affirmative action plans constitutes discrimination on the basis
of affirmative action rather than discrimination on the basis of race, because it applies to all
racial affirmative action plans regardless of which race is benefited and which is burdened. This
argument, however, ignores the fact that the Supreme Court is treating racial affirmative action
plans different from nonracial affirmative action plans. The Court is, therefore, discriminating
against racial classifications, even if it is not discriminating against particular racial groups. One
might be tempted to argue that the equal protection principle does not prohibit discrimination
against racial classifications, but Loving's invalidation of miscegenation statutes seems squarely
to reject such an argument. See id. Although the actual miscegenation statute before the Court
in Loving prohibited intermarriage with whites but not intermarriage not involving whites, the
Court declined to seize upon this basis for characterizing the Virginia statute as an impermissible
racial classification. See id. at 12 n.11. The Court's argument appears to be that, even when all
races are treated equally, the equal protection principle is still offended by treating the category
of race different from other social organizing categories. See id.
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societal resource under some "natural" state of affairs, before any artificial distortion of that natural state has occurred. If the baseline to
be used is the resource allocation that existed before enactment of the
affirmative action program at issue, then the affirmative action program does indeed divert resources from whites to racial minorities,
and the Supreme Court's invalidation of that plan restores the original
allocation. However, if the baseline selected is the resource allocation that exists after enactment of the affirmative action program,
then the Supreme Court's invalidation upsets that allocation and constitutes a diversion of resources from racial minorities to whites.
More subtly, if the proper baseline is the current allocation of resources, the Supreme Court's invalidation of an affirmative action
program constitutes an effort to preserve that natural state and to prevent a usurpation of resources by racial minorities. However, if the
proper baseline is some hypothetical allocation of resources that
would have existed in the absence of slavery and the nation's history
of official segregation, then the Supreme Court's invalidation of an
affirmative action program constitutes Supreme Court interference
with an effort to approximate a natural state of affairs, and is therefore subject to characterization as a diversion of resources from racial
minorities to whites.
There is, of course, no "correct" characterization of the Supreme
Court's invalidation of an affirmative action program, because the act
of selecting an appropriate baseline is ultimately the act of asserting a
normative preference. Nevertheless, the arguments favoring a baseline that encompasses a politically adopted affirmative action program
seem persuasive. In a democracy, we typically believe that decisions
concerning normative preferences should be made by politically accountable government representatives. It follows that when Congress
or the President, or a state legislative or executive body, chooses to
adopt an affirmative action program, that program should be viewed
as establishing the "natural" baseline for the allocation of societal resources against which judicial interventions should be measured. Accordingly, Supreme Court invalidation of such a program should be
viewed both as judicial interference with the political process, and as a
countermajoritarian diversion of resources from racial minorities to
the white majority. 9
349. There is one way that the Supreme Court could persuasively escape the indictment that
it was undemocratically diverting resources from racial minorities to the majority when it invalidated an affirmative action program. If the Court's action could somehow be shown to have
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The Supreme Court's decision in Adarand constitutes an act of

pervasive racial discrimination for yet another reason. It stigmatizes
racial minorities in the way that Brown v. Board of Education held to
be a core violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Brown is a controversial case whose substitution of a desegregation principle for the
separate-but-equal principle of Plessy is doctrinally difficult to explain. 350 The most viable explanation for the decision, however, is
that the holding in Brown is about avoiding the racial stigma that
many view as inherent in official segregation.3 51 Whether or not such

a stigma is implicit in segregated education, it is certainly implicit in a
Supreme Court decision to make legal protections available to whites
when it simultaneously makes analogous protections unavailable to

racial minorities.
The proper baseline for determining the "natural" allocation of
resources in society may not be clear; affirmative action may constitute discrimination against whites, or the invalidation of affirmative

action may constitute discrimination against racial minorities. But
one thing is clear: The baseline issue is doctrinally ambiguous and uncertain. In the midst of such ambiguous uncertainty, one would normally expect the Supreme Court to err on the side of protecting racial
minorities, for a number of reasons. First, the primary justification
for contemporary judicial review has been the protection of minority
rights, 35 2 not majority rights.353 In addition, the greater relative political power that the white majority has over racial minorities suggests
resulted from principle rather than mere normative preference, the Court could then claim that
it was not simply substituting its preferences for those of the politically accountable representative branches, but was rather enforcing a principled limitation on the scope of the political power
that can be exercised by the representative branches. That, of course, is what the Supreme Court
claimed to be doing in Adarand and the other cases in which it has invalidated affirmative action
programs. But for the reasons discussed in Part Ill(B), that claim is difficult to accept.
350. Brown is difficult to defend on either doctrinal or policy grounds. See SPANN, supra note
5, at 70-82, 105-10 (discussing doctrinal and policy difficulties surrounding Brown). The substitution of formally-desegregated-but-empirically-segregated schools for separate-but-equal schools
has been especially controversial because of the inferior minority educational opportunities that
seem to have ensued. See id. at 110-18 (discussing shortcomings of school desegregation as
means of improving the quality of minority student education).
351. See STONE ET AL, supra note 31, at 497-504 (discussing stigma explanation of Brown);
see also Charles R. Lawrence, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus,
1990 DuKE L.J. 431, 438-49 (1991) (arguing that the stigma rationale of Brown made Brown a
hate-speech case).
352. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (positing
Supreme Court duty to protect "discrete and insular" minorities); see generally ELY, supranote
29, at 155-60 (discussing representation-reinforcement theory of judicial review as means of protecting racial minorities).
353. Although public choice theory is premised upon the belief that judicial review should
protect the majority from special interests, this theory has been unable to supplant the represen-
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that the white majority is more likely to be taking advantage of racial
minorities than racial minorities are to be taking advantage of the
white majority. Moreover, this theoretical observation has been
borne out empirically; the history of racial discrimination in the
United States indicates that whites have posed a much greater danger
to racial minorities than racial minorities have posed to whites. Nevertheless, in a doctrinal environment where the baseline issue is at
best in equipoise, the Supreme Court has chosen to draw the baseline
in a way that favors the white majority at the expense of racial
minorities.
In so doing, the Supreme Court has chosen to make available to
the white majority judicial protections from affirmative action but to
deny to racial minorities judicial protection from perpetuated discrimination-even though any racial animus entailed in these two forms of
differentiation seems precisely analogous. As a result, the Court's decision to extend judicial protection to whites while denying the same
protection to racial minorities discounts the interests of racial minorities in the classic way that legislatures discount minority interests
when they enact discriminatory legislation. Whether acting through
malice or submission to racial stereotyping, the Court has chosen to
value members of the white majority more highly than members of
racial minority groups.354 Stated more directly, when the Supreme
Court was asked to decide who most deserved the class of societal
resources encompassed by the range of affirmative action programs
that will be invalidated under Adarand,the Court chose the white majority as more deserving than racial minorities. And in so doing, the
Court stigmatized racial minorities as second class citizens in precisely
the way that Brown held to be unconstitutional under the equal protection principle.
In sum, the Supreme Court's inversion of the concepts of affirmative action and discrimination enabled the Court to invalidate some
as-yet unspecified number of future race-based affirmative action programs. This was an official act of pervasive racial discrimination that
both diverted resources from racial minorities to the white majority
and stigmatized racial minorities as inferior to whites. The Supreme
Court's act of racial discrimination is made painfully derisive by the
tation-reinforcement theory as the prevailing justification for judicial review. See generally EsKriDO & FRiCKEY, supra note 337, at 367-98.
354. See ELY, supra note 29, at 155-60 (discussing legislative discounting of racial minority
interests resulting from racial stereotyping and generalizations).
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fact it occurred in the course of a Supreme Court proclamation that
such official acts of pervasive racial discrimination no longer exist in
contemporary culture. This is one respect in which Adarand is selfcontradictory, but it is not the only respect. Ironically, Adarand is also
a judicially activist decision issued by a Supreme Court that condemns
judicial activism.
B.

Irony

The Supreme Court's decision in Adarand expands judicial power
in the formulation of race-relations policy. It does so by replacing the
traditional strict-scrutiny standard of judicial review, which had always
been fatal in equal protection cases, with a new version of strict scrutiny that a majority of the Court states is not necessarily fatal. This
means that the ultimate validity of any affirmative action program will
be determined by the discretionary preferences of the Court. This
shift in the power to make race-relations policy from the representative branches of government to the Supreme Court constitutes a form
of judicial activism that is mirrored in other decisions by the present
Court, and which has traditionally been identified with the doctrine of
judicial restraint. The Court's expansion of judicial power is particularly ironic because it has occurred in a doctrinal context in which the
governing principle is political rather than judicial in nature. As a result, the formulation of race-relations policy by the Supreme Court
seems both undemocratic and illegitimate.
Adarand holds that all racial classifications, including benign affirmative action programs, are subject to strict judicial scrutiny under
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, or the
equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment, whether they
are federal, state, or local programs.355 To satisfy strict scrutiny, a
racial classification must advance a compelling governmental interest
and be narrowly tailored to the advancement of that interest. 5 6 The
Court first held that strict scrutiny applied to racial classifications during World War II, when it applied strict scrutiny to the racial classifications that the federal government had used to impose curfew and
355. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2112-13 (1995) (applying strict
scrutiny to all racial classifications); see also id. at 2107-08 (citing Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
(1954) for the proposition that the Fifth Amendment contains an equal protection component
that applies to the federal government).
356. See id. at 2107-08.
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exclusion orders on Japanese-American citizens.3 57 Nevertheless, in
the midst of the wartime hysteria that followed the Japanese bombing
of Pearl Harbor, the Court upheld the constitutionality of those classifications, notwithstanding the strict scrutiny to which they had been
subjected.3 5 8 Since that time, however, the Supreme Court has never
upheld the constitutionality of a racial classification that it subjected
to strict scrutiny, thereby prompting Justice Marshall to term strict
scrutiny "strict in theory, but fatal in fact. ' 359 Before Adarand, therefore, strict scrutiny was a determinate constitutional standard.
Although there could be uncertainty about whether strict scrutiny ap-

plied, 6° once it was determined that strict scrutiny did apply, the racial classification at issue was held to be unconstitutional in violation
of the Equal Protection Clause.
Adarand has, at least nominally, given new content to the old
strict scrutiny standard. Although the language of the strict scrutiny
test remains the same, Justice O'Connor's opinion in Adarand emphasizes that strict scrutiny should no longer be viewed as "fatal in
fact. '3 6 1 As a result, the new strict scrutiny test increases the amount

357. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214,216 (1944) (deeming racial classifications
"immediately suspect" and applying "most rigid scrutiny"); cf. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320
U.S. 81 (1943) (terming classifications based upon ancestry to be "by their nature odious to a
free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality"); see also Adarand,
115 S. Ct. at 2106-08 (discussing Korematsu and Hirabayashi).
358. See Korematsu, 323 U. S. at 219-20 (upholding exclusion order after strict scrutiny as
proper exercise of wartime authority); cf Hirabayashi,320 U.S. at 100-02 (upholding curfew
after nominal reasonableness scrutiny as proper exercise of wartime authority); see also
Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2106-08 (discussing Korematsu and Hirabayashi). Korematsu and Hirabayashi are now generally regarded as the products of wartime hysteria, and the results reached in
those cases are widely discredited. See, e.g., Adarand, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2106, 2117 (criticizing
result in Korematsu); id. at 2121 (Stevens, J. dissenting) (criticizing the results in Korematsu and
Hirabayashi);STONE ET AL., supra note 31, at 572.

359. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment) (strict scrutiny is "strict in theory, but fatal in fact"); see also STONE ET AL., supra note 31,
at 572 (Korematsu is the last case in which the Supreme Court upheld a racial classification after
the application strict scrutiny, and the decision has been widely criticized).
360. See supra Part I(C)(1) (discussing the Court's difficulty in arriving at the appropriate
standard of review for affirmative action).
361. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2117 ("[W]e wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is
,strict in theory, but fatal in fact."'). Upholding a racial classification despite having strictly scrutinized it now appears to be an option for the Court. Justice Scalia was one of the five justices
who signed this portion of Justice O'Connor's opinion, see id at 2101 (listing votes of justices),
but he joined Justice O'Connor's opinion "except insofar as it may be inconsistent with" the
views expressed in his concurrence. See id. at 2118 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring
in judgment). Justice Scalia's concurrence went on to stress that "[i]n my view, government can
never have a 'compelling interest' in discriminating on the basis of race in order to 'make up' for
past racial discrimination in the opposite direction." See h. at 2118 (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and concurring in judgment). Even if Justice Scalia still believes that strict scrutiny is fatal in
fact, however, the Adarand dissenters appear willing to uphold otherwise acceptable affirmative
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of discretion that the Supreme Court possesses in ruling on the validity of affirmative action programs. Note that this increase in Supreme
Court discretion exists even if it turns out that the Supreme Court
never upholds an affirmative action program under the new non-fatal
standard. 6 2 Justice O'Connor's mere statement in Adarand that strict
scrutiny is no longer fatal 363 gives the Court the option of upholding a
program whenever it wishes to do so.
The old strict scrutiny test gave the Court limited discretion. In
state and local affirmative action cases, the Court's primary responsibility was to determine what the standard of review would be. This
was a relatively mechanical task. Under the rule that the Court
evolved in Fullilove, Croson, and Metro Broadcasting, strict scrutiny
applied to local programs adopted by states and municipalities, and
intermediate scrutiny applied to federal programs adopted by Congress.3 6 Accordingly, the Court had only to characterize an affirmative action program as congressional or local in order to determine the
appropriate standard of review. Because the applicable standard of
review was determined by the type of the program at issue, the Court
had limited discretion in characterizing the program. Because the
strict scrutiny that applied to local programs was fatal, characterization of a program largely ended the case.
The Court had considerably more discretion in ruling on congressional programs. The intermediate scrutiny test that applied to those
programs required the Court to determine whether a congressional
program was "substantially" related to an "important" government interest. 365 Under the new, non-fatal strict scrutiny standard, the
Supreme Court has the same sort of discretion in ruling on all affirmative action programs that it had in ruling on congressional programs
under the old intermediate scrutiny standard. Now, it is never sufficient for the Court to make a status determination of the type that
used to be dispositive in local cases. Rather, the Court must now always make a determination about how "compelling" a governmental
action programs under the strict scrutiny standard. See supra text accompanying notes 123-42
(discussing various positions of justices on the question of whether strict scrutiny is necessarily
fatal).
362. See supra text accompanying notes 123-142 (discussing whether new strict scrutiny will
actually be fatal or non-fatal).
363. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2117 (holding that strict scrutiny is not fatal in fact).
364. See id. at 2108-12 (discussing the evolution of affirmative action standards of review);
see also supra Part I(C)(1) (discussing the standard of review).
365. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 564 (1990) (describing the intermediate scrutiny test).
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interest is, and how "narrowly tailored" a program is to that interest.366 Such determinations are obviously very subjective, leaving considerable latitude for judicial discretion. That means that the Court
on affirmative action than it had
now has broader discretion in 3ruling
67
prior to the Adarand decision.
This expansion of judicial power over the formulation of racerelations policy corresponds to similar expansions of judicial power by
the present Supreme Court that have occurred in other areas. In
United States v. Lopez,36 8 the Court changed the operative test for
determining the scope of congressional power under the Constitution
to regulate interstate commerce.3 69 Since 1937 the Supreme Court
had upheld all challenged exercises of congressional authority under
the Commerce Clause.3 7° Although the linguistic test for determining
the scope of the commerce power was whether the activity being regulated "affected" or "substantially affected" interstate commerce, the
outcome had always been the same,3 7 ' just as the outcome in strict
scrutiny equal protection cases had always been the same before
Adarand.37 2 This fifty-eight year history of uniform deferential interpretation of the commerce power occurred because in the decades
preceding that uniform test, the Court had been unable to formulate a
workable standard for Commerce Clause interpretation that stopped
short of total deference. 373 Nevertheless, in Lopez the same five-tofour Court that decided Adarand held that the Commerce Clause did
not authorize Congress to criminalize possession of a gun in a school
zone, because such possession had an insufficient connection to interstate commerce. 374 As a result, it is no longer clear what the scope of
366. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113 (describing the strict scrutiny test).
367. Ironically, there is a sense in which the Supreme Court's abandonment of fatal strict
scrutiny may have increased the Supreme Court's formal power, while actually decreasing its
operational power. Because strict scrutiny is no longer necessarily fatal, strict scrutiny has become less determinate, and therefore, a less useful tool for Supreme Court supervision of lower
court behavior. Now, the Supreme Court will have to grant review in order to reverse lower
court decisions upholding affirmative action programs of which the Court disapproves, whereas
those decisions might never have been rendered under a fatal strict-scrutiny standard.
368. United States v. Lopez. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
369. The Constitution gives Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce. See U.S.
CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
370. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1627-29 (discussing the Commerce Clause cases decided since
1937).

371. See id.
372. See supra text accompanying notes 359-60 (describing the old strict scrutiny test).
373. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1652-53 (Souter, J., dissenting) (discussing the early commerce
clause cases).

374. See id. at 1626 (stating facts and holding).
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congressional power is under the Commerce Clause.3 75 The Supreme
Court will have to make this determination by ascertaining what "substantially affects" interstate commerce in particular cases.376
The Court's well-known decision reaffirming a modified right to
abortion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey3 7 7 also entailed an expansion of judicial policymaking power.
378
Before Casey, the Supreme Court's 1973 decision in Roe v. Wade
recognized a right to abortion that was governed by a viability standard that was typically implemented through a relatively mechanical
trimester test.379 In Casey, however, the joint opinion of Justices

O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter rejected the trimester framework in
favor of a more nebulous "undue burden" test, 8 0 thereby expanding

the role for the judiciary to play in the regulation of abortion. Likewise, the Court's most recent decisions under the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment have apparently rejected the tradi-

tional three-part test of Lemon v. Kurtzman,38 1 but curiously have not
substituted a replacement test.382 As a result, the Supreme Court has
granted itself very broad discretionary power, because it is simply announcing results without articulating a governing test.383 In its recent
voting rights cases, the Court has also increased the scope of its discretionary power. In Shaw, the Court created a new cause of action for
375. Cf. id. at 1633 (noting but minimizing the significance of the uncertainty inherent in the
Court's new test).
376. See id. at 1630 (adopting "substantially affects" test for scope of congressional commerce power). Professor Powell has stressed that the Framers' federalism goals, which the
Supreme Court claimed to be pursuing in Lopez, cannot be realized through interpretation of
the Commerce Clause alone and has demonstrated how the Lopez majority's endorsement of a
broad congressional spending power is inconsistent with the concept of federalism on which the
Lopez decision purports to rest. See H. Jefferson Powell, Enumerated Means and Unlimited
Ends, 94 MicH. L. REv. 651 (1995).
377. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S.Ct. 2791 (1992).
378. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
379. See id. at 162-66 (adopting the trimester test).
380. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2816-17 (substituting the "undue burden" test for the trimester
framework).
381. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (adopting three-part test for determining Establishment Clause violations).
382. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510, 2521-25
(1995) (discussing general principles in Establishment Clause cases without.applying Lemon v.
Kurtzman test or adopting a substitute test); Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v.
Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481, 2487-93 (1994); Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2655 (1992) (explicitly
declining to specify the governing legal standard for Establishment Clause claims).
383. Cf Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967) (First Amendment obscenity case in which
the Supreme Court was unable to articulate definition of obscenity to which a majority of the
Court could subscribe, spawning a series of per curiam reversals whenever five members of the
Court deemed the speech at issue not to be obscene). See generally STONE ET AL, supra note 31,
at 1211 (describing Redrup procedure).
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racially motivated assignment to a voting district, 384 thereby creating a
new opportunity for judicial intervention into the voter apportionment process. And in Miller, the Court held that the new cause of
action existed only where racial considerations "predominate,""3 8
thereby giving the Court broad discretion in the regulation of this new
cause of action. As Jenkins indicates, the Court's recent school desegregation cases have introduced the concept of a partially unitary
school system that can be deemed "desegregated" even though it is all
black and its students have lower achievement levels than white
students.

386

The Court's recent fondness for broad discretionary power is
noteworthy because it comes from a politically conservative Court
that is generally associated with a commitment to judicial restraint.38 7
Political conservatives are thought to favor judicial restraint precisely
because judicial policymaking is viewed as less defensible than policymaking by politically accountable bodies. 3 1 Accordingly, political
conservatives tend to be strict constructionists, in the belief that close
adherence to the text of the Constitution or the intent of the Framers
will minimize the need for judicial discretion, which can degenerate
into judicial policymaking.3 80 Justice Scalia has even opposed judicial
384. See supra text accompanying notes 300-01 (discussing Shaw).
385. See supra text accompanying notes 298-99 (discussing Miller).
386. See supra text accompanying notes 275-77 (discussing Jenkins).
387. See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, The Mysterious Mr. Rehnquist; Where Is the ChiefJustice Going
and Who Will follow? WASH. POST, Nov. 25, 1994, at C1 (discussing political conservatism of
Supreme Court and judicial restraint); Linda Greenhouse, Gavel Rousers, Farewell to the Old
Order in the Court, N.Y. TIMES, JULY 2, 1995, § 4, at 1; David O'Brien, The Nation; The
Supreme Court; On Race-Rehnquist's Been Waiting 40 Years, L.A. TIMES, May 8, 1995, at 2;
Jeffrey Rosen, Terminated U.S. Supreme Court Overturns States' Congressional Term Limits:
Court Watch, NEw REpuBauc, June 12, 1995, at 12; Herman Schwartz, United States v. Lopez;
The Feds Lose a Piece of Their Rock; Court Tries to Patrola PoliticalLine, LEGAL TIMES, May 8,
1995, at 25.
388. See Lino A. Graglia, Constitutional Interpretation,44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 631, 637-40
(1993) (arguing that lack of judicial restraint has resulted in Supreme Court enactment of
"ACLU agenda" that the ACLU could not get enacted through the political process); Morton
Horwitz, Forward: The Constitution of Change: Legal Fundamentally Without Fundamentalism,
107 HARV. L. REV. 30, 32-41 (1993) (discussing the threat to judicial legitimacy entailed in judicial policy making). See generally Symposium, A Constitutional Bicentennial Celebration: The
Role of the Supreme Court, 47 MD. L. REV. 147 (1987) (discussing judicial activism and judicial
restraint).
389. See Graglia, supra note 388, at 631-37 (arguing that liberal judicial activism has resulted
in Supreme Court's adoption of policy preferences that are not contained in Constitution); Horwitz, supra note 388, at 32-41 (noting the difficulty faced by the post-Warren conservative
Supreme Court in overruling liberal Warren Court precedents without losing its legitimacy);
Christopher E. Smith & Avis A. Jones, The Rehnquist Court'sActivism andthe Risk of Injustice,
26 Coreri. L. REV. 53-59 (1993) (discussing judicial activism and judicial restraint); cf. William
Wayne Justice, The Two Faces of JudicialActivism, 61 F.W. L REV. 11 (1987) (discussing feder-
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recourse to legislative history when statutory language is clear, to minimize opportunities for judicial discretion. 390 Many commentators

have recognized that political conservatives can meaningfully be characterized as proponents of judicial activism when they advocate judi391
cial invalidation of a policy choice made by the political branches.
Others have questioned the utility of terms such as judicial activism
and judicial restraint because of the imprecision of those terms and
their susceptibility to manipulation. 392 Nevertheless, it is striking that
from justices
recent increases in Supreme Court discretion have come
39 3
restraint.
judicial
their
on
themselves
pride
often
who
The Court's recent fondness for broad discretionary power is also
noteworthy because of the very limited doctrinal guidance that the
Court will have in interpreting the imprecise language that is the
source of its discretionary power. Reasonable people can differ in
their opinions about what is "compelling" and what constitutes "narrow tailoring," and there is no objective standard that can be consulted in order to ascertain the meaning of those terms. As is
frequently the case, the linguistic terms themselves do little to convey
a determinate meaning. In such circumstances, legal doctrine typically
relies upon some form of functional analysis to deal with the problem

alism issues that arise when judicial activism is exercised at the remedy stage, permitting federal
courts to run state institutions). See generally Symposium, supra note 388 (discussing judicial
activism and judicial restraint).
390. See, e.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527-30 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in judgment) (objecting to use of legislative history); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480
U.S. 421, 452-55 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment); Hirschey v. FERC, 777 F.2d. 1, 6-8
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J., concurring); cf. Horwitz, supra note 388, at 95 (discussing other
aspects of Justice Scalia's aversion to judicial activism); Smith & Jones, supra note 389, at 56
(discussing Justice Scalia's views on judicial restraint).
391. See Justice, supra note 389, at 6 (discussing political activism of the Rehnquist Court
despite its identification as a conservative Court favoring judicial restraint); Smith & Jones,
supra note 389, at 53-58, 62-66, 76-77; Mark V. Tushnet, Comment on Archibald Cox, The Role
of the Supreme Court, Judicial Activism or Self-Restraint, 47 Mo. L. REv. 147, 148-50 (1987)
(arguing that judicial activism need not be limited to liberals); see also Biskupic, supra note 387,
at C1 (discussing the judicial activism of a politically conservative Supreme Court); Greenhouse,
supra note 387, § 4, at 1; O'Brien, supra note 387, at 2; Rosen, supra note 387, at 12; Schwartz,
supra note 387, at 25.
392. See Tushnet, supra note 391, at 147, 153 (linguistic terms used by the Court have too
many meanings to be useful for other than political purposes); Justice, supra note 389, at 3-5, 13
(judicial activism consists of something to which one is politically opposed).
393. See Smith & Jones, supra note 389, at 53-58, 62-66, 76-77 (noting disjunction between
Rehnquist Court's purported judicial restraint and its actual judicial activism); see also Biskupic,
supra note 387, at Cl (discussing judicial activism of politically conservative Supreme Court);
Greenhouse, supra note 387, § 4, at 1; O'Brien, supra note 387, at 2; Rosen, supra note 387, at 12;
Schwartz, supra note 387, at 25.
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of linguistic indeterminacy.3 94 Linguistic ambiguities are resolved in a
manner that best advances the purpose of the legal provision under
consideration. In the context of affirmative action, however, not even
the doctrinal function that the strict scrutiny standard is intended to
serve offers any assistance in giving that standard meaning. This is be-

cause the Supreme Court's affirmative action decisions are not sufficiently coherent to permit any governing principle to emerge. Rather,
the Court's cases are internally inconsistent and externally conflicting.
There are two fundamental problems with the Supreme Court's
affirmative action jurisprudence that make the Court's decisions difficult to defend. First, the Court has never adequately explained why
the Equal Protection Clause, which is the basis for the Supreme
Court's constitutional scrutiny of affirmative action programs, should
apply to whites claiming governmental discrimination in a white-majority country.39 5 Although there is nothing in the language of the
Fourteenth Amendment to prevent such an application, 396 neither the
intent of the Framers, nor the prevailing representation-reinforcement
theory of judicial review would permit an extension of the equal protection guarantee to whites in such circumstances, because whites are
neither former black slaves nor members of a politically underrepresented, discrete and insular minority group.397 Second, the
Court's frequently repeated insistence that the equal protection guarantee applies to individuals and not to groups 398 is less than self-evidently correct in the context of racial discrimination, because racial
discrimination is inherently directed at groups rather than at individu-

394. See, e.g., Church of Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892) (broad statutory language should be interpreted in a manner consistent with the statutory purpose); see also
Harold D. Laswell & Myres S. McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional
Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203 (1943) (contending that the law should serve
public policy functions); Girardeau A. Spann, Functional Analysis of the Plain-ErrorRule, 71
GEO. L.J. 945, 979-82 (1983) (functional analysis is an appropriate response to doctrinal
indeterminacy).
395. See SPANN, supra note 5, at 132 (arguing that it is unclear why the white majority needs
Supreme Court protection from affirmative action programs adopted by the white majority).
396. "No State shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (applying equally to all races).
397. See SPANN, supra note 5, at 132 (discussing doctrinal difficulty of extending equal protection guarantee to whites).
398. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2112-13 (1995) (holding
that the right to be free from racial discrimination is individual rather than a group right (citing
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 299 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.) (citing
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948))); Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 602,
609-10 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-94 (opinion of O'Connor, J.).
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als. 399 These are fundamental difficulties with the Court's equal pro-

tection jurisprudence that have been debated elsewhere. 40 0 But, the
Court's 1994 Term cases raise additional problems that make it even
more difficult to view the Court's position on affirmative action as
coherent.
The Supreme Court's decision in Adarand holds that the ten percent bonus that the federal government gives to contractors who hire
minority subcontractors is constitutionally suspect, and that it violates
the equal protection guarantee unless it can be shown to survive strict
scrutiny. 4"° This is because the equal protection guarantee gives white
subcontractors an individual right not to be discriminated against by
the government on the basis of their race.40 2 But it is unclear why the
bonus program in Adarand should be viewed as racial discrimination.
Rather, it is simply an exercise of the congressional spending power in
a way that is designed to encourage behavior of which Congress
approves. 0 3
It is clear that Congress may use the spending power selectively
to encourage or discourage private conduct of which it approves or
disapproves. °' It is also now clear that such selective spending does
not violate the Constitution even when it burdens an individual constitutional right. The abortion funding cases illustrate the scope of this
congressional power. In Harris v. McRae40 5 and Maher v. Roe,40 6 the
Supreme Court held that Congress could use its Medicaid program to
fund childbirth without funding abortions, and that such selective
funding did not violate either the substantive due process right to
abortion or the equal protection prohibition on discrimination against
fundamental rights.40 7
399. See SPANN, supra note, 5 at 120, 123 (discussing individual versus group nature of discrimination and affirmative action).
400. See id. at 119-49 and commentators cited therein (discussing affirmative action).
401. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2102-04 (describing bonus program); id. at 2118 (remanding

for strict scrutiny).
402. See id. at 2111 (emphasizing the individual nature of the equal protection right).
403. The Constitution grants Congress the power to spend for the general welfare. See U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
404. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65-66 (1936) (Congress has power to spend for

purposes that it deems to advance general welfare).
405.

Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).

406. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
407. See Harris,448 U.S. at 312-18 (holding that congressional restriction on the use of federal Medicaid funds for most abortions does not violate Due Process Clause); id. at 321-23;
Maher, 432 U.S. at 469-77 (holding that state restrictions on the use of Medicaid funds for most
abortions does not discriminate against the fundamental right to an abortion).
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Why, then, is the congressional decision to encourage the hiring
of minority subcontractors in Adarand not deemed an equally valid
exercise of the congressional spending power? It imposes no more of
a burden on white contractors seeking subcontracts than the abortion
funding restrictions imposed on women wishing to exercise their constitutional right to abortion. If anything, the Adarand bonus is less
offensive than the abortion restrictions. The abortion funding cases
involved two constitutional rights: the due process right to abortion
and the equal protection right not to be discriminated against for exercising a fundamental right. Adarand,however, involved only one constitutional right: the right not to be discriminated against on the basis
of race. In Adarand there was no constitutional right to a construction
contract that was analogous to the right to abortion in the abortion
funding cases. The Supreme Court's failure to mention-let alone distinguish-its abortion funding cases in its affirmative action decisions,
despite their different resolutions of similar constitutional issues, undermines the coherence of whatever principle the Supreme Court believes that it is applying in the affirmative action cases.
A similar incoherence emerges when Adarand is compared to
Miller, the voter apportionment case that the Court decided a few
weeks after Adarand. °8 In Miller, the Court held that when race is
the predominant factor in drawing voting district lines, the voting districts are constitutionally suspect and subject to strict equal protection
scrutiny.40 9 When race is not the predominant factor but is simply one
of several factors taken into account in drawing district lines, a voter
apportionment scheme is not a racial classification that triggers strict
scrutiny.4"' If the Miller reasoning is applied to the Adarand statutory
scheme, an intractable problem emerges.
The presumption of minority social and economic disadvantage
contained in the Small Business and Surface Transportation Acts, was
the source of the constitutional problem that triggered strict scrutiny
in Adarand.4 1 x If Congress were to amend those statutes so that, in
addition to the presumption of minority disadvantage, the statute also
contained presumptions of disadvantage extending to women, individ408. See supra text accompanying notes 298-99 (discussing the Miller decision).
409. See Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2488, 2490 (1995) (adopting "predominant factor"
test).
410. See id. at 2488 (holding that where race does not dominate traditional districting principles, district lines are not considered gerrymandered, and strict scrutiny does not apply).
411. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2103-05 (1995) (focusing on
the rebuttable presumption of minority social and economic disadvantage).
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uals with physical impairments, veterans, and individuals with nontraditional sexual preferences, the Supreme Court's precedents seem
to preclude the possibility of any ruling on the constitutionality of the
amended statute. If Miller controls, the amended statute would appear
to be constitutional, because race would not "predominate" in the
congressional presumption of social and economic disadvantage but
would simply be one of five factors that Congress considered. Miller
would seem to compel the conclusion that the presumption, considered as an aggregation of component presumptions, was not a racial
preference. Accordingly, strict scrutiny would not apply. But that cannot possibly be the correct result. It would permit racial discrimination to sneak by uncorrected simply because of its association with
other classifications that do not trigger strict scrutiny.412 Yet, the conclusion that the amended presumption would be unconstitutional is
equally problematic.
It is possible to view the hypothetical amended presumption as a
series of five independent presumptions rather than as a single set of
presumptions that must be analyzed in the aggregate. So viewed, it is
then possible to isolate the racial presumption for strict scrutiny without strictly scrutinizing the four other presumptions, because only the
racial presumption involves a suspect classification that triggers strict
scrutiny. This saves Adarand from the neutralizing effects of Miller,
but it does so at the cost of implicating the Supreme Court in yet another act of racial discrimination. If the Supreme Court were to isolate the presumption benefiting racial minorities from the four other
presumptions included in the amended statutes, the Supreme Court
would be imposing on that presumption the special burdens of strict
scrutiny that it did not impose on the four presumptions that benefited
whites. When legislatures have imposed special burdens on programs
that benefit racial minorities without imposing those same burdens on
programs that benefit whites, the Supreme Court has invalidated
those special burdens as unconstitutionally discriminatory under the
Equal Protection Clause.413 Accordingly, if the Supreme Court were
412. In this regard, note that under the facts of the actual Adarand case, the Small Business

Act extends the presumption of disadvantaged status to groups, other than racial minorities, who
are designated from time to time by the Small Business Administration. See id. at 2103. In
addition, the Surface Transportation Act extends the presumption of disadvantaged status to
women. See id. at 2103; supra note 241. Note also that Miller seems to let race "sneak by uncorrected" simply because of its association with other districting principles that do not trigger strict
scrutiny. Accordingly, either Adarand or Miller must be wrong; they cannot peacefully co-exist.
413. See, e.g., Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982) (invalidating statewide initiative that effectively required passage of a statewide counter-initiative to authorize
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similarly to single out the presumption that benefited racial minorities
for strict scrutiny, it would be guilty of the very same equal protection
violation that it invalidates when committed by legislatures. Again,
because there is no doctrinally acceptable way to reconcile Adarand
and Miller, it is difficult to have confidence in the Supreme Court's
resolution of either case.
A third incoherence in the Supreme Court's approach to affirmative action can be uncovered by comparing Adarand to Rosenbergerv.
Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia,"' which was also decided a few weeks after Adarand. In Rosenberger, a religiously oriented student organization sought funding for a campus publication
from a student activity fund available for general student activities,
but the University denied the requested funding.4 15 The Supreme
Court held-once again, with the same five-to-four majority that decided Adarand-that the University was required to fund the student
publication because a denial of funding would constitute viewpoint
discrimination that violated the First Amendment rights of the students.4 16 The Court also held that the University's student activity
fund was sufficiently neutral that funding by the University would not
Clause of the First Amendment by supportviolate the Establishment
4 17
ing religion.
Rosenberger and Adarand involved the same basic constitutional
problem, but the two cases arrived at contradictory results. Both
cases concerned the government's obligation to remain neutral in the
operation of a funding program that the government had adopted in
order to advance constitutionally permissible goals. In Rosenberger,
the government adopted a program to fund publications run by students, and in Adarand the government adopted a program to fund
busing as a remedy for local de facto school segregation, where the normal legislative process
was adequate to authorize all other local legislative actions); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385
(1969) (invalidating city charter provision requiring a voter referendum to authorize fair housing ordinances, where the normal legislative process was adequate to authorize all other types of
ordinances). But cf. Crawford v. Board of Educ., 458 U.S. 527 (1982) (companion case to Seattle
Sch. Dist. No. 1, upholding state constitutional amendment that prohibited busing as remedy for
de facto school segregation, where busing remained available to remedy other pertinent legal
violations). To the extent that one views Crawford as indistinguishable from Seattle School District No. I and Hunter v. Erickson, the principle underlying the Supreme Court's decisions in
Adarandand Miller appears to be even less coherent.
414. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
415. See id. at 2510, 2513-16 (stating the facts of case).
416. See id. at 2523-24 (refusal to fund violates First Amendment).
417. See id. at 2523 (honoring First Amendment obligation does not violate the Establishment Clause).
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construction companies run by disadvantaged contractors. Both cases
also involved the funding of a minority group. In Rosenberger, the
minority group was the group of students who sought to publish religious views rather than the non-religious views published by the majority of students. In Adarand, the minority group was the group of
contractors who sought funding under a racial presumption of disadof disvantaged status rather than under the non-racial presumptions
4 18
advantaged status that were available to the white majority.
In Rosenberger, the Supreme Court held that the government's
obligation to remain neutral required it to fund the minority publication, because a failure to do so would constitute viewpoint discrimination prohibited by the First Amendment. In Adarand, the Court held
that the government's obligation to remain neutral prohibitedit from
funding the minority contractors because such funding would constitute racial discrimination prohibited by the equal protection principle.
The two cases reached results that were diametrically opposed to each
other concerning the way in which a government must act in order to
satisfy its constitutional obligation to remain neutral. The only doctrinal difference that existed between the two cases was that one involved First Amendment viewpoint discrimination, and the other
involved equal protection racial discrimination. But that difference
seems inconsequential, because both types of discrimination trigger
the very same strict constitutional scrutiny.
The reason that Rosenberger and Adarand can both follow logically acceptable lines of analysis and yet arrive at contrary conclusions
is that the concept of discrimination-like the concept of equality itself-does not have any content until it is linked to a normative judgment about what sorts of conduct are desirable and undesirable.4 19
Forming the linkage is a highly indeterminate act, turning on deeply
contestable, normative preferences. Therefore, if the Supreme Court
has different normative feelings about government conduct in two different cases, the Court can manipulate the same non-discrimination
rule to accommodate those different normative feelings. Indeed, the
Court must do so, because the non-discrimination rule has no content
until the Court links it to a normative value.
418. Remember, the Adarand presumption also applied to women and other non-racial
groups that the Small Business Administration could select from time to time. See Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2103 (1995).
419. Cf. Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REv. 537 (1982) (stating
that the idea of equality is meaningless without the infusion of a normative standard against
which equality can be determined).
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Accordingly, if the government eliminates religious publications
or minority contractors from a funding program, it is discriminating
against the groups that it has chosen to eliminate. If, however, the
government adds religious publications or minority contractors to a
funding program, it is discriminating in favor of the groups that it has
chosen to add. Characterization of a governmental action as discriminatory or non-discriminatory, therefore, turns once again on the baseline that is selected as the starting point for analysis.4 20 No baseline
can be "natural" or "correct," because the operative baseline is a
function of how the problem is perceived. Accordingly, if one views
Adarand as involving a new program created to give a government
subsidy to minority contractors, the program looks like a program that
discriminates in favor of racial minorities and against whites. But if
one moves the baseline back in time to the point at which the government created its range of subsidy programs for white defense contractors, oil companies, tobacco growers and the like, but failed to include
a similar subsidy for minority construction contractors, then the
Adarand program looks like affirmative action that compensates for
past discrimination. The non-discrimination doctrine will not have
any content until the Supreme Court makes this baseline determination, and the baseline determination cannot be made until the Court
makes a normative judgment.
It follows that when the Supreme Court expands judicial power,
as it did in Adarand by replacing fatal strict scrutiny with potentially
non-fatal strict scrutiny, the Court also expands the need for the normative judicial judgments necessary to give content to the legal doctrines that the Court applies. Because these judgments are ultimately
normative rather than doctrinal in nature, an expansion of judicial
power also constitutes an expansion of the degree to which the normative preferences of the representative branches are supplanted by the
normative preferences of Court.

420. This is the same phenomenon that made it possible to show that Adarand conflicted
with Miller and the abortion funding cases. See supra text accompanying notes 408-10 (discussing conflict between Adarand and Miller); supra text accompanying notes 404-07 (discussing
conflict between Adarand and abortion funding cases). The baselines for analysis were simply
shifted in order to expose latent conflicts that are not apparent when different baselines are
selected. Moreover, it is this same latent baseline ambiguity that made it impossible to draw an
objective distinction between the concepts of affirmative action and discrimination. See supra
text accompanying note 349 (noting the lack of objective distinction between affirmative action
and discrimination).
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Cases like Adarand constitute direct substitutions of Supreme
Court normative preferences for the normative preferences of the representative branches. Such cases make it apparent that the locus of
power in the formulation of race-relations policy has shifted from the
political branches to the Court. As Adarand attests, the political
branches can now formulate race-relations policy only in the manner
that the Supreme Court deems appropriate. Such a shift in power
might make sense if the Court were applying doctrinal principles that
had to be insulated from political infection. But, as has been shown,
the non-discrimination principle that the Court purports to apply
when it invalidates affirmative action programs does not have principled content requiring insulation from political influence. Rather, the
non-discrimination principle must derive its meaning from the political preferences to which it is linked. This suggests that the shift in
race-relations policymaking power from the representative branches
to the Court is undemocratic, and that the Court's invalidation of affirmative action plans adopted by the representative branches of government is illegitimate. Justice Ginsburg was certainly correct in her
Adarand dissent when she argued that the affirmative action debate
was best left to the political branches for resolution. a2 ' The affirmative action debate is a debate in which the Supreme Court simply has
no legitimate role to play.
CONCLUSION
The practical implications of the Supreme Court's decision in
Adarand may well be unremarkable. Even under a strong reading of
the case, in which strict scrutiny remains fatal scrutiny, the decision
may come to mean little more than that government entities wishing
to adopt affirmative action programs will have to restructure their
programs to create preferences for individuals who suffer social or
economic disadvantage, without making explicit reference to race as a
proxy for such disadvantage. Restructured programs will still be able
to provide primary assistance to racial minorities, because racial minorities are overrepresented among the ranks of the disadvantaged,
and the Supreme Court has stressed that a mere racially disparate impact will not suffice to establish an equal protection violation. As a
practical matter, therefore, Adarand may mean only that government
entities will be forced to incur the additional administrative expenses
421. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2134 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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entailed in seeking to identify disadvantaged individuals without using
race as a proxy.42 2
The aspect of Adarand that is most noteworthy is not its practical
consequence but its rhetorical content. The Supreme Court's holding
that a congressional presumption of minority disadvantage is constitutionally suspect constitutes a proclamation by the Supreme Court that
systemic racial discrimination no longer exists in the United States.
There is a palpable divergence between the doctrinal world from
which the Court issued its Adarand proclamation and the world of
ordinary experience, in which racial minorities remain conspicuously
underrepresented in the allocation of societal resources. In fact, the
divergence is so palpable that one cannot help but wonder what could
have motivated the Court to insist on such an artificial depiction of
contemporary culture.
It is logically possible for the Court to have concluded that the
discriminatory forces historically at play in American culture have
now ceased to exist and that over time discrepancies in the allocation
of resources will disappear so long as the culture remains committed
to the principle of prospective race neutrality. It is difficult, however,
to imagine that anyone sincerely believes such an argument. It is the
same argument that opponents of racial equality made in opposition
to remedial Reconstruction legislation, in support of separate-butequal facilities under Plessy, and in support of de facto segregated
schools in the wake of Brown. And the argument seems no more
plausible today than it did when the Supreme Court accepted it in
those three prior contexts. The contention that racial minorities will,
in a race-neutral environment, eventually be able to overcome the historic head start that the white majority has been given in the competition for societal resources requires one to believe that racial
minorities are better qualified than members of the white majority to
compete for societal resources. It is unlikely, however, that the
Supreme Court embraces this view. As a result, the suggestion that
racial neutrality will someday produce racial equality seems more like
422. In addition to the administrative costs of restructuring affirmative action programs to be
disadvantage-based programs, Adarand may result in a reallocation of affirmative action resources among racial minorities. Wealthy minority individuals and firms may no longer be eligible for preferential treatment under disadvantage-based affirmative action programs. This
outcome may be normatively acceptable, although it seems important to remember that successful minority firms can still be the victims of racial discrimination despite the fact that they might
not qualify for preferential treatment under subsistence income redistribution programs.
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a rationalization than a genuine account of Supreme Court
motivation.
It is also possible that the Supreme Court believes that the benefits of prospective neutrality to the society as a whole outweigh the
costs of such neutrality to racial minorities. Although this belief may
be sincere, it is hardly comforting. It reflects a potential discounting
of minority interests that representation-reinforcement judicial review
requires the Court itself to guard against when such discounting is engaged in by the representative branches of government. In the affirmative action context, however, the Supreme Court has now discounted
minority interests more than the representative branches that the
Court is supposed to oversee. Moreover, the institutional history of
the Supreme Court in the context of race relations makes it unrealistic
to suppose that the Court can be counted on to strike a better costbenefit balance than the representative branches have struck between
the competing interests that are implicated in the affirmative action
debate.
Benign accounts of the Supreme Court's motivation in adopting
its Adarand opposition to affirmative action seem either disingenuous
or unrealistic. One is, therefore, prompted to seek alternate accounts
of the Supreme Court's actions. Ultimately, I believe that it is most
realistic to conclude that the Court has been motivated by a form of
racial prejudice that has become too virulent to be mentioned in polite
conversation, but which is widespread in the culture nonetheless. I
believe that a majority of the justices on the Supreme Court believe
that racial minorities are inherently inferior to whites.
Historically, the language of infamous Supreme Court opinions
has revealed unmistakable condescension toward racial minorities in
the attitudes of the justices who wrote those opinions. Justice Taney
in Dred Scott viewed blacks "as beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race. '423 In Plessy, even the
dissenting opinion of Justice Harlan agreed that the white race was
"the dominant race in this country, '424 and added, "So, I doubt not, it
423. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1856). The suggestion that Chief
Justice Taney was merely describing the views of the Framers, rather than adopting those views
as his own, has never rung true. See STONE ET AL., supra note 31, at 480 (suggesting that it might
be unfair to attribute the sentiments expressed in Chief Justice Taney's opinion to Chief Justice
Taney himself). Chief Justice Taney repeated those views too often and with too much relish to
permit the inference that he did not share those views himself. See SPANN, supra note 5, at 96
(arguing that Chief Justice Taney shared views attributed to Framers in Dred Scott).
424. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1986) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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will continue to be for all time, if it remains true to its great heritage."4 2 The Adarand Court dispensed with the inherent-inferiority
language used by its predecessor Courts, but its holding remains
equally condescending. The racial attitude of the Adarand Court can
be uncovered by asking one revealing question. Why was not the presumption of minority disadvantage in Adarand adequately supported
by the stark racial disparity that presently exists in the allocation of
societal resources-the disparity that the Supreme Court goes to such
pains to disregard as the product of non-cognizable, general societal
discrimination?4 2 6 After all, if the society has truly arrived at a postdiscriminatory stage in its cultural evolution, one would expect societal resources to be distributed among racial groups in a way that corresponds to the representation of those groups in the population at
large. By hypothesis, race is irrelevant to the distribution of resources, so a nondiscriminatory distribution should be racially proportional. Why then isn't proportional distribution of societal resources
the proper test for distinguishing racial discrimination from racial
equality?
The answer that is commonly given to this question is that an
insistence on proportional distribution would override considerations
of merit; it would force resources to go to those with the appropriate
complexion rather than to those with the appropriate abilities. Even a
moment's reflection, however, reveals that this cannot be the right answer. If the society were free from racial discrimination, not only societal resources, but merit itself would be distributed proportionally
among racial groups. As a result, an allocation of resources based on
merit would also be an allocation that was racially proportional.
Moreover, a racially disproportionate allocation of societal resources
would be evidence that the society was discriminating on the basis of
race. That discrimination might occur in the way that the society cultivated merit in its members, or in the way that the society defined the
concept of merit. But, one way or the other, racial discrimination
would necessarily exist.
This is the line of reasoning that Congress pursued in its adoption
of the Adarand presumption, viewing the perpetual disadvantage of
racial minorities in the allocation of resources as evidence that discriminatory forces must still be at play in the society. This, however, is
425. Id.
426. See supra text accompanying notes 143-66 (discussing general societal discrimination).
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also the line of reasoning that the Supreme Court read the Constitution to prohibit Congress from adopting, proclaiming that the society
was free from the forces of systemic racial discrimination. The Court
must, therefore, have found some fault in the seemingly straightforward congressional reasoning that led to the Adarand presumption.
There seems to be only one assumption in the congressional reasoning
that could realistically be objected to as faulty. This is the assumption
that merit would be distributed in a racially proportional manner in a
non-discriminatory society. It might be that even after having been
given equal opportunities, racial minorities would convert those opportunities into less merit than their white counterparts. And
although it is possible to conclude, as the Supreme Court appears to
have concluded in Adarand, that merit is not proportionally distributed in a non-discriminatory society, it is possible to reach this conclusion only if one first believes in the inherent inferiority of racial
minorities.
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